

DISSERTATION

CHINA AND TRANSPARENCY NORM DEVELOPMENT
IN GLOBAL EXTRACTIVES GOVERNANCE

Submitted by

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In partial fulfillment of the requirements

For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Fort Collins, Colorado

Summer 2021

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ABSTRACT

CHINA AND TRANSPARENCY NORM DEVELOPMENT IN GLOBAL EXTRACTIVES GOVERNANCE

Growing global demand for extractive resources, such as metals and minerals, particularly to produce low-carbon products, requires international society to develop effective global governance mechanisms to mitigate some of the environmentally and socially negative impacts of mining operations beyond national borders. Since early 2000, several transnational extractive governance initiatives (TEGI) have been established, and these initiatives commonly emphasize a transparency norm to cope with these new global challenges. At the same time, the influence of Chinese actors in global extractive sectors has been increasing along with China's rapid economic growth and rising natural resources demands. Notably, Chinese actors have started engaging in TEGIs and recently appear to take a more active role in global extractives governance. This dissertation examines whether China is a norm-taker or a norm-maker in transparency norm development processes of global extractives governance to understand this new phenomenon. In addition, this research seeks to answer under what conditions China is a norm-taker or a norm-maker and how power matters in transparency norm development.

To date, there has been limited research on transnational extractives governance as an independent governance architecture within the system of global environmental governance. In addition, few International Relations (IR) and global governance scholars have examined China's normative role in global governance. In particular, there is a lack of understanding of China's normative role in "re-shaping" existing norms in global governance. This dissertation aims to fill the gaps in existing scholarship. By applying Acharya's (2018) norm-circulation model emphasizing two-way socialization processes, this dissertation find that Chinese actors take a global transparency norm, localize the norm based on China's local context, then universalize the localized transparency norm at the global level.

Based on qualitative document analysis, semi-structured interviews, and process-tracing, this research includes a mapping exercise of 48 TEGIs and a case study of the Responsible Cobalt Initiative (RCI), a TEGI established by China in 2016 to improve the responsibility of upstream and downstream companies in the cobalt supply chain. The major findings show that Chinese actors act as both a norm-taker and a norm-maker. The mapping analysis shows that they more actively participate in TEGIs emphasizing a thin transparency norm that lacks the disclosure of information about decision-making processes to the public, the presence of an independent third-party auditor in monitoring processes, or the disclosure of the verification information to the public. The RCI case study reveals that the China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals and Chemical Importers and Exporters (CCCMC) acted as a local idea-shifter by localizing a global transparency norm and developing Chinese versions of transparency guidelines. CCCMC is trying to universalize their locally constituted norm at the transnational level through the RCI. China's role in facilitating a thin transparency norm could lead to green- or white-washing of extractive companies, given the less stringent characteristics of a thin transparency norm.

I argue that CCCMC's efforts to universalize the localized Chinese version of transparency is based on their institutional and structural power supported by the Chinese government's sponsorship and its close ties with powerful business actors. These findings, notably, suggest that power facilitates or constrains agency of certain groups of actors seeking to play a norm-maker's role, particularly in a universalization process in Acharya's norm-circulation model. These findings resonate with realist constructivists' understanding of world politics, emphasizing both norms and power, beyond the fragmented paradigmatic debates in IR between realists and constructivists. Collectively, this dissertation contributes to the broader debates in IR and Global Environmental Politics about the rise of China in global governance, global norm development, and legitimacy and accountability of global environmental governance.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would not have been able to complete this dissertation without the incredible support and encouragement of many people. First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Michele Betsill for her dedicated support and guidance. She always passionately shared her professional knowledge and all kinds of academic assets. Her effective mentorship has helped me get through all the academic and personal challenges throughout the research process. Particularly, I could not have completed this project without her consistent caring and patience under the COVID-19 pandemic. She has taught me not only practical research skills but also how to enjoy conducting research as a well-balanced scholar, work together with other scholars, and build supportive academic communities. Second, I would like to thank my committee members for their in-depth insights and generous support to develop this research and help me to thrive as an independent researcher. Third, I would like to thank faculty members, my colleagues, and friends at the Department of Political Science. They sharpened my academic knowledge throughout the courses and discussions, encouraged me always, and gave me unforgettable memories by going through all the ups and downs together on my PhD journey. Fourth, I am grateful to my academic mentors and colleagues of the Earth System Governance (ESG) Network, who expanded my knowledge on global environmental governance and provided practical support for this dissertation by giving insightful feedback and helping me to find proper interviewees. In the ESG community, I could have learned how to connect my research to more diverse and meaningful stories in multiple regions based on a planetary perspective. Fifth, I would like to thank my friends in Colorado, who became my family in the US. Their incredible support, love, and prayers made me feel like Fort Collins is my second home. I also thank my lifelong friends in Korea, Germany, and other countries, who sincerely supported and encouraged me while working on this project. Lastly, I am extremely grateful for my family for their unconditional love always. Their fascinating encouragement made me endure many difficulties in this project. I would not have been able to finish this dissertation without their steadfast support and prayers for so many years.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AIIB - Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
AMV - Africa Mining Vision
ARM - Alliance for Responsible Mining
ASI - Aluminum Stewardship Initiative
BGI - Better Gold Initiative
BRI - Belt and Road Initiative
CBDR - Common but Differentiated Responsibility
CCCMC - China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals and Chemical Importers and Exporters
CDB - Chinese Development Bank
CPC - Communist Party of China
CSR - Corporate Social Responsibility
DI - Devonshire Initiative
DDI - Diamond Development Initiative International
DJS - Dow Jones Sustainability Index
DMCC - Dubai Multi Commodities Centre
DRC - Democratic Republic of the Congo
DSM - Deep Seabed Mining Projects
EIA - Environmental Impact Assessment
EITI - Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EO - Equitable Origin
EP - Equator Principles
EPRM - European Partnership & Responsible Minerals
EU - European Union
EV - Electric Vehicles
FDI - Foreign Direct Investment
FI - Fairmined Initiative
FTSE - FTSE Russell
GBBP - Global Business and Biodiversity Programme
GEG - Global Environmental Governance
GEP - Global Environmental Politics
GeSI - Global e-Sustainability Initiative
GIZ - German Corporation for International Cooperation
GRI - Global Reporting Initiative
GW - Global Witness
G20 - Group of 20
ICMC - International Cyanide Management Code
ICMM - International Council on Mining and Metals
IFC - International Finance Corporation
IGF - Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development
INGO - International Non-governmental Organization
IPE - International Political Economy
IPIECA - International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association
IR - International Relations
IRMA - Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance
ISA - International Seabed Authority Mining Code
ISO - ISO14001 Standard for Environmental Management Systems
ITRI - International Tin Research Institute Tin Supply Chain Initiative

ITS - The International Tin Association Code of Conduct
KIN - Kellogg Innovation Network
KP - Kimberley Process
LBMA - London Bullion Market Association's Program
MOFCOM - Ministry of Commerce, People's Republic of China
MoU - Memorandum of Understanding
NGO - Non-Governmental Organization
OFDI - Outward Foreign Direct Investment
OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PARMT - Public-Private Alliance for Responsible Minerals Trade
PDAC - Prospectors & Developers Association of Canada e3 plus
PWYP - Publish What You Pay
RAGS - Responsible Artisanal Gold Solutions Forum
RBA - Responsible Business Alliance
RCI - Responsible Cobalt Initiative
RJC - Responsible Jewellery Council
RMF - Responsible Mining Foundation
RSTM - Responsible Steel TM
RMDI - Responsible Mineral Development Initiative
RMI - Responsible Minerals Initiative
R2P - Responsibility to Protect
SA8000 - Social Accountability 8000 Standard
SCO - Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SD - Sustainable Development
SHTP - Solutions for Hope Tantalum Project
TEGI - Transnational extractive governance initiatives
TSM - Towards Sustainable Mining
UN - United Nations
UNGC - United Nations Global Compact
UNFCCC - United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
US - United States
VPSHR - Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights
WEF - World Economic Forum
WGC - World Gold Council
WTO - World Trade Organization

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

International society is in urgent need of effective global governance of extractive resources because of growing global demand of critical metals and minerals to produce renewable energy products such as wind, solar, and energy storage batteries to build a low-carbon society (Ali et al. 2017; World Bank 2017). The global consumption of extractive resources is expected to keep increasing along with the current upsurge of clean energy transition policies along with some major economies' carbon neutrality pledges—such as the US, the EU, and China, for the post-COVID 19 era. Meanwhile, most mining sites are concentrated in resource-rich developing countries in Africa and Latin America, and the GDP of those states heavily relies on their extractive resource exports. As resource curse theory (e.g., Badeeb et al. 2017) explains, these resource commodity exports usually do not lead to improved livelihoods of the mining-affected communities due to governments' corruption and ongoing conflicts related to the resources in the regions (Church and Crawford 2018). Unfortunately, the mining boom in the areas caused by the increasing price of some key minerals for new decarbonization technologies has created many social problems, such as child labor in cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and environmental issues like deforestation or water contamination (Sanderson 2019).

Domestic laws and regulations in the mining states have had limited effect in solving these problems because the major stakeholders are both local and foreign actors, and, in many cases, the poor resource-rich countries have a lack of institutional competencies to implement and enforce their policies. For instance, some of the world's leading electric companies and car companies such as Apple, Samsung, Tesla, or BMW have been accused of consuming 'dirty minerals' that cause severe social and environmental harms to the local people and nature in extractive sites (e.g., International Rights Advocates 2019). The global connections among relevant stakeholders beyond a national boundary (e.g., local mining workers, foreign mining and refining companies, electric corporations, and final consumers of their

products) demands transnational policy solutions to supplement the loophole of lax domestic policies in the resource-rich developing countries.

Since early 2000, several transnational extractive governance initiatives (TEGI) have been established such as the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPSHR), the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), and the ICMM Sustainable Development Framework (ICMM SDF) (Auld et al. 2018). These governance initiatives, led by both state and non-state actors, suggest guidelines to governments and mining companies for sustainable mining projects. Transparency is a prominent norm in the transnational extractive governance arena, based on the idea that a high level of transparency can mitigate the resource curse that plagues many resource-rich countries (Humphereys et al. 2007:324; Alstine 2014; David-Barrett and Okamura 2015). For instance, transparency policies are expected to curb corruption problems in countries where resource extraction results in conflicts and poverty (World Bank 2002 and Transnational International 2004 in Weinthal and Luong 2006:36). A large number of TEGIs such as EITI and ICMM require resource-rich states and extractive companies to disclose information related to financial flows and social and environmental impacts (Auld et al. 2018:431; Ponsford et al. 2018). These transnational governance initiatives function as platforms for transparency norm development and work as global norm entrepreneurs.

At the same time, the influence of Chinese actors in global extractive sectors has been increasing along with China's rapid economic growth and rising natural resources demands. In 2003, China became the second largest energy-consuming country in the world after the US (Zhang, 2011) and 11 of the world's 40 largest mining companies are Chinese firms such as China Shenhua Energy Company Limited and China Coal Energy Company Limited (Els 2017). Domestic shortages of natural resources particularly have triggered China's active overseas investments in the extractives sector (Gallagher 2016), and the Chinese government has utilized national grand strategies, such as the "going-out" policy and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), to support Chinese extractive companies to access to mining sites in many resource-rich developing countries (Economy and Levi 2014). These government-led policies have made China a crucial player in the global supply chain of key minerals used for cutting-edge clean energy technologies. For

instance, China occupies almost 60 percent of the lithium supply chain, closely linked to the production of electronic vehicles (FP 2019, 5).

This rapidly growing presence of China in global extractive sectors raises serious concerns about increasing negative social and environmental impacts related to the different characteristics of business operations of Chinese companies and investors, compared to Western actors, such as the World Bank or companies from North America and Europe. Some scholars argue that Chinese massive extractive projects follow an approach focusing on profitability rather than a value-based good governance approach emphasizing norms such as transparency, human rights, environment, and democracy (Mol, 2001; Power et al. 2012; Kopinski and Sun 2014; Zhang 2011). Other scholars contend that Chinese actors carry their lax domestic social and environmental regulations and Chinese business culture (*Guanxi*, 關係) into their oversea extractive sites, preferring informal social networks over formal legal channels, (Tuman and Shirali 2017). In that context, many international NGOs and news media have published critical reports about how Chinese mining companies devastate the local environment and violate human rights, such as child labor issue in cobalt mining sites in the Democratic Republic of Congo (e.g., Global Witness 2011).

Chinese actors have started engaging in transnational extractive governance initiatives, emphasizing social and environmental responsibilities of stakeholders in global supply chain of extractive resources. For example, Chinese government agencies, civil society, and Chinese companies participated in the 7th EITI Global Conference (Cordy 2016). ICMM and the China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals and Chemical Importers and Exporters (CCCMC) made an agreement to promote sustainable development in Chinese overseas mining investments in December 2017 (ICMM 2017). Besides, more Chinese extractives companies (upstream companies) and large electric companies (downstream companies) have joined in several TEGIs as an official member, for instance, China Minmetals in ISO14001 standard program, Huawei and ZTE in the Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI).

Moreover, China recently appears to take a more active role in global extractives governance, moving beyond passive participation in existing TEGIs. Notably, CCCMC, a Chinese industrial association

affiliated in the Ministry of Commerce, developed Chinese versions of transparency guidelines for companies' responsible mining activities. In addition, CCCMC partnered with the OECD to create the Responsible Cobalt Initiative (RCI) in 2016 to improve the responsibility of upstream and downstream companies in the cobalt supply chain. The RCI is a China-led transnational governance initiative, having a broad range of Chinese and non-Chinese corporation members, such as BMW, Apple, Samsung SDI, and Huawei (Ali et al. 2018). Of note, CCCMC as a Chair of the RCI has been developing new due diligence standards for cobalt smelters and refiners based on the CCCMC transparency guidelines. Given the fact that the traditionally powerful “Western” actors based on North America and Europe have led most existing TEGIs and supported a transparency norm as one of the important measures for “good governance,” this new phenomenon raises questions about the influence of China as an emerging power in global transparency norm development in the current global extractive governance architecture.

This dissertation seeks to address these questions and to fill gaps in existing scholarship. To date, there has been limited research on transnational extractives governance as an independent governance architecture within the system of global environmental governance (GEG) (e.g., Acosta 2013; Carbonnier et al. 2011). In addition, few International Relations (IR) and global governance scholars have examined China's normative role in global governance (e.g., Stephen 2017; Jinnah 2017; Liu 2020). Based on conventional paradigmatic theoretical approaches, dominant debates about the rise of China have focused on the question of whether China is a threat or a follower to the current world order. While most realists draw on power transition theory to highlight China as a challenger (e.g., Tammen et al. 2000; Mearsheimer 2006), IR scholars following liberal approaches (e.g., Ikenberry 2008) or constructivism (e.g., Johnson 2008) emphasize China's peaceful integration into the current order of the world politics. Despite abundant theoretical contributions of these approaches, their binary perspective seeing China as either a threat or a follower offers limited understanding of the complex dynamics related to the rise of China. For instance, there is a lack of understanding of China's normative role in “re-shaping” existing norms in global governance—i.e., China as neither a challenger nor a passive follower. Given these theoretical and empirical research gaps, this dissertation aims to analyze how China as an emerging country engages in

transparency norm development processes in global extractives governance. Specifically, this research project seeks to answer to the following three questions:

- 1) Is China a norm-taker or a norm-maker in transparency norm development processes of global extractives governance?
- 2) Under what conditions is China a norm-taker or a norm-maker?
- 3) How does power matter in norm development in global extractives governance?

By applying Pu and Acharya's two-way socialization framework, I assume that international norm development occurs in a two-way process that involves both norm-taking and norm-making (Pu 2012; Acharya 2014). It may be that China is not only a passive norm-taker as hypothesized by liberal constructivists (Johnston 2008), but also an active norm-maker spreading ideas and norms in international society, based on its emerging power resources (Pu 2012:349). Acharya's (2018) norm circulation model serves as the conceptual framework for the analysis of China's engagement in transparency norm development in global extractives governance. The norm circulation model provides many innovative theoretical insights, particularly to understand multilevel political dynamics and local actors' role in developing global norms. Meanwhile, there is a lack of empirical research on analyzing China based on the theoretical framework, related to diverse global governance issues outside the security studies.

Acharya's norm circulation model explains that a global norm advocated by international norm entrepreneurs is not always adopted by local actors without contestations. Instead, local idea-shifters localize the global norm based on their local culture and contexts at the local level, then universalize the locally re-constructed norm (a subsidiary norm) at the transnational level (Acharya 2018). Based on its theoretical focus on the transnational interactions among actors, the norm circulation model emphasizes both norm-taking and norm-making roles of local actors (two-way socialization process) in global norm development. In that sense, the norm circulation model develops our understandings of some specific conditions that have shaped China's norm-taking and norm-making roles. Furthermore, I seek to refine the norm circulation framework by drawing on realist constructivist theory (Barkin 2010), which emphasizes both power and norm, to analyze how China's power has mattered in transparency norm development.

In the remainder of this chapter, I briefly introduce the empirical context of this dissertation by focusing on the topic of transnational extractives governance and China's role in the extractives sector and governance initiatives. I then outline the structure of this dissertation and a short overview of each following chapters.

Transnational Extractives Governance

Transnational extractives governance is a relatively recent phenomenon that has developed due to growing global demands to solve diverse issues, such as corruption in resource-rich countries, child labor, conflict minerals, water pollution in mining sites. Mining of oil, gas, metals, and minerals is linked to higher risks compared to other resources such as timber or rubber, including violent conflicts from mining tantalum (Nest 2011) or diamonds (Smillie 2014), radiation of harmful elements (e.g., radioactive isotopes and radon), workers' safety, and health problems caused by thorium-containing wastes from rare earth mines (Ali 2014). Negative environmental impacts are observed in other stages of the global supply chain. For example, large amounts of CO₂ are emitted from refining and smelting aluminum (Paraskevas et al. 2016). These problems are global, meaning that they cannot be solved effectively within a single jurisdiction due to the broad range of stakeholders acting at multiple levels and across national borders. Many major mining companies operate their projects not only in their home states but also in other resource-rich countries as in the case of Canadian company Noranda's copper mining in Chile and Peru (Dashwood 2012) or the oil production of China National Petroleum Corporation (a Chinese national company) partnering with BP (a British company) in Angola (Economy and Levi 2014).

Global governance is therefore necessary to address these social and environmental problems in the extractives sector. Weiss (2013: 32) defines global governance as "collective efforts to identify, understand, or address worldwide problems that go beyond the capacities of individual states to solve." Global governance provides global public goods in various forms, such as formal or informal values, norms, rules, procedures, practices, policies, and organizations (Weiss 2013). Global governance can be delivered

through diverse mechanisms organized by a range of different actors. States work together through intergovernmental organizations such as the UN and by negotiating multilateral agreements such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Non-state actors such as companies and NGOs increasingly lead alternative governance arrangements such as standard and certification schemes. Such arrangements are referred to as transnational governance initiatives in that they involve cross-border interactions where at least one of the actors does not represent the foreign policy interests of the state (Risse-Kappen 1995). To date there have been limited multilateral governance efforts to address social and environmental issues in the extractives sector, perhaps reflecting states' reluctance to have their sovereignty constrained in the use of high-value nature resources (Auld et al. 2018). Instead, global extractives governance has been dominated by TEGIs.

Since the early 2000s, several TEGIs have emerged to address these issues throughout the global supply chain. EITI, ICMM, and the Kimberley Process for the global diamond supply chain were established in 2003. ICMM declares that it pursues “a safe, fair and sustainable mining and metals industry” (ICMM 2021), while EITI introduces itself as “the global standard to promote the open and accountable management of extractive resources” (EITI official website). The World Gold Council, which was created in 1987, developed its conflict-free gold standard in 2011. Similar to transnational governance initiatives in other areas (Bulkeley et al. 2014), TEGIs vary in terms of their governance characteristics. For instance, the Aluminum Stewardship Initiative (ASI) operates as a global private governance initiative led by mostly private companies, while EITI runs as a global public-private governance mechanism consisting of state and non-state actors. TEGIs function as governance platforms developing new global policies, common principles and voluntary standards to improve environmentally and socio-economically responsible behaviors of private actors and governments related to oil, gas, and mineral resource extractive projects.

Broadly, previous literature in Global Environmental Politics (GEP) about global private governance (Cashore 2002; Pattberg 2005; Auld et al. 2015), transnational multi-stakeholder governance (Pattberg and Widerberg 2016), transnational public-private governance (Andonova et al. 2009; Bäckstrand 2011) can provide theoretical insights on these trends in resource governance beyond the state. However,

there is a lack of research that examines TEGIs as an integrated global governance system creating global norms for resource governance, especially when compared to other environmental issue areas like climate change or biodiversity (Auld et al 2018; exceptions are Carbonnier et al. 2011 and Acosta 2013). Previous studies on TEGI are mostly either focusing on a specific extractive sector such as gold (Bloomfield 2017; Auld et al 2018) or diamonds (Haufler 2010a) or looking at a single initiative as a case study. A large volume of the research examines the case of EITI, while other governance mechanisms have received less attention. These studies often examine EITI's institutional traits in the context of implementation or compliance of EITI members (Russell 2014; David-Barrett and Okamura 2016; Ihugba 2016) or the local impact of EITI (Öge 2014; Sovacool et al 2015; Papyrakis et al 2017; Vijge et al. 2019). Only a few studies explain the transnational political aspects of EITI (Haufler 2010b; Caspary 2012; Escribano 2017; Vijge 2018; Yanuardi et al. 2021). This dissertation seeks to fill the gap and examine transnational extractives governance as an independent governance issue area, supported by globally shared governing values and norms.

Transparency is one of the principal norms among TEGIs, particularly for supporting resource-rich developing countries (e.g., Alstine 2014 and David-Barrett and Okamura 2015). Despite a lack of a unified definition of transparency, it refers to “the degree to which information is available to outsiders that enables them to have informed voice in decisions and/or to assess the decisions made by insiders” (Florini 2007: 5). The norm has been applied to fix the problem of information asymmetries among powerful and less powerful actors, particularly to monitor powerful corporations or governments publicly and protect the affected people (Florini 2007). Regarding global extractives governance, traditionally, the issue of corruption linked to resource extraction has been one of the major problems hindering the increase of the national wealth of resource-rich developing countries. For that reason, international pressure on disclosing the information about financial transactions of resource projects, such as tax payments of extractive companies or incomes of governments, has been growing. The usefulness of the information disclosure has been the basic idea of many governance initiatives proliferating the value of transparency, especially EITI (Alstine 2014; Rustad et al. 2017; Vijge et al. 2019).

TEGIs serve as platforms for the development of transparency as a central norm in global extractives governance. Haufler (2010b) introduces rich details about the process of EITI's establishment and how a transparency norm became EITI's primary governance principle. NGOs supported a transparency norm as part of an anti-corruption campaign against corrupted governments during the 1990s (e.g., Transparency International). This early trend shifted to creating the Publish What You Pay (PWYP) campaign that encourages extractive companies to disclose their financial information related to their development projects in 2002. World leaders adopted the core value and agenda of PWYP G8 summit in 2003, leading to the establishment of EITI in 2003 (Haufler 2010b). Because of the original orientation of a transparency norm against anti-corruption, EITI's transparency norm targets disclosure of financial information. More recently, EITI has expanded the scope of transparency to include information about members' environmental and ecological impacts (Ponsford et al. 2018). Notably, Rustad et al (2017) argue that EITI successfully consolidated transparency as a global norm. Today, many TEGIs appear to link a transparency norm to other norms or governance goals, such as sustainability (e.g., ICMM, see Sethi and Emelianova 2006 and Fonseca 2010) or corporate social responsibility (e.g., Kimberley Process, see Haufler 2010a). However, few studies systematically examine transparency across various TEGIs. This dissertation addresses this gap by investigating how a transparency norm is reflected in TEGIs broadly beyond a single case study approach focusing on EITI.

China in the Global Extractives Sector

China's influence in the global extractive resource supply chain has been increasing more than any other state, suggesting that China's engagement in global extractives governance and how Chinese actors affect the governance area would be important issues for exploration by global governance scholars. Domestic shortage of natural resources has triggered China's aggressive overseas investments in the extractives sector (Gallagher 2016). International Political Economy (IPE) scholars and geographers have studied increasing levels of Chinese investment in overseas extractive projects and its economic impact on

less developed countries (Power et al. 2012; Gallagher 2016). In addition, some studies examine social and environmental impacts of increasing Chinese investments in the developing world. For example, Ray et al (2017) investigate China's rapidly increasing investment in Latin America and its impact on the region. They notably explain that the export from the extractive sector of the Latin America and Caribbean region to China has increased from 20% of the total exports in 2003 to 57% in 2013 (Ray et al. 2017: 5). There are some several factors help explain Chinese companies' growing mining investments and projects overseas. For instance, Economy (2014) explains that Chinese companies are more willing to take political and security risks compared to Western companies, linked to unstable situations in local mining sites, and the Chinese government strongly supports the companies' overseas mining projects based on its close tie with mining industry leaders (2014: 59, 61).

China's growing role in global extraction is closely related to its current grand strategy, the so-called, '*Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)*: 一带一路.' The Chinese government has started launching massive infrastructure projects across the global South by reviving the old Silk Road to build expansive global trade routes and establish China's global leadership (The Economist 2018). Many Chinese private extractive corporations have broadened their project sites based on governmental support as the part of BRI. According to the database of Global Development Policy Center at Boston University, China's national banks, particularly China Development Bank and Export-Import Bank of China, have invested 37 billion USD in exploration and extraction overseas since 2000, as one of the biggest sectors in China's global energy finance (Gallagher 2021). Meanwhile, many international NGOs have continuously criticized China's negative social and environmental impact on mining sites (e.g., Global Witness 2011, see also the Amnesty International report in 2018). Economy (2014) points out that the Chinese government's limited capacity to monitor companies overseas is one of the factors contributing to these problems. In addition, unique characteristics of the Chinese political system, such as poor transparency, limited public engagement, and a weak judiciary, hinder Chinese companies' responsible behavior (Economy and Levi 2014: 105).

In that context, several scholars explain why transparency matters in the relationship between resource-rich countries and China specifically. For example, Shinn (2015) links Chinese violation of local laws for their natural resource demand to negative involvement of African government officials such as abuse of permits and concession licenses and smuggling logs. Bond and Garcia (2015) advance a similar argument that emerging countries such as China intensify the unfair relationship between local people and African elites through tax evasion or mispricing minerals. Tuman and Shirali (2017) explain that Chinese business culture, emphasizing social networks or “*Guanxi* (關係),”¹ reflects the preference of Chinese firms working in African countries to use informal avenues opposed to legal channels in host countries. Power et al. (2012) also focus on this informal relationship between Chinese and African actors, which they refer to as “Angola-mode”. Transparency is seen as one way of making these issues visible and mitigating social and environmental problems in mining regions (Bleischwitz et al. 2012; Yuan 2015). However, some critical scholars view transparency as a neoliberal ‘Western’ value (Ciplet et al. 2018), raising questions about its acceptability to Chinese actors and thus whether transparency will continue to be a central norm in transnational extractives governance.

There has been limited GEG scholarship on China’s engagement in the realm of transnational extractives governance or its influence on transparency norm development. Only a few studies acknowledge the role of China in this governance area, and these studies commonly highlight China’s reluctance to take part in TEGIs. As one of a few studies on that topic, Mouan (2010) explains that Chinese reluctance is caused by the incongruity between the principles or values of such governance initiatives and China’s culture, philosophy, and business interests. Economy (2014) points out that Chinese officials see initiatives such as EITI as a Western NGO which may hinder the Chinese government’s authority.

Nevertheless, Chinese actors have recently started engaging in several transnational extractive governance platforms as illustrated by the CCCMC staffs’ participation in the 7th EITI Conference in 2016

¹ Even though the authors do not directly mention “*Guanxi* (關係),” their argument explicitly shows the typical Chinese business culture and how this culture influences in the Chinese behavior in African countries.

and an agreement between CCCMC and ICMM in 2017. Some Chinese companies participate in EITI mechanisms locally when they operate their projects in EITI member states (e.g., Shougang, China MinMentlas and CNPC in Peru: see Ray et al. 2017). These stories indicate that Chinese actors are not entirely absent in transnational extractives governance. Most notably, CCCMC, a Chinese industry association affiliated under the Ministry of Commerce, created its own versions of transparency guidelines for extractive companies operating overseas and established the RCI in 2017 in partnership with OECD as a TEGI having both Chinese and non-Chinese members. These recent developments seem to reflect China's effort to become a responsible player in international society and perhaps a desire to take a leadership role in re-shaping existing global governance norms and rules. For example, Xi Jinping declared China's new leadership in global governance at a Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference in 2018 as follows, "(China will) take an active part in leading the reform of the global governance system" (Tobin 2018). There is a gap in understanding what China's new role means for the long-term viability of a transparency norm in global extractives governance and how China may affect TEGIs and their transparency norm development processes.

Overview of the Dissertation

This dissertation aims to examine China's role in transparency norm development in transnational extractives governance. Chapter 2 is a literature review of the main theoretical debates about the rise of China and global norm development in the fields of IR, global governance studies, and GEG. This literature review reveals how the dominant debates on these issues follow one of the theoretical paradigms in IR (i.e., realism, liberalism, or constructivism), creating gaps in understanding China's role as an emerging power in global norm development. I argue that a new IR perspective seeing China as a reformist pursuing changes within the existing order overcomes the limits of a binary approach that views China as either a threat to the current global governance order or a peaceful follower. At the same time, debates about the rise of China fail to explain China's normative role by focusing on China's material power and power politics in

the world order. Similarly, constructivist norm development literature fails to engage with the debates about power and power politics, including the issue of the rise of China. In particular, this chapter highlights that most liberal constructivists (e.g. Risse-Kappen 1995; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) disregard the norm-making role of “non-Western” actors and contestations that occur during the norm development process. In contrast, critical constructivists emphasize norm contestation (e.g., Wiener 2014; Bloomfield 2016) and view norm development through a two-way socialization framework (Pu 2012). Drawing on these debates, Acharya’s (2018) norm-circulation model serves as the conceptual framework for my analysis of China’s role in transparency norm development. Acharya contends that norms develop through three distinct stages: (1) transnational engagement, (2) constitutive localization, and (3) universalization. Each of these stages are elaborated in greater detail in Chapter 2.

The three empirical chapters (Chapter 3, 4, and 5) address the dissertation’s central research questions as illustrated in Figure 1. These chapters also follow the stages of Acharya’s norm circulation model. Chapter 3 examines China’s engagement with transparency norms at the transnational level (transnational engagement); Chapter 4 explores the process of localizing transparency in China through the creation of domestic guidance (constitutive localization); and Chapters 4 and 5 focus on Chinese efforts to universalize a Chinese version of transparency (universalization). Each chapter was prepared as a stand-alone article to be submitted for journal publication, leading to some inevitable overlaps between chapters. Each chapter includes its own methods discussion.




Figure 1. Dissertation Overview

In Chapter 3, I conduct a mapping exercise to illustrate the current transnational extractives governance landscape regarding a transparency norm and examine Chinese actors' engagement in the TEGIs where a transparency norm is developed. Based on qualitative document analysis and expert interviews, I analyze 48 TEGIs and classify them in terms of whether they have Chinese participants and if so, which types of actors. I note that Chinese companies are more actively participating in TEGIs than Chinese government agencies because of their reluctance to be bound by “foreign” rules. I also explore what type of a transparency norm is central to each TEGI in which Chinese actors participate. This analysis shows that most Chinese actors prefer to join corporation-centric TEGIs based on a “thin” transparency norm lacking stringent enforcement rules and featuring limited multi-stakeholder participation.

Chapter 4 uses process-tracing to detail the historical trajectory of China's engagement in transnational extractives governance from the early 2000s to the present, with a particular focus on the RCI case. I examine the processes in which CCCMC has developed Chinese versions of transparency guidelines by synthesizing their ideas with some of transparency principles drawn from TEGIs then established the RCI based on the CCCMC guidelines. This analysis uses data drawn from documents and semi-structured

expert interviews with people who participated in the process of developing Chinese guidelines to investigate domestic and international factors that trigger China's norm-taking and norm-making. I analyze the collected data based on an abductive analysis approach (Timmermans and Tavory 2012), focusing on finding surprise, puzzle, or anomaly to advance a theory. I argue that the Chinese government supported the development of domestic guidelines and the establishment of the RCI as a way to respond to internal and external legitimacy crises.

Chapter 5 explores how Chinese power impacts China's norm-making in transnational extractives governance drawing on Barnett and Duvall's (2008) typology of power in global governance and applying realist constructivism, which emphasizes both norms and power. Specifically, I examine how Chinese actors deployed different types of power in efforts to universalize China's localized transparency norm. I suggest that China's material power resources are translated into institutional and structural power, and these particular types of power support the norm-making role of Chinese government agencies and business actors. In this analysis, I seek to challenge a perspective of seeing China as a monolithic actor, and also show a more nuanced understandings of China's power based on complex relations among various types of actors in the governance settings.

Lastly, Chapter 6 summarizes the major findings of this dissertation that directly speak to the three primary research questions. In addition, I delve into major theoretical implications of this project, particularly regarding the following topics in IR and GEG: (1) China as an emerging power in world politics; (2) multilevel and multiagency norm development; and (3) power and norm development. This chapter also suggests several practical implications that could benefit GEG scholars and policymakers involved in TEGIs. I conclude by discussing some limitations and suggesting future research directions that would lead to further theoretical development of Acharya's norm-circulation model and policy-oriented studies to improve governance outcomes.

CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter provides an overview of the primary theoretical debates related to key components of this research—the rise of China and norm development in world politics. This literature review particularly focuses on how scholars in international relations (IR) and global (environmental) governance studies view these topics and positions this research in the context of major theoretical debates and research gaps. I argue that there is a lack of attention to interactions between power politics and norm development in global governance, mainly because scholarship often draws on particular IR theories, such as realism, liberalism, or constructivism. This heavy theoretical reliance often hinders bringing up innovative research questions to understand new phenomenon as a part of increasing complexities of world politics, for example, about a normative role of China as a powerful, but non-Western actor in global governance. The dominant academic debates regarding the rise of China have been primarily about whether China would challenge the current world order as expected by the realist tradition in IR. On the other hand, most conventional norms literature is based on a cosmopolitan approach that disregards power politics among states and the role of non-Western actors. The chapter concludes by presenting Acharya's (2018) norm circulation model and elaborating how this framework informs this dissertation's empirical analysis of China's role in transparency norm development in transnational extractives governance.

The Rise of China in World Politics

The rise of China has been one of the most debated issues in IR for last two decades. Today, China is the world's second-largest economy. China's GDP was 14.7 trillion US dollars (compared to 20.9 trillion US dollars of the US GDP) in 2020, but some analysts predict that China will become the world's largest economy earlier than expected due to the COVID-19 pandemic (Chen and Lee 2021). Meanwhile, China's economic influence in other regions, particularly in developing countries, has rapidly grown. For instance, Chinese FDI flows to Africa started exceeding US FDI flows to the region in 2012 (CARI 2021). Many

scholars raise questions about the impact of China's growing economic and political power in world politics linked to different kinds of issue areas. Major bodies of previous research on the rise of China draw on the theoretical paradigms of realism, liberalism, and constructivism. Even though they emphasize different components of the rise of China, scholars commonly have attempted to discern whether China will change the current liberal world order and related global governance architecture. Below, I outline three distinct approaches found in the literature.

China as a threat

Dominant discourses about the rise of China in realism show severe concerns about physical conflicts between emerging China and powerful countries, particularly the US, caused by the shift of distribution of power in world politics. Drawing on power transition theory, realist pessimists argue that a conflict between a rising power and an existing hegemonic state is inevitable because bipolarization caused by a rising power breaks the stability of the pre-existing unipolar world order. From this perspective, China will become a threat to the US and the current world order (Organski 1958; Gilpin 1988; Tammen et al. 2000; Mearsheimer 2006; Brooks and Wohlforth 2016). This zero-sum perspective emphasizing China's increasing economic and military power underlies most current foreign policy debates on the dangers of China's rise.

For instance, Mearsheimer (2010) argues that China may attempt to maximize its national power to be a regional hegemon as its best strategy for pursuing national safety, making US-China competition inevitable in the Asian-Pacific region. Similarly, Tammen et al. (2000) highlights potential US-China confrontations especially when China become a "dissatisfied international power"—a challenger against the current system, and explains that, in that case, "China is the most immediate danger to the United States and the international system" (Tammen et al. 2000: 179). Many scholars argue that China's sensitive ongoing territorial dispute issues, such as the Taiwan problem, could trigger serious conflicts between the US and China as a part of power transition (Tammen et al. 2000). These views resonate with the argument

of Paul Kennedy (1989) and Robert Gilpin (1988) that a rising power tries to reshape the world order in accordance with its national interest, and that consequentially leads to conflicts with a pre-existing hegemonic state (a declining state) that fears losing its power—the so-called, Thucydides trap.

Although global governance scholars are likely to be less pessimistic than conventional IR power transition theorists based on realism, the “China-threat” narrative has been embedded in some issue areas, especially related to global development policy, emphasizing China’s rapidly growing influence in developing countries as a new donor. This perspective reinforces debates on a global governance architecture based on a balance of power (Gu et al. 2008). For instance, many studies emphasize the negative impacts of increasing Chinese OFDI, including environmental impact, on recipient countries. Kopinski and Sun (2014) explain that Chinese investment is based on project-type financing which emphasizes profitability and differs from the World Bank’s program-type financing, which considers potential environmental and social impacts of investments. Harvey’s (2014) work links Chinese investment in Africa to lowering the quality of African development due to the non-transparent relationship between Chinese national banks and government elites (see also Power et al. 2012). Chin (2012) points out a myth of the South-South cooperation that highlights the solidarity between China and a partner recipient country. He argues that China already has become a net donor as one of the greatest world economic powers making China a powerful threat to partner countries in the global South. Zhang (2011) contends China’s OFDI is linked not only to global governance but also to conventional security agendas such as China’s strategy to curb the alliance for democracy between Taiwan and other states.

In the global environmental governance (GEG) literature, this China threat narrative links to increasing concerns about China’s growing environmental footprint. For instance, Shapiro (2016) explains China’s planetary footprint, including its large carbon emissions, as the second largest per capita after the US, illegal timber trade, and massive extraction of raw materials overseas such as Petro China’s extraction of oil in Yasuni National Park in Ecuador, a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve, based on the 2013 inter-governmental agreement trading oil for Chinese loans. Ray et al. (2017) similarly point out China’s growing negative impact on the environment in mining sites in Latin America, e.g., Chinese companies’ lack of

measures to cope with environmental deterioration in Bolivian lithium mining sites. In sum, this growing body of literature in GEG represents China's image as a heavy polluter or an environmental rule-breaker.

Integration of China

Liberal and conventional constructivist scholars share more optimistic views on the rise of China compared to the realist view discussed in the previous section. These bodies of literature emphasize China's peaceful engagement in the current world order and describe China as a status-quo power rather than a challenger or a threat. From this perspective, China tends to adopt the current global governance rules. Meanwhile, the liberal and constructivist views rely on distinctive rationales to explain the integration of China: logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness.

Ikenberry (2008) is representative of liberals arguing that China can be peacefully integrated in the current liberal order without the violent confrontations of a hegemonic transition. He explains that China has sufficient incentives to actively engage with the current 'Western' order based on liberal rules and institutions, particularly for its ongoing national economic growth (e.g. through participation in the WTO). From this perspective, Ikenberry expects that China will work within the current liberal order instead of overthrowing it. This argument is based on logic of consequences—in other words, China adopts the existing global order because the integration benefits the state. Similarly, Oksenberg and Economy (1999) explain that China's entry to the WTO and opening its market to the globe are because Chinese leaders' acknowledgement of the benefits from the membership.

Another influential factor triggering the engagement of Chinese actors seems to be the Chinese government's concern about its global reputation and strengthening soft power (Nye 1998) based on liberal ideas. For instance, Nest (2011) in his study of coltan politics highlights the crucial role of the Chinese government in pressuring Chinese companies to avoid their connection to conflict minerals, and explains that such Chinese involvement in global resource markets depends on China's desire to gain soft power so that China appears to be a responsible and law-abiding power in international affairs (Nest 2011:183-184).

Some scholars explain that China's participation in international multilateral mechanisms reflects China's pragmatism (Li 2011). In short, this liberal approach explains that China engages in the existing global order and remains as a status-quo power because of policy makers' rational decisions based on cost-benefit calculations (Friedberg 2005: 35).

Conventional constructivists come to similar conclusions in China's status-quo standpoint but base their argument on the importance of norms in world politics. Constructivism emphasizes intersubjectivity and ideational matters – such as knowledge, values, and norms (Wendt 1999). Norms constitutes actors' beliefs, interest, and behaviors, and systems of global governance (Ruggie 1998). Constructivists view norms as one of the crucial ontological components that shape world politics through the logic of appropriateness (Hoffmann 2005: 113), which explains that an actor chooses a particular behavior because of beliefs, feelings, or ideas about what is proper, not because of cost-benefit calculations. For example, Ian Johnston (2008) observes China's increasing participation in liberal international institutions since the early 1980s but focuses on China's internal socialization processes shaping its psychological preferences and motivation. Johnston argues that we can observe growing compliance to international rules because Chinese actors imitate other states' behaviors then gradually adopt, and internalize the norms of international institutions through its socializing processes that leads to reconsidering its identity and preferences (Johnston 2008, see also Johnston and Evans 1999).

Some GEG scholars reflect similar understandings that China has become more integrated into existing global environmental governance mechanisms. Carter and Mol (2006) observe that China started acknowledging its growing role in global environmental politics and joined various multilateral environmental agreements, including its ratification in the Biosafety Protocol in 2005. China's increasing engagement results from international pressure after its participation in the WTO to adopt higher environmental standards, along with its economic growth (Carter and Mol 2006: 339). Harris (2008) argues that China joined international environmental regimes during the early 1990s because China could get high benefits with paying low costs through environmental aid and technology funding and overcome its diplomatic isolation (Harris 2008: 928). In addition, Chinese domestic "knowledge brokers" (e.g. scientists)

facilitated an idea-shift toward supporting international environmental regimes based on increasing awareness about the negative impact of environmental harm on economic development (Harris 2008: 933). Sun (2016) also highlights that China is becoming an active participant in current global governance mechanisms, including G20 and UNFCCC negotiations, moving away from its passive attitude in the past due to the concerns about impeding economic development and sovereignty. These studies commonly show that China is increasingly integrated into the current global environmental governance because it matches with China's national interests and China's accumulated experience over past years in global environmental politics.

China as a reformist

Global governance scholars have begun to explore the impact of a global power transition triggered by emerging countries from the global South playing a greater role in existing global governance mechanisms and how this new phenomenon fosters multiple complexities in the global governance system (Hale and Held 2011; Zürn 2018). A large volume of literature points out that China is seemingly a reformist working within the current global governance system (e.g., Stephen 2017). In other words, China appears to stand in an “in-between” position—between a challenger and a passive follower in the current global governance architecture. Zürn (2018: 184) observes that rising powers do not seek to overhaul the current system but rather contest against institutionalized inequality and neoliberal policies—i.e., “asking for more than routine changes within the given system”. Based on various case studies, Kennedy (2018) similarly concludes that China interacts with the international system through China's socialization and incorporation into the system and global institutions' adaptation to China's activism (Kennedy 2018: 3).

Many studies also show similar approaches to understanding China's mixed signals (Zeng 2018; De Graaff et al. 2020). For example, in the field of global environmental governance, Compagnon et al (2012: 246) argue that China participates in global governance institutions (e.g., the current climate regime) but seeks to “reformulate these institutions and rules according to its interest” because they are “shaped by

Western ideas”. China’s insistence in keeping its developing country status and representing the interest of the global South in international climate change negotiations is one of the representative examples (Jinnah 2017; Uddin 2017). In a recent study, Zhao et al (2020) introduce unique Chinese characteristics in environmental governance and argue that China’s goal-based strategies—differentiated from the US rule-based governance—would affect (re-)shaping the international climate change regime.

This literature on China’s mixed role in global governance provides a more complex and nuanced picture that goes beyond a binary perspective seeing China as either a threat or a status-quo actor. However, there are two explicit gaps. First, there is a predominant focus on China’s role and influence in state-centric/intergovernmental governance mechanisms (mostly international organizations), while disregarding its impact on transnational governance mechanisms led by both state and non-state actors. One of the reasons for this gap could come from the fact that most scholars studying this topic are concentrated in the field of International Political Economy (IPE) overlapped with global governance studies and their empirical research focus has been on China’s growing role in old and new global economic governance institutions (e.g., WTO and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)). In addition, the underdevelopment of Chinese civil society and limited participation by Chinese non-state actors in global governance mechanisms may cause the biased research tendency. Zeng (2018) explains that due to the central role of the state and negative view on NGOs as a threat to its one-party system, the key theoretical concept of global governance, ‘governance without government,’ is not applicable to China (Zeng 2018:11). Only a few recent studies investigate China in transnational governance based on state and non-state actors’ partnerships (e.g., Bartley and Zhang 2018 on global labor standards or Hale and Roger 2018 on transnational climate governance).

Second, and more importantly, there has been a relative lack of attention to the question of how China influences norms that underlie the current global order and operate as core features of global governance. Even though some studies acknowledge emerging norm contestation caused by the rise of China in global governance (Stephen 2017; Onis and Kutlay 2020), there is an explicit gap in the previous literature in elaborating how Chinese actors affect global norm development processes along with their

growing material power in global governance. Many studies primarily focus on growing institutional fragmentation problems based on China's creation of new governance institutions such as AIIB and ask whether those new institutions would be supplementary or competitive with existing institutions (Kahler 2018; Zürn 2018). Meanwhile, Stephen (2017) expects both institutional and normative contestations as an impact of emerging powers, particularly China, in polycentric global governance. He points out that emerging countries emphasize the value of sovereignty or strong state virtue over other liberal values (e.g., human rights), which can lead to new international norms contesting Western liberal norms (e.g., R2P). Despite his insightful view on potential norm contestations as an emerging trend in global governance, there is a lack of detailed empirical examination of China's effect on reshaping a global norm.

This dissertation engages with these debates on the rise of China by focusing on China's role in global extractives governance. Compared to previous studies about the rise of China in global economic governance or international security studies, GEG scholars have not sufficiently paid attention to the impact of the rise of China on the current global environmental governance architecture except for a few recent studies (e.g., Zhao et al. 2020). Moreover, there seems to be no previous literature explaining China's role in global extractives governance. In this sense, this research contributes to expanding the current debate about the rise of China into a broader scope of global environmental governance, especially related to China's growing planetary footprint and its environmental responsibilities. In so doing, it helps expand our knowledge of whether China challenges, integrates, or reforms the current global environmental governance architecture (including both intergovernmental and transnational mechanisms) and factors that trigger China's specific role in the governance arena.

Moreover, this research aims to fill other gaps in these bodies of literature—a lack of research on the roles of both Chinese state and non-state actors in global governance and their influence on the norms supporting current global governance mechanisms. Despite some global governance studies focusing on the role of Chinese non-state actors (e.g., Hale and Roger 2018), a large volume of literature in IR and global governance studies remains state-centric. I reject a perspective regarding China as a monolithic actor in this research project and show various types of Chinese actors in global extractives governance. This

alternative view opens another possibility of recognizing that not all Chinese actors are a threat or a status-quo power; rather, different Chinese actors might have distinctive positions. I add nuance to current debates on the rise of China and help understand increasing complexities in diverse global governance areas. Besides, “the rise of China” issue in IR seems to be disconnected from the norms literature except for a few studies like Johnston’s work (2008). Given this point, this dissertation, targeting to answer the question of China’s role in transparency norm development in global extractives governance, would make a linkage between the body of literature on the rise of China and norm literature in IR as explained in the next section.

Global Norm Development

Despite a lack of one common definition, most IR scholars understand norms as standards of appropriate behaviors for actors with a given identity (Katzenstein 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Jurkovich (2020: 694) nicely summarized three essential components defining norms based on early norm scholarship: 1) a moral sense of “oughtness” (indicating appropriateness or properness of behaviors), 2) a defined actor’s given “identity,” and 3) expected specific “action”. It resonates with Florini’s (1996: 365) definition of norms where she views “behavior” and “oughtness” (linked to the legitimacy of a behavioral claim) as the two main components of norms. For instance, human rights, sovereignty, and Responsibility to Protect (R2P) have been broadly regarded as norms in previous IR literature (e.g., Finnemore and Holis 2016).

Global governance scholarship has closely interacted with the constructivist norm debates because norms are a critical constitutive factor of global governance (Hoffmann 2005). For instance, Ruggie (1998) claims that norms constitute actors’ beliefs, interest, and behaviors, and system of global governance. In addition, the common understanding of norms among global governance scholars is reflected in the definitions of global governance as below.

We define the term (global governance architecture) here as the overarching system of public and private institutions that are valid or active in a given issue area of world politics. This system comprises organizations, regimes, and other forms of principles, **norms**, regulations, and decision-making procedures. Architecture can thus be described as the meta-level of governance (Biermann et al. 2009:15, emphasis added)

My definition of global governance is collective efforts to identify, understand, or address worldwide problems that go beyond the capacities of individual states to solve...it is the combination of informal and formal values, rules, **norms**, procedure, practices, policies, and organizations of various types that often provides a surprising and desirable degree of global order, stability, and predictability (Weiss 2013:32, emphasis added)

Relatedly, GEG scholars examine various environmental norms, such as sustainable development, the precautionary principle, and the common but differentiated responsibility principle in climate change governance (e.g., Rosencranz 2003). Meanwhile, regarding global extractives governance connected to this dissertation research, transparency has been most significantly identified as a crucial norm (e.g., Alstine 2014 and David-Barrett and Okamura 2015) along with CSR and sustainability (Sethi and Emelianova 2006; Dashwood 2012; Tost et al. 2017).

Norm research in IR has been developed predominantly by constructivists because of their ontological focus on ideational matters and intersubjective social construction shaped by dialectical interactions between agents and structure. Constructivists emphasize the concept of co-constitution between agents and structure, emphasizing both agents creating norms and the effects of existing norms on individuals (Barkin 2010:28). One of the most advanced theoretical debates is about norm diffusion. There are two theoretical clusters among constructivists showing different understandings of norm diffusion processes: (1) liberal constructivism (usually the constructivist scholarship in the 1990s) explaining one-way socialization triggered by global norm entrepreneurs and involving learning norms among actors (Risse-Kappen 1994; Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Checkel 2001); and (2) a critical approach on existing global norms as hegemonic governing tools which emphasizes political tensions surrounding social norms (Wiener 2004; Wiener 2014; Bloomfield 2016; Acharya 2018). It is a relatively recent trend of critical norm research in IR that emphasizes norm contestation (Deitelhoff and Zimmermann 2020).

One-way Socialization

Most conventional constructivist literature views global norm development processes as a smooth and peaceful cycle occurring through learning, mimicking or norm diffusion (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Park 2006). From this perspective, a norm emerges through the work of global norm entrepreneurs who are mainly non-state actors based in North America or Europe, and state actors who promote the institutionalization of norms by persuasion and intersubjective learning (Risse-Kappen 1995; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Checkel 2001; Johnston 2008). The conventional framework tends to assume an asymmetrical story whereby ‘enlightened’ Western norm entrepreneurs guide ‘unenlightened,’ non-Western norm followers through a one-way socialization process (Bloomfield 2016; see also Epstein, 2012; Pu 2012). In the GEG scholarship, many researchers pay attention to the significant role of various types of non-state actors and transnational advocacy networks in diffusing environmental norms. For instance, Schroeder (2008) applies the norm ‘spiral model’ of Risse et al (1999) to her research on China’s climate politics and argues that transnational cooperation between international and Chinese NGOs changed the Chinese position on climate change politics through information sharing. In this paper, she emphasizes the norm entrepreneurship of INGOs and the socialization of China (as a state). Park (2005) accounts for the role of transnational advocacy networks, primarily consisting of NGOs, in socializing the International Financial Corporation to follow sustainable development norms via social influence and persuasion (Park 2005: 114). Haufler (2010b) shows how international non-state activists in the global North promoted a transparency idea that led to creating EITI and affecting businesses and governments related to the extractive sector.

While this conventional constructivist lens provides an insightful account of how actors behave based on international norms, reflecting a logic of appropriateness, it tends to overlook several important pieces of global norm dynamics. First, this conventional norm literature under-emphasizes political tensions or power struggles occurring in norm development processes. This perspective also disregards the agents resisting a common international norm and trying to build an alternative norm. In addition, this type of

literature reflects the idea of a moral cosmopolitanism claiming that norms advocated by transnational agents are cosmopolitan and universal (Hall 2014:153).

A related problem of the conventional approach is that it often leads to limiting the scope of empirical cases. One of the repeated criticisms against liberal constructivism is that their case studies seem to be cherry-picked (Bloomfield 2016). A large volume of global governance studies applying conventional constructivism has shown successful governance cases of transnational cooperation, mostly led by Western non-state actors (or middle power states such as Sweden and Canada) as a norm entrepreneur disseminating ‘good’ values (Epstein 2012). Based on this tradition, the issue of power and power politics (specifically regarding material power) has received less attention from global governance scholars studying norms (Ba and Hoffmann 2005:251) except for some attempts to bring the matter of power back to their governance research (e.g., Barnett and Duvall 2005). In this conventional tendency, there is a gap in examining how power (especially regarding non-Western emerging states like China) matters in socialization processes in global governance norm development. By bringing back the power aspect in global governance norm research, we can reveal more dynamic political complexities related to the norm development process. This approach helps us to go beyond an assumption that global governance itself is a ‘good’ and ‘politically neutral’ way to achieve global common goods (Abbott and Snidal 2009:47; Avant et al. 2010:7).

Second, these scholars focus on the issue of how powerful states become a norm-receiver, influenced by norm entrepreneurs, usually ‘good’ and ‘enlightened’ non-state actors from the West. Their view grounded in a moral cosmopolitanism emphasizes that “morally gifted norm-makers” use persuasion and pressure from naming and shaming to convince other actors (particularly states) to take up norms (Risse et al. 1999). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 901) claim that the norm adoption of ‘critical states’ is an important element for norm diffusion. Regarding this dissertation research’s focus on the rise of China in global extractives governance and transparency norm development, this theoretical approach highlights China’s uptake of a global transparency norm tendentiously and considers possibilities in which China would challenge or re-shape the norm with its norm entrepreneurship. This dominant narrative in traditional norm studies tends to disregard the norm-entrepreneurship of emerging powers, and the fact that global

norms are not always morally good (Wunderlich 2013:33-34). In this sense, these scholars provide only a partial explanation of how China as an emerging powerful state may engage in norm development (Pu 2012:354).

Two-way Socialization and Norm Contestation

Recent critical literature on norm contestation addresses these shortfalls. Scholars in this theoretical cluster emphasize two-way political interactions among actors in norm development processes. Antje Wiener (Wiener 2014: 23), one of the representative norm contestation scholars, points out that traditional norm literature tends to undermine the critical practice of “arguing” among norm development agents. Norm contestations occur at different stages of norm development from a constituting stage to implementing stage and various types of actors actively participate in the norm contestation processes. Thus, norm contestation theory could be a useful tool to capture politically conflictual situations regarding norm evolution (Wiener 2014).

Similar to Wiener’s criticism about “political cosmopolitanism” disregarding conflictual situations in conventional norm literature, Bloomfield (2016) also argues that previous norm studies often are beset with selection biases by studying only successfully socialized cases without severe resistance. The conventional framework tends to assume an asymmetrical story that ‘enlightened’ Western norm entrepreneurs guide ‘unenlightened’ non-Western norm followers (Bloomfield 2016:4; see also Epstein, 2012). He argues that norm contestation occurs between norm entrepreneurs, who are eager to create innovative norms, and norm anti-preneurs who try to maintain existing norms, and that both sides use diverse tactics to achieve their goals. He explains that when material and discursive structure changes as a result of temporal crises or structural shifts, new norms can arise in a norm contestation cycle. He argues that the temporal crisis causing discursive structure change creates a ‘window of opportunity’ (Bloomfield 2016: 17, 18).

These norm contestation debates emphasize that norms are not necessarily “good” moral principles, but a product of political interactions among “multiple” actors. Wiener (2018: 39) particularly highlights that “norm conflicts are most likely to occur when the affected stakeholders have distinctively different socio-cultural backgrounds”. In that way, these scholars acknowledge that more diverse agents co-constitute norms rather than “infantilize the socializee” in norm dynamics (Epstein 2012: 141). They emphasize the agency of actors that receive relatively less attention in world politics and their norm-making role. From this point of view, socialization processes surrounding global norm development are not one-directional, but two-way and co-constitutive interactions among various actors. There is no moral “teacher” and “learner” of a global norm.

In this sense, it’s worth noting that Pu (2012) introduced the concept of two-way socialization as an alternative theoretical framework. He criticizes previous studies highlighting the normative power of traditionally powerful Western actors, while overlooking the normative powers of emerging countries, such as China and Brazil. According to his argument, international norm diffusion occurs through both resisting and reframing international norms in a particular context. He argues that when emerging countries initially enter a realm of international society, they tend to take up existing norms. At an early stage, one-way socialization is more likely. Meanwhile, at a later stage, emerging countries can often play a role of norm-maker based on their growing power. In this process, emerging countries not only act as norm-takers but also as norm-shapers who spread their ideas and norms in international society. Thus, norm diffusion is not a linear process, but involves complex dynamics of resisting and reframing global norms through two-way socialization processes among actors.

Some other studies also highlight the two-way socialization of emerging countries, particularly China, as both norm-taker and norm-maker (Acharya 2014; Acharya 2018; Chin 2012; Jinnah 2017). Acharya (2014: 75) explains China’s potential motivation to create new norms originating from its history and culture in world politics. China not only learns a global norm and but also (re)shapes a norm strategically when the global norm doesn’t match with China’s existing domestic norms or its national

interest. China's contribution to developing the norm of "common but differentiated responsibility" (CBDR) in global climate change negotiations is one of the examples (Acharya 2014: 73).

In GEP literature, only a few recent studies (e.g., Jinnah 2017; Liu 2020) shed light on China and other emerging countries' role in developing global norms. Jinnah (2017) particularly applies the two-way socialization approach to explain China's influence on CBDR in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). She highlights the fact that emerging economies are both socializees and socializers of international norms (Jinnah 2017: 288). The article shows that China acted as a norm-taker and a norm-maker simultaneously by engaging in the UNFCCC governance framework and insisting on the accountability of developed country finance and voluntary mitigation commitments for developing countries through CBDR in the Paris Agreement (Jinnah 2017: 299). This is different from the traditional view on China as a norm-taker, based on one-way socialization, and reflects how China played as a norm-maker when China became to see it as a major carbon emitter, not only as a developing country (Jinnah 2017: 300).

Liu (2020) emphasizes that China is taking more of a norm entrepreneur's role (i.e., a norm-maker's role) in supporting the norm of "rational use" of marine resources in the Arctic and Antarctica through international negotiations in the regions. Liu's study shows that China is promoting sustainable utilization of the resources while weakening the ideas of pure environmental protections, such as the precautionary principle, in establishing governance mechanisms, such as the 2018 Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean (Liu 2020). In so doing, China is re-shaping international fisheries norms in the polar regions and inducing anxieties in the West (Liu 2020: 4).

These studies provide a new understanding of China's norm-making role in global environmental governance, based on the two-way socialization approach. Most GEP literature and previous studies regarding transnational extractives governance lack this alternative view of Chinese actors as norm-makers. While most literature about transnational extractives governance focuses on a transparency norm and some INGOs' role in diffusing the norm (e.g., Global Witness), it disregards the normative role of other actors, including China. Even though some articles attempt to examine China's status in global extractives

governance, those studies describe the inactive participation or the absence of Chinese actors in transnational governance mechanisms (Mouan 2010; Bleischwitz et al. 2012; Yuan 2015).

Therefore, the two-way socialization framework provides a new approach to understand Chinese actors in global extractives governance. This perspective suggests that Chinese actors not only learn existing norms but also may reshape norms through their participation in governance mechanisms. China's involvement in norm development processes in world politics may change the substance of an old norm even though it is represented by the same terminology. For instance, Chinese actors can try to change the meaning of transparency, one of the representative norms in global extractives governance, which is distinguished from the meaning of transparency supported by traditional great powers such as the US. In this sense, even though the term, transparency doesn't change, the substance of the term can become closer to a Chinese version of transparency.

The Norm Circulation Framework

Acharya's (2018) norm circulation model, which shows specific multilevel processes of two-way socialization, serves as the primary analytical framework for this dissertation research (Figure 2). This framework is a particularly useful theoretical tool by which to examine two significant factors related to the two-way norm development process in global governance: 1) norm dynamics between state and non-state actors; and 2) norm dynamics across multiple levels. This approach does not regard a country as a monolithic actor. It is an important matter to look closely at who are the agents of socialization processes, particularly in global governance studies that shed light on both state and non-state actors. Previous norm literature focuses either on the socialization of states (mostly in IR studies) or on the socialization of non-state actors (for example, corporations' norm adoption in CSR literature in business studies). This division overlooks how multiple state and non-state actors from a country engage with global norm dynamics interactively. Dashwood (2012) points out that previous studies have overlooked how state and transnational actors (particularly companies) interact, and how private and public sector norms are

intertwined in global norm dynamics. Figure 2 below shows how a global norm travels across the global and domestic (local) levels. The norm circulation framework explains nonlinear and evolutionary norm dynamics as a ‘multiple-agency, two-way, multi-step’ process (Acharya 2018: 56).




Figure 2. Norm circulation (adapted from Acharya 2018: 56)

Acharya (2018) argues that global (meta) norms (*grundnorms*) are contested not only at the international level but also at a regional or local level. Local social entities do not passively accept a global norm but modify it based on their local contexts and pre-existing values. Local actors adjust both local and global ideas to solve a tension between the two ideas. This modification process is ‘constitutive localization.’ While most previous norm studies emphasize norm-takers’ *adaptation to* foreign norms (e.g., Risse and Sikkink 1999), norm-takers in constitutive localization *adapt from* foreign ideas selectively, and integrate them with inherited values and ideas in order to support their core beliefs and affirm their existing identity (Acharya 2018: 46). Acharya emphasizes the role of local idea-shifters who contribute to revising the global norm in this process. The concept of idea-shifters is not the same as the liberal constructivists’ understanding of norm entrepreneurs, who are mostly Western actors working at the transnational level. Idea-shifters are a broader group of actors, including non-Western agents and those other than norm entrepreneurs. Acharya emphasizes weaker/non-state actors in the global South as potential idea-shifters, such as ‘non-Western thinkers and practitioners’ (Acharya 2018: 66). This concept provides a new

opportunity to shed light upon the normative leadership role of non-Western actors, which have been relatively disregarded in traditional global governance literature.

Acharya (2018) explains that the local-idea shifters localize global norms because of their desire to legitimize and empower their authority. He introduces the following three types of constitutive localization acts. First, local actors initiate a normative change by proactively seeking morally appealing foreign norms as “insider proponents” (instead of relying on “outsider proponents”) and legitimizing their local identity simultaneously (Acharya 2018: 44). Acharya calls this “local initiative” (Acharya 2018: 43). Second, localizers infuse local ideas into the contents of a selected foreign idea so that “the formal shape of the foreign idea is intact” and they can “signifying” and “universalizing” local beliefs to outsiders (Acharya 2018: 44-45). Third, another type of constitutive localization is transforming the formal shape and content of foreign norms and ideas to fit into local beliefs and practices (Acharya 2018: 45). These three types of localization acts show that Acharya broadly define a “localized norm.” Based on his nuanced understanding of this norm localization, a newly constituted localized norm does not need to have a new formal shape. More importantly, Acharya points out that new international norms “do not enter into a local normative vacuum” and may be tested through local actors’ “legitimate resistance” (Acharya 2009: 5).

A newly-shaped global norm through a constitutive localization process may become a subsidiary norm to challenge or resist powerful actors and ideas (Acharya 2018: 53). The norm can be universalized and become another global norm in the feedback loop of norm circulation. Acharya explains three reasons that local actors may make a subsidiary norm and attempt to export/ universalize it. First, when local actors are marginalized in global norm-making processes, they may develop a subsidiary norm against great powers imposing a global norm (Acharya 2018: 49). Second, when a global meta norm shaped by great powers violates a crucial local norm, local actors may make a subsidiary norm to limit the possibly unilateral norm violation (Acharya 2018: 50). Third, local actors may need to refine a global norm to match their local ideas and identities (Acharya 2018: 51). Compared to localization, the subsidiarity processes emphasize local actors’ role of norm-rejection and/or norm-making based on their “outward-looking” view

and “fear of dominance by external powers” (Acharya 2018:54). The local actors focus on the “export” of locally constructed norms beyond a local usage of the norms (Acharya 2018: 54).

Acharya developed this alternative theoretical model to understand how ideas and norms spread in world politics by emphasizing “the agency role of norm-takers” and challenging the conventional top-down constructivist view (Acharya 2009: 3-4). His emphasis on a bottom-up/two-way process of norm development is the most distinguishable point compared to previous norm development theories like Risse and Sikkink’s norm “spiral model” (1999). The spiral model focuses on explaining target-government’s adoption of a human rights norm advocated by a global advocacy network, through “norm cascade.” Even though these theorists also emphasize local actors’ role—particularly local human rights NGOs, as Acharya does, they assume that these local actors share a normative ground with other foreign norm entrepreneurs such as international human rights organizations (Risse et al. 1999). From this perspective, their target norms are treated as a universal idea. Alternatively, Acharya’s model is useful to understand interactions between foreign and local norms (two-way dialogue) and increasing complexities of multilevel dynamics in global governance.

Meanwhile, there is a lack of understanding of some key components of Acharya’s norm-circulation model. For instance, Bloomfield (2016) pointed out a lack of theoretical explanations of when and why specific outcomes appear in this model. In other words, there are possibilities to develop the norm-circulation model by examining under what conditions constitutive localization occurs and when/how local idea-shifters successfully universalize a locally shaped norm at the transnational level. Another gap of Acharya’s model is that it does not clearly explain how power affects the norm circulation, including the norm-localization and universalization processes. Acharya focuses mostly on weaker non-Western actors’ ideas and a global “idea-shift” which is as important as “power-shift” (Acharya 2018: 66). It is a reasonable approach given his constructivist view. On the other hand, I assume that power would be an important factor affecting the idea-shift in the norm circulation model. Particularly, different sources of power of each actor would impact their roles and capacities in constitutive localization and universalization processes.

Therefore, powerful non-Western actors may play a bigger norm-making role than weak non-Western actors.

In this sense, realist constructivism emphasizing both norms and power (Barkin 2003; Barkin 2010; Jackson et al. 2004; Guzzini 2005) provides a useful lens to fill the gap of Acharya's norm circulation model and helps this dissertation examine how power matters in norm development processes (particularly related to the third main research question introduced in chapter 1). According to Barkin, realist constructivism "would look at the way in which power structures affect patterns of normative change in international relations and, conversely, the way in which a particular set of norms affect power structures" (Barkin 2003: 337). It is "a constructivism in which a concern for power politics, understood as relational rather than structural, is central" (Barkin 2010: 169). This theoretical approach examining the interrelationships between power and international norms (Barkin 2003: 337) brings the issue of power and power politics back to norm debates in global governance studies. For example, drawing on realist constructivism, Reinold (2013) explains powerful states' disproportionate influence on norms supporting sovereignty, based on their hard and soft power resources (Reinold 2013: 5). From this perspective, realist constructivism can be a useful tool for elaborating on the concept of two-way socialization and Acharya's norm-circulation model. More specifically, this theoretical lens expands our understanding of how the power of actors (especially powerful non-Western states) influences constitutive localization and universalization of a norm in the norm-circulation model. Moreover, in so doing, this theoretical lens opens an innovative opportunity to overcome the ontological dichotomy between realism and constructivism—in other words, it rejects paradigmaticism in IR (Barkin 2020: 213).

In this dissertation, I apply Acharya's norm-circulation model to the case of China in transparency norm development in global extractives governance. In addition, I attempt to integrate realist constructivism's insight emphasizing both norms and power into the norm-circulation model to show how power affects norm circulation processes, such as norm-localization and universalization. The following chapters (Chapter 3, 4, and 5) examine Chinese actors' role in a transnational transparency norm circulation

and see how the empirical analysis matches with each stage of Acharya's model and develops the framework.

Specifically, chapter 3 focusing on China's engagement in transnational extractive governance initiatives grounded in a transparency norm fits into the first stage in the norm-circulation model—learning and taking a global norm advertised by a norm entrepreneur at the transnational level (See A in Figure 2). The chapter clarifies who are the major Chinese and non-Chinese actors in the norm development process and the primary venues of a transparency norm diffusion/contestation at the transnational level. The norm-circulation model helps us to understand that China's participation in TEGIs is not a static phenomenon, but a part of an evolutionary norm development process as multilevel dynamics across the transnational and local level.

Chapter 4, which is a case study of Chinese versions of transparency guidelines and China's establishment of the Responsible Cobalt Initiative (RCI), focuses on the second and third stages of Acharya's framework: constitutive localization (see B in Figure 2) and universalization (see C in Figure 2). The norm-circulation model provides useful terminologies and analytical tools to conceptualize the process, particularly to understand how and why Chinese actors developed a distinct version of transparency guidelines. For instance, the concept of local idea-shifters supports analyzing the role of major Chinese local actors in developing the guidelines.

Finally, chapter 5 analyzes the interlinkages between power and the universalization of a localized transparency norm, drawing on both the norm-circulation framework and realist constructivism's view on norms and power. I apply Barnett and Duvall (2005)'s different types of power to the case of RCI to examine how China's material resources are translated into institutional and structural power and affect the universalization process of China's localized transparency norms (See C in Figure 2). Collectively, Acharya's norm circulation model and realist constructivism provide useful theoretical lenses that make cross-paradigmatic conversations possible. Notably, Acharya's norm circulation framework connected to the two-way socialization concept expands potential research scope of global governance studies by emphasizing various types of actors' role in developing a transnational norm (including both Western and

non-Western actors' norm-making role). It provides useful theoretical languages that can emphasize both norm development and power politics in global governance. Therefore, this approach is particularly beneficial to shed light on China's multidimensional roles beyond the binary notion of China as a threat or China as a passive norm-taker. This dissertation based on this theoretical orientation brings new understandings of China as an emerging power in world politics in general. At the same time, this research fills the gap in previous studies about China's normative role and its growing power in global environmental governance.

CHAPTER 3. CHINA IN TRANSNATIONAL EXTRACTIVES GOVERNANCE: A MAPPING EXERCISE²

Introduction

The sustainability of the global extractive resource supply chain is a significant issue in global environmental governance. This issue is exacerbated by the growing international demand for resources that are critical to green industries, such as cobalt, which is used to produce lithium-ion batteries in solar panels and electric vehicles. China has become one of the biggest players in the global market for extractive sources over the last few decades—today, China controls almost 60% of the global lithium supply chain (FP 2019, 5). Moreover, the Xi regime’s national grand strategy, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has expanded China’s influence in the global extractive sector (OECD 2018, 24) by supporting Chinese companies seeking to develop infrastructure and operate massive mining projects in resource-rich countries. Despite its rapidly growing impacts on the extractive sector, previous studies in global governance have not sufficiently investigated China’s role in the governance of the extractive sector.

Since the early 2000s, the international community has established several transnational extractive governance initiatives (TEGI), such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) (see Auld et al 2018), which provide guidelines meant to enhance the transparency of governments and mining companies and make extractive projects more sustainable. The basic idea behind TEGIs is that enhanced transparency in the global extractive resource supply chain can mitigate the resource curse that plagues many resource-rich countries. (Alstine 2014; David-Barrett and Okamura 2015; Humphreys et al 2007). For example, disclosing financial transactions between resource suppliers and buyers through TEGIs’ transparency policies might curb corruption in those developing countries where resource extraction results in conflicts and poverty (Weinthal and Luong 2006). In this way, TEGIs function as platforms for the development of global transparency norms and work as global norm entrepreneurs. On the other hand, we

² This chapter has been submitted to a peer-review journal and currently being revised and resubmitted.

cannot understand the actual effects of TEGIs without reviewing China's role in TEGIs. If China, one of the world's biggest players in resource extraction, does not participate in transnational governance mechanisms advocating transparency norms, then TEGIs cannot effectively achieve their intended policy goals. Thus, this article explores China's engagement in TEGIs and its impact on the development of global transparency norms.

The so-called "China-threat theory" debated in today's academic and policy discussions provides skeptical views on China's role in global governance. This theory asserts that China is challenging existing norms of "good governance"—e.g., transparency, human rights, environmental rights, and democracy—advocated by traditionally powerful actors from the West, such as the World Bank, the United States, and the European Union (EU). Some scholars have shown different characteristics of Chinese versions of global governance and highlighted how Chinese investment and business operations in resource-rich developing countries focus on so-called "effective governance" rather than upholding values—i.e., these actors focus on the profitability of their operations (e.g., Mol 2011; Power et al 2012; Zhang 2011). On the other hand, Chinese actors have recently begun to participate in some TEGIs developing global transparency standards. It is noteworthy that most TEGIs are "good governance" initiatives advocating global transparency norms (Alstine et al 2014), and China has become a participant in the governance architecture. For example, Chinese government agencies and companies participated in the 7th EITI Global Conference (Cordy 2016). Furthermore, the International Council on Mining and Minerals (ICMM) and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals, and Chemical Importers and Exporters (CCCMC) agreed to promote sustainable development in Chinese overseas mining investments in December 2017 (ICMM 2017). Increasing Chinese involvement in such TEGIs raises the question of whether Chinese actors accept or challenge the transparency norms forwarded or supported by these governance initiatives, based on their unique values and growing international power.

Whereas some studies have examined the environmental and social impacts of Chinese investment and extractive projects overseas at the local level (González-Vicente 2013; Mol 2011), there is a lack of studies examining the role of China in the existing global extractives governance architecture. This gap

exists in part because most previous studies of TEGIs employ a single case study approach. With few exceptions (e.g., Auld et al 2018), academic research does not provide comprehensive topology of the current landscape of transnational extractives governance. Furthermore, there have been no attempts to explain China's role in developing global norms in the governance realm. This study fills these gaps in the literature by conducting a mapping exercise and attempting to chart the general tendencies of Chinese actors' involvement in TEGIs where transparency norms are developed and translated into global public policies. It seeks to examine (1) which TEGIs produce and reproduce what type of transparency norms projected onto their policies; (2) which Chinese actors are involved in which TEGIs; (3) how these actors engage in TEGIs that emphasize transparency norms; and (4) the distinct conditions under which Chinese corporations and government agencies engage in TEGIs.

The paper is organized as follows. The first section introduces a brief overview of transnational extractives governance, especially vis-à-vis transparency. The second section describes the current debates about China as an emerging power in transnational extractives governance. The third section shows the results of the study's empirical analysis of 48 TEGI governance platforms aimed at improving the social and environmental responsibility of the extractive sector. This section reveals different types of transparency norms within TEGIs and patterns of Chinese actors' participation in TEGIs. The last section discusses the implications of China's normative role in global extractives governance.

Transnational Extractives Governance and Transparency

Transnational extractives governance is a relatively recent phenomenon. Growing international demand to solve diverse issues in the global extractive resources supply chain—including corruption, the use of child labor, and water pollution at mining sites—have led to the establishment of several TEGIs in the past two decades. TEGIs function as governance platforms; they help stakeholders come together to develop new global policies and norms and identify common principles or voluntary standards regarding the environmental and social elements of resource extractive projects. TEGIs grew out of a sense that top-

down regulations within a country's jurisdictional territory could not effectively govern various actors in the global supply chain. For similar reasons, many previous studies emphasize the increasing demand for transnational multi-stakeholder networks and have provided an abundance of theoretical terminology within the field of Global Environmental Politics (GEP), such as global private governance (Cashore 2002; Pattberg 2005), transnational multi-stakeholder governance (Pattberg and Widerberg 2016), and transnational public-private governance (Andonova et al 2009; Bäckstrand 2006).

Despite the theoretical richness of these GEP perspectives, the literature lacks research which sees TEGI as an independent realm of global governance—one distinct from other environmental concerns, such as climate change (Auld et al 2018; exceptions include Acosta 2013; Carbonnier et al. 2011). Previous studies of TEGI usually focus on a specific extractive sector, such as gold (Auld et al 2018; Bloomfield 2017) or diamonds (Haufler 2010a), or look at a single initiative as a case study. Of the latter group, most studies focus on the EITI. These studies often examine the institutional traits of the EITI in the context of the implementation of policy, the compliance of EITI members (David-Barrett and Okamura 2016; Ihugba 2016), or the local impacts of the EITI (Öge 2014; Papyrakis et al 2017; Sovacool et al 2015). In short, there is no comprehensive picture of existing TEGIs as an integrated global governance architecture that creates global norms for resource governance.

Most global governance scholars recognize norms as critical components of transnational governance systems (Bernstein and Cashore 2007). Moreover, many scholars assert that transnational governance organizations interact with one another and produce common social norms, and that these norms constitute a unified, normative structure which has “a life of its own” (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2009, 709). While some researchers attend to global norms of corporate social responsibility (CSR) or sustainable development (SD) (Dashwood 2012), others emphasize how individual TEGIs advance transparency as a core norm of resource extraction governance (Alstine 2014; David-Barrett and Okamura 2016). Although transparency was initially advanced as a core norm to combat corruption and disclose financial transactions of resource projects (Alstine 2014; Haufler 2010b), Bleischwitz (2014) argues that transparency norms in resource extraction need to be broadened to include environmental concerns. In mapping the landscape of

TEGIs, I argue, we can gain new insights into the commonalities and differences between different TEGIs' influence on transparency norms in global extractives governance. Most of the existing literature does not reflect the full variety of transparency norms operated in TEGIs because of its heavy focus on the EITI and financial transparency. Thus, by drawing a comprehensive map of different types of TEGI transparency norms and showing how Chinese actors engage in this broad picture, this paper makes a substantial contribution to the literature.

The Rise of China in the Extractive Sector

The rise of China is currently one of the most hotly debated issues in international relations scholarship. For instance, some scholars have tried to discern whether an emergent China will attempt to challenge American hegemony and reshape the existing world order (Brooks and Wohlforth 2016; Mearsheimer 2010). This narrative has led scholars to portray China's national grand strategy, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI; 一帶一路), in a negative light. Even though the Chinese government has argued that the BRI is not part of a strategy to challenge American hegemony, the BRI's massive infrastructure projects have greatly and rapidly expanded China's influence in the developing world (The Economist 2018). Moreover, China has become the leading investor in many regions since Western countries' foreign direct investment (FDI) ratios declined following the global financial crisis of 2009.

China's growing influence has raised questions about its various impacts on global governance. Domestic shortages of natural resources have led China to invest aggressively in the extractives sectors of other countries (Gallagher 2016). Exploration/extraction has been the second-largest sector (\$83.3 billion) in China's global energy finance through BRI, and major banks such as the Chinese Development Bank (CDB) have increased their financial supports for companies in this sector (Gallagher 2019). In this light, the BRI has been a useful platform for Chinese extraction companies to access mining sites around the world. Many studies have emphasized the negative impacts of China's increased outward foreign direct

investment (OFDI) on the environment and recipient countries and have emphasized the potentially negative outcomes of China's growing political influence (Chin 2012; Zhang 2011). For example, Kopinski and Sun (2014) explained that Chinese investment is based on project-type financing, which emphasizes profitability and is therefore distinct from the World Bank's program-type financing, which considers a project's potential environmental and social impacts as a rule.

The China threat narrative often highlights Chinese actors' different behavioral patterns and explains them with reference to Chinese values and norms (as distinct from Western norms). Several scholars have explained how Chinese government actors and companies violate transparency norms in resource-rich developing countries. For instance, Harvey's (2014) work links Chinese investment in Africa to the low level of African development via the opaque relationship between Chinese national banks and government elites (see also Power et al 2012). Bond and Garcia (2015) advance a similar argument that China intensifies the unfair relationship between local people and local elites through tax evasion or mispricing minerals. Furthermore, Tuman and Shirali (2017) suggested that Chinese business culture, especially social networks and *guanxi* (關係),³ can help explain Chinese firms in African countries' preference for informal avenues as opposed to legal channels.

Despite this literature on the perceived China threat regarding transparency norms at the local level, there is a distinct lack of studies observing China's normative influence in the process of creating and disseminating transparency norms at the transnational level. Indeed, the role of actors from the Global South has been overlooked in global governance studies in general (Hale and Held 2011), and only a few studies in the global extractives governance literature have focused on China. For instance, Mouan (2010) exceptionally describes how Western actors' principles and values hinder China's active participation in the EITI. Furthermore, Auld et al (2018) pointed out the significance of examining the increasing influence

³ Even though these authors do not directly mention *guanxi* (關係), their argument explicitly describes how Chinese business culture and social norms influence Chinese behavior in African countries. Guanxi is a unique Chinese cultural element of business relationships, emphasizing interpersonal connections rather than official connections.

of emerging economies, such as China and India, given that their growth and emergence might cause new governance challenges.

Research Method and Data

This mapping exercise is based on an analysis of 48 cases of TEGIs that were active as of October 2019 (see Table 1). Cases were identified by drawing on the International Trade Centre (ITC) Standards Map and several lists from the scholarly literature (Auld et al 2018; Bauchowitz 2014). These lists were then cross-checked with the list of voluntary responsible mining initiatives in the 2015 white paper of the World Economic Forum and RESOLVE. The main data source was written documents—including meeting minutes, annual reports, governance guidelines, and member lists—published by each TEGI and made accessible on their official websites. Analysis of these documents was supplemented with expert interviews: one with a senior staff member of an international non-governmental organization (INGO), one with a director of a Chinese government agency, and one with a Chinese scholar who specializes in this topic. The expert interviews provided crucial background knowledge that helped the author to interpret the coding results and increase the credibility of the data analysis.⁴

The TEGI data were analyzed through a two-tier coding cycle (cf. Saldaña 2016) and by applying abductive analysis, which pursues “a finding of surprise, puzzle, or anomaly” (Timmermans and Tavory 2012, 180). Abductive analysis is an ongoing reasoning process that repeats cycles between analysis and data gathering (Timmermans and Tavory 2012, 175) so that a researcher can determine which anomalous cases should be highlighted. Each TEGI was coded in terms of 1) its approach to the issue of transparency, 2) the types of actors involved (e.g., companies, banks, government agencies), and 3) the nature of Chinese actors’ participation (see Appendix 1.). This analysis aims to show the primary characteristics of the transparency of current TEGIs and to reveal various patterns in Chinese actors’ involvement in the

⁴ The interviewees’ anonymity has been assured and protected for privacy reasons.

transnational extractive governance architecture. I assume the Chinese actors' active engagement in certain TEGIs reflects their adoption of primary norms projected onto the TEGIs' policies.

Table 1. The 48 transnational extractives governance initiatives (TEGI) analyzed in the study.

TEGI	Abbreviation
Africa Mining Vision	AMV
Alliance for Responsible Mining	ARM
Alliance for Responsible Mining Fairmined Initiative	FI
Aluminum Stewardship Initiative	ASI
Better Gold Initiative	BGI
Devonshire Initiative	DI
Diamond Development Initiative International	DDI
Dow Jones Sustainability Index	DJSI
Dubai Multi Commodities Centre	DMCC
Equitable Origin	EO
Equator Principles	EP
European Partnership & Responsible Minerals	EPRM
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative	EITI
FTSE Russell	FTSE
Global e-Sustainability Initiative	GeSI
Global Reporting Initiative	GRI
Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance	IRMA
Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development	IGF
International Council on Mining and Metals	ICMM
International Cyanide Management Code	ICMC
International Finance Corporation	IFC
International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association Oil and Gas Industry Guidance on voluntary sustainable reporting	IPIECA
International Seabed Authority Mining Code	ISA
International Tin Research Institute Tin Supply Chain Initiative	ITRI
ISO14001 Standard for Environmental Management Systems	ISO
Kellogg Innovation Network	KIN
Kimberley Process	KP
London Bullion Market Association's Program	LBMA
Mining Association of Canada-Towards Sustainable Mining	TSM
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises	OECD
Prospectors & Developers Association of Canada e3 plus	PDAC
RESOLVE Deep Seabed Mining Projects	DSM
Public-Private Alliance for Responsible Minerals Trade	PARMT
Responsible Artisanal Gold Solutions Forum	RAGS
Responsible Business Alliance	RBA
Responsible Cobalt Initiative	RCI
Responsible Jewellery Council	RJC

Responsible Minerals Initiative	RMI
Responsible Mining Foundation	RMF
Responsible Steel TM	RSTM
Social Accountability 8000 Standard	SA8000
Solutions for Hope Tantalum Project	SHTP
The International Tin Association Code of Conduct	ITS
The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Global Business and Biodiversity Programme	GBBP
United Nations Global Compact	UNGC
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights	VPSHR
World Economic Forum Responsible Mineral Development Initiative	RMDI
World Gold Council	WGC

Transparency in TEGI

This research confirms that transparency is a primary norm of TEGIs. The disclosure of information via audits or reporting is a common policy tool for improving accountability in all 48 TEGIs analyzed in this study. Figure 3 displays the type(s) of information members of these initiatives are required to disclose. Figure 3 also shows how TEGIs have expanded the scope of information they require and thus broadened the meaning of transparency beyond focusing on the disclosure of financial information in the extractives sector: 47 of the 48 TEGIs asked companies to report on social issues such as human rights, labor rights, and public health, and 46 demanded that companies disclose information on their operations’ environmental effects. Furthermore, half of the 48 initiatives ask participants to report on all four different types of information, while only ten initiatives focus on one or two types of transparency-related issues.




Figure 3. Different transparency-related issues among the 48 TEGIs analyzed in the study.

This analysis also reveals an important distinction between thick and thin versions of the transparency projected by TEGIs. Schleifer et al (2019) distinguish between shallow and deep transparency, and Bloomfield (2017) distinguishes between first-, second-, and third-party governance initiatives. These scholars’ categories imply that there are degrees of transparency in decision-making procedures and that substantial policy outcomes are decided in part by “what information is disclosed by whom, and for whom” (Schleifer et al 2019, 4). In short, these scholars suggest that if transparency standards are created and implemented by industrial actors alone, and compliance and verifying mechanisms are not developed and enforced by outside parties, transnational governance systems would lack legitimacy and accountability.

This paper distinguishes between thick and thin transparency initiatives based on the findings of the studies mentioned above. It defines a thick transparent initiative as one possessing a more accountable governance mechanism and a thin transparent initiative as one lacking verifying systems—particularly those which share only a limited amount of information with the public. By applying the evaluation criteria of previous literature, the 48 TEGIs in this study were coded as promoting thick transparency if they met all of the following three criteria: 1) they disclose information about multi-stakeholder rule-setting

processes to the public; 2) an independent third-party is present in the monitoring process; and 3) they disclose a substantial amount of information about their monitoring results to the public.

The coding results show that most initiatives project thin transparency through their governance mechanisms. Only 11 of the 48 initiatives (about 23%) satisfy all three thick transparency criteria (Figure 4); 27 (more than 50%) met only one condition or none, and 10 fulfilled two criteria. The prominence of thin transparency in these TEGIs indicates that the public has limited access to information about companies' behaviors in the extractive sector. This could in turn foster doubt regarding the credibility and efficacy of TEGIs.




Figure 4. Thick and Thin Transparency TEGIs

Chinese Engagement in TEGI

A considerable number of Chinese actors engage with TEGIs. Chinese companies, government agencies, banks, academics, and civil society actors participate in 29 of the 48 TEGIs examined in this study. The growing presence of Chinese actors in TEGIs indicates that China is not rejecting global transparency norms; instead, it is becoming an active player by adopting the transparency standards of transnational extractive governance mechanisms. Of these 29 TEGIs featuring Chinese participants, 21 advanced thin transparency.

Transnational governance scholars differentiate between public, private, and hybrid initiatives based on the types of actors involved (Abbot and Snidal 2009). Figure 5 shows how Chinese actors tend to take part in more private initiatives i.e., those regulated by companies or banks (13 of the 29 TEGIs with Chinese participants) than other types of TEGIs. This concentration is notable because the majority (26) of the 48 TEGIs analyzed in this study are hybrid; that is, they are led by all three types of actors (government agencies, companies, and NGOs). By mapping Chinese involvement in these 48 TEGIs, we can see that Chinese actors seem to prefer private governance arrangements (corporation-centric mechanisms) over hybrid schemes jointly operated by companies, governments, and NGOs. Abbot and Snidal (2009) claim that such private initiatives are instances of firms' self-regulation and do not necessarily lead firms to act in the public interest because of the absence of states and NGOs playing an essential role in monitoring and enforcement processes. From this perspective, China's preference for private initiatives could create accountability issues in global extractives governance generally.




Figure 5. Mapping the 48 TEGIs by their main participants, including Chinese participants

It is worth acknowledging that China does not participate in TEGIs as a unified, monolithic actor. Figure 6 demonstrates different Chinese actors' participation in TEGIs. The graph identifies the total number of TEGI open to different kinds of actors, and the number of participants with direct Chinese participants—not all 48 TEGIs are open to all types of actors. For instance, Chinese companies are part of 22 of the 43 TEGIs available to them, and Chinese banks participate in about 45% of the 11 TEGIs available to them. The participation rates of Chinese companies and banks are distinctly higher than those of Chinese government agencies (8 of 33 available TEGIs) and civil society actors (5 of 31 available TEGIs). In other words, Chinese market actors are more active participants in the current TEGI architecture than their government or civil society counterparts. Below, this study details how Chinese companies and government agencies show distinctive engagement patterns.




Figure 6. Types of Chinese actors participating in TEGIs.

Chinese companies

Chinese companies are the most prominent type of Chinese participants in TEGIs. As of 2019, about 208 Chinese companies had joined 24 TEGIs. These companies included China's largest extractive companies—both state-owned companies such as the China Minmetals Corporation (participating in five TEGIs: ISO, UNGC, ITS, ISA, and DSM) and China National Gold Corporation (in UNGC and ICMC) and private companies such as the Zijin Mining Group (in DJSI and LBMA) and China Molybdenum (in RMI and DJSI). Figure 7 shows that most Chinese companies are active participants in TEGIs—i.e., they

accept a formal obligation to comply with transparency requirements and can participate in decision-making processes related to transparency norm development within the initiative itself. The active participation of China’s largest private- and state-owned extractive companies is remarkable given their growing influence overseas. Other companies involved in these TEGIs include the electronics giants Huawei and ZTE. This latter group tends to be sensitive to the reputation of their brand, given the demands of global consumers and Western NGOs (Drezner and Lu 2009, 188). To improve their market image, these companies put pressure on their upstream resource suppliers to follow CSR standards of TEGI-like codes of conduct, including transparency measures.⁵




Figure 7. Numbers of Chinese companies participating in TEGIs and their engagement types.

Another major characteristic of Chinese companies’ participation in TEGI is that most companies are engaging with initiatives that advance thin transparency. Figure 7 shows that Chinese companies actively participated in 15 thin transparency TEGIs and only 7 thick transparency TEGIs. Overall, approximately 70% of the 208 Chinese companies are involved in thin transparency TEGIs. As mentioned above, these types of initiatives usually lack governance mechanisms that make them accountable to the

⁵ For example, Huawei published a statement regarding its cobalt supply chain requiring its upstream suppliers to avoid any social and environmental harm by using certain global governance mechanisms such as the RCI and RBA (more information is available at: <https://www.huawei.com/en/declarations/statement-on-responsible-cobalt-supply-chain>).

public, and thus raise concerns that TEGIs serve the interests of powerful companies by enhancing their reputation and not guaranteeing their actual compliance with environmental regulations (Dingwerth and Eichinger 2014, 243). Indeed, Drezner and Lu (2009) suggested that Chinese companies lean toward voluntary CSR programs that have weak enforcement mechanisms, and other experts have shown that Chinese companies are concerned that stringent global standards may restrain their business opportunities and competitiveness (Guo et al 2013, 3). A senior director in a Chinese government agency explained that high global standards could be burdensome for Chinese companies due to their short history of learning CSR (interview #1, July 31, 2019). For the same reason, another expert interviewee who has been working in an INGO closely partnering with China also expected Chinese companies to keep reacting passively to a transparency policy with high scrutiny (interview #2, July 23, 2019).

On the other hand, this finding reveals a few exceptional cases showing Chinese companies' involvement in thick transparency TEGIs. It is worth mentioning that 32 Chinese companies are active members in the London Bullion Market Association's Program (LBMA), a thick transparency governance mechanism which oversees the largest global bullion market. The LBMA trades approximately 900 tons of gold every day and has about 150 members from more than 30 states (Hobson 2018). Its members are required to follow several transparency standards in order to maintain their membership status (LBMA 2020). For instance, Daye Nonferrous Metals Co. (DNMC), one of the largest Chinese copper manufacturing companies, joined the LBMA in 2007. It has since published reports which affirm its compliance with LBMA guidelines and procedures, including publishing a list of its suppliers, its third-party audit information, and the company's due diligence management policy (DNMC 2018). LBMA membership is an entry ticket to the world's largest bullion market—in other words, access to the market depends on companies' compliance with the LBMA's transparency standards. This strong market incentive may explain Chinese companies' unusually high rate of participation in this particular thick transparency TEGI.

In sum, Chinese companies' involvement in existing TEGIs appears to reflect their business interests. Their participation can be interpreted as a reaction to increasing international scrutiny of their

corporate practices (Economy and Levi 2014, 100) and their desire to improve their reputation in global markets—a desire which is directly linked to the economic benefits they hope to derive from having such a reputation (Guo et al 2011). In short, China’s adoption of transparency rules seems to be aimed at developing market efficiency and attracting foreign investors rather than fulfilling grassroots demands for information and the right to know (Florini and Jairaj 2014).

Chinese government agencies

Chinese government agencies prefer thin transparency initiatives as well (see Figure 8). Compared to Chinese companies, Chinese government agencies participate in fewer TEGI and are more passive participants—they tend to support transparency norms symbolically, e.g., by signing a memorandum of understanding (MoU) or acting as partners on temporary projects, thereby skirting the formal obligation to follow TEGI rules and having only limited say in decision-making processes. The Chinese government’s passive engagement with TEGIs signals its limited commitment to existing transparency norms. Interestingly, Chinese governmental agencies engage actively in some TEGIs when initiatives are formed by a sub-body of a traditional intergovernmental organization and the Chinese government is an official member of that organization (e.g., the International Seabed Authority).




Figure 8. Chinese government agencies’ participation in TEGIs.

There seem to be two explanations for the Chinese government's passive engagement with TEGIs. First, the credibility of a given TEGI partially determines the degree of the Chinese government's active engagement. According to a Chinese expert on Chinese environmental foreign policy, the Chinese government regards the United Nations as a strategic platform to strengthen China's green leadership (interview #3, January 14, 2020). It has been supposed that, for example, Chinese officials prefer the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) to the EITI, which they perceive as a "Western NGO" (Economy and Levi 2014, 109). Although the Chinese government supported the EITI at the 2009 G20 Summit (Economy and Levi 2014, 108) and at least 130 Chinese companies follow the EITI's reporting process in 24 EITI implementing countries (EITI 2016a), China is not currently a member state of the EITI. Instead, China participates in the EITI passively, for instance, as an invited conference participant (EITI 2016b).

Second, Chinese government agencies engage in TEGIs passively when their primary rules are already set up by Western actors. This shows China's reluctance to be regulated by foreign institutions. Drezner and Lu (2009) claim that China does not follow international standards when it perceives that these standards are imposed by Western countries. One of this study's expert interviewees also emphasized Chinese actors' skepticism regarding international standards created without China's input, such as the EITI (interview #2, July 23, 2019). According to a statement by China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China worries that EITI standards may violate China's noninterference principle (Economy and Levi 2014, 109). This stance emphasizes the Chinese government's autonomy and has been observed across other global governance issues (Bevir and Gaskarth 2015, 80–81).

Instead of actively participating in TEGI standards imposed by Western countries, Chinese governmental agencies have begun to develop their own domestic standards and TEGIs. For example, the CCCMC developed its Guidelines for Social Responsibility in Outbound Mining Investment in 2014 (MOFCOM 2018) and Chinese Due Diligence Guidelines for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains in 2015 (CCCMC 2016a), initiated the Responsible Cobalt Initiative (RCI), and published the Cobalt Refiner Supply Chain Due Diligence Standard based on the OECD Due Diligence Guidance in 2017 in

collaboration with the RMI.⁶ Through these efforts, the Chinese government aims to resolve many social and environmental problems regarding cobalt production—particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The RCI appears to be the first Chinese-led global governance initiative advocating for the responsible global supply of the extractive sector. Some large well-known corporations—including Apple, Hewlett-Packard, Huawei, Samsung SDI, and LG Chemistry—participate in the RCI as official members. Significantly, the RCI did not passively adopt existing global guidelines but instead applied Chinese-derived transparency rules.

There is no clear evidence to describe the actual impact of these Chinese versions of global extractives governance rules on the global governance architecture. However, Chinese governance mechanisms seem to be supporting a thin transparency norm. Although the RCI’s membership continues to increase, there is a distinct lack of publicly available RCI documents and the RCI lacks an official website. This limited accessibility and the lack of civil society actors participating in the mechanism seem to reflect a preference for thin transparency TEGIs.

Conclusion

This mapping exercise shows that 1) transparency is a fundamental norm in the existing transnational extractives governance architecture, and 2) the concept of transparency has recently been expanded beyond its anti-corruption origins to include a range of social and environmental issues. Despite many concerns about China’s threat to the current norm-based global order, many Chinese actors (particularly top Chinese extractive and electronic corporations) participate actively in existing TEGIs and thus reinforce existing transparency norms in global extractives governance. This indicates that China is

⁶ Follow-up research should explore what triggered China’s leadership (or an active engagement) in building this new initiative and standard for the cobalt supply chain. Further information can be found on the following link: <http://www.responsiblemineralsinitiative.org/emerging-risks/cobalt>.

becoming incorporated into the global transparency norm architecture and that its potential influence in the transparency norm development processes is growing.

Chinese companies' active engagement in TEGIs could be good news, given their increasing market influence on the global extractive resources supply chain. This might suggest that concerns about China's negative impact on transnational CSR are exaggerated (Pegg 2012) and counter the China threat theory assuming that China is breaking the existing world order. However, rather than posing a challenge to this order, China is attempting to build a positive reputation by working within the current order to increase its soft power (Buhmann 2017).

This study revealed that Chinese actors participate in TEGIs selectively, depending on each initiative's different governance mechanisms and transparency norms, and operate in distinct ways. It showed that Chinese companies that are sensitive to their reputation among consumers and investors participate actively in TEGIs, but mostly thin transparency TEGIs, and therefore their participation may not foster changes in their behavior, thereby possibly leading to greenwashing or whitewashing of the companies. Furthermore, it showed that Chinese government agencies are more passive TEGI participants than companies because they are reluctant to be regulated by Western actors. In response, they develop Chinese versions of transparency standards and their own global initiatives. In short, this study suggests that Chinese companies and government agencies selectively adopt global transparency rules that uphold their uncompromising values—market interests and Chinese sovereignty, respectively—and that both Chinese corporations and government agencies prefer thin transparent governance mechanisms despite these differences.

In this sense, Chinese actors' continuously growing engagement in TEGIs can reshape the existing transnational extractives governance architecture by reinforcing a thin transparency norm through their increasing political and market influence. Moreover, China's more active participation in private, rather than hybrid governance mechanisms, might further facilitate their tendency toward thin transparency TEGIs and make the initiatives function as unaccountable private clubs by excluding diverse stakeholders, particularly civil society actors. An expert interviewee working closely with Chinese industry associations

emphasized that Chinese extractives companies have been disinclined to collaborate with INGOs in transnational multi-stakeholder venues because of their harsh criticisms of Chinese companies in international media (interview #1, July 31, 2019).

These patterns—China’s rising presence within TEGIs, its preference for thin transparency TEGIs, and the active role of private corporations in private forms of governance—all demonstrate China’s preference for market-focused accountability over democratic accountability in global civil society. Companies aim to enhance their image without incurring significant costs; this empowers large companies and other powerful actors in the market and disempowers and excludes weaker agents, such as indigenous communities in mining-affected regions. Therefore, a transnational governance system based on business-to-business transparency may not lead to positive policy outcomes on the ground, especially regarding democratic values (Dingwerth and Eichinger 2014). China’s increasing involvement in TEGIs and its role in strengthening thin transparency norms could continue accelerating the current marketization of transparency captured by powerful actors such as large corporations (Mason and Gupta 2014; Mol 2014). Therefore, the actual problem seems to be that China emphasizes and strengthens certain aspects of transparency norms as an emerging power.

This research aimed to capture patterns in Chinese actors’ engagement in existing TEGIs regarding transparency norms. It does not examine to what extent this engagement fosters their actual behavioral changes on extractive sites. This is a limitation that future research should address. Some previous studies have argued that weak transnational governance mechanisms might provide a chance for companies to learn CSR principles and lead to the development of an effective global “meta-regime” (Berliner and Prakash 2012, 2015), but this claim can only be accurate if Chinese actors in thin transparency TEGIs move to develop stringent rules and empower weaker agents over time. However, most Chinese actors do not seem to be moving in this direction. Therefore, future research can examine the local impacts of China’s growing presence in thin transparency TEGIs and reflect on how China’s engagement in thin TEGIs strengthens or weakens the value of transparency in the existing global extractive governance architecture.

CHAPTER 4. GLOBAL NORM-MAKER AS CHINA'S NEW BRAND? AN ANALYSIS OF THE RESPONSIBLE COBALT INITIATIVE (RCI)⁷

Introduction

China has become one of the most powerful actors in the global mineral supply chain. China is the biggest player in the world lithium-ion battery market and controls almost 60 percent of the global cobalt supply chain, a mineral closely linked to the growing market of electric vehicles (EV) (FP 2019). Growing policy and market demand for other green technology products such as solar panels and wind turbines has expanded the volume of extractive resource consumption by Chinese companies. Moreover, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Xi Jinping's new grand strategy, has increased the influence of China in the global extractive sector (OECD 2018), and a growing number of Chinese companies now operate mining projects overseas, particularly in resource-rich countries in the global South. Their growing international presence raises concerns about negative environmental and social impacts on the ground, as illustrated by INGO accusations against Chinese cobalt and copper companies for soil contamination and child labor in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Sanderson 2019).

Meanwhile, since the early 2000s, Chinese actors have started engaging in many transnational extractive governance initiatives (TEGI), such as the Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI) and the Responsible Jewelry Council (RJC). Most TEGI strongly emphasize a transparency norm and require member companies or governments to disclose information about environmental and social risks and impacts from mining projects. Such engagement in TEGI suggests that Chinese actors are taking up the transparency norm. At the same time, they appear to be reshaping the transparency norm through the work of the China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals and Chemical Importers and Exporters (CCCME), a quasi-governmental body⁸ registered in the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), which recently

⁷ This chapter will be submitted to a peer-reviewed journal after some revisions.

⁸ Guttman et al. 2018 explain the unique identity of CCCME in the Chinese context. The article defines it as a public institution that positions between a governmental agency and a non-state actor.

developed Chinese versions of transparency guidelines (e.g., the 2015 CCCMC Due Diligence Guidelines) and established the Responsible Cobalt Initiative (RCI), a TEGI aiming at sustainable global cobalt supply. These developments raise questions about the role of China in transparency norm development in global extractives governance and the impact of a transparency norm shaped by Chinese actors on the current governance architecture.

The norms literature in international relations (IR) does not sufficiently explain the role of non-Western actors and emerging countries on norm development (Epstein 2012; Pu 2012; Bloomfield 2016). Reflecting this theoretical gap, previous studies in global governance overall have paid little attention to the normative influence of China as an emerging power except for a few studies (e.g., Jinnah 2017). Most studies of norm diffusion and conventional global governance literature assume that a norm entrepreneur (usually from the West) ‘teaches,’ and a non-Western actor ‘learns,’ a global norm. This theoretical approach has disregarded the norm-making role of non-Western participants in global governance. Even though some recent norm contestation literature attempted to emphasize non-Western actors’ normative role (e.g., Acharya 2018; Wiener 2018; Bloomfield 2016), there is still a lack of empirical studies. This paper addresses this gap through an examination of China’s normative role in global extractives governance and a case study of the process leading to the creation of the RCI. Drawing on two-way socialization theory, which considers the interactions between norm-taking and norm-making across multiple levels (Pu 2012; Acharya 2018), this study aims to understand China’s new leadership role in transparency norm development in transnational extractives governance.

The RCI case highlights the interplay between global norm development processes and the localization of global norms. The main questions of this paper are as follows: 1) why did Chinese actors launch a Chinese version of transparency guidelines and a new governance initiative (RCI) instead of adopting existing global standards (e.g., OECD Due Diligence Guidance)? 2) what are the roles of domestic actors and transnational foreign partners in the development of the RCI? 3) how does the RCI compare to global extractives governance initiatives led by ‘the West’? and 4) what impact might the RCI have upon global transparency norm development in global extractives governance?

The first section of this paper outlines its main theoretical framework and research methods. Upon applying a process tracing approach with elite interviews and document analysis, I discover that China's role in transparency norm development within global extractive governance has evolved from a norm-taker to a norm-maker at the global level through three phases. From the early 2000s-2012, Chinese actors engaged in norm-taking through their involvement in TEGI. Notably, I find that Chinese actors strongly preferred to participate in TEGI promoting a “thin” version of transparency with limited obligation to disclose information to the public. 2013-2015 represents a period of “norm localization” whereby Chinese actors translated a global transparency norm into domestic guidelines for Chinese companies involved in the extractives sectors and in the process creating a subsidiary norm consistent with thin transparency. Finally, the RCI (2016-present) represents an effort to “universalize” the new Chinese version of transparency and reshape understanding of transparency in global extractives governance. The concluding section discusses key theoretical and empirical implications of this analysis. This research contributes overall to developing a stronger theoretical understanding of the role of an emerging, non-Western country in norm development processes in global governance.

Norm Development through Two-way Socialization

Most conventional constructivist literature in IR (and global governance scholarship influenced by this theoretical perspective) views global norm development processes as a smooth and steady cycle without conflicts occurring through learning, mimicking, and diffusing a norm among actors, led by a global norm entrepreneur such as INGOs based in North America and Europe (Risse-Kappen 1994; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Checkel 2001). The conventional framework tends to assume an asymmetrical story that ‘enlightened’ Western norm entrepreneurs guide ‘unenlightened,’ non-Western norm followers (Bloomfield 2016; see also Epstein, 2012). This ‘one-way socialization’ approach tends to overlook the normative power of non-Western actors in world politics (Pu 2012). This perspective hinders our

understanding of China's role as a norm maker in global governance, including as a developer of essential global norms and a global policymaker.

The two-way socialization theory of Pu (2012) and Acharya (2014) provides an alternative theoretical ground by which to perceive China as both a norm-taker and a norm-maker in global governance.⁹ This new approach highlights that norms are contested by various actors, particularly including non-Western actors, across levels. From this perspective, China not only learns a global norm and but also (re)shapes a norm strategically when the global norm doesn't match with China's existing domestic norms or its national interest. China's contribution to developing the norm of "common but differentiated responsibility" in global climate change negotiations is one of the examples (Acharya 2014: 73). Thus, norm diffusion is not a linear process, but involves complex dynamics of resisting and reframing global norms through two-way socialization processes among actors (Pu 2012).

Acharya's (2018) norm circulation framework is particularly a useful theoretical tool by which to examine two significant factors related to these two-way norm development processes and power politics in global governance: 1) norm dynamics between state and non-state actors; and 2) norm dynamics across multiple levels. Figure 9 below shows how a global norm travels across the global and domestic (local) levels. The norm circulation framework explains nonlinear and evolutionary norm dynamics because norm diffusion in this model is a 'multiple-agency, two-way, multi-step' process (Acharya 2018: 56).

⁹ Even though Acharya has not used the term "two-way socialization," his norm-circulation model can be seen as an elaborative version of Pu's two-way socialization (norm-taking and norm-making).




Figure 9. Norm circulation (a revised version of Acharya 2018: 56)

Acharya (2018) argues that global (meta) norms (*grundnorms*) are contested not only at the international level but also at a regional or local level. Local social entities do not passively accept a global norm but modify it based on their local contexts and pre-existing values. Local actors adjust both local and global ideas to solve a tension between the two ideas. This modification process is ‘constitutive localization.’ While most previous norm studies emphasize norm-takers’ *adaptation to* foreign norms (e.g., Risse and Sikkink 1999), norm-takers in constitutive localization *adapt from* foreign ideas selectively, and integrate them with inherited values and ideas in order to support their core beliefs and affirm their existing identity (Acharya 2018: 46). Acharya emphasizes the role of local idea-shifters who contribute to revising the global norm in this process. The concept of idea-shifters is not the same as the liberal constructivists’ understanding of norm entrepreneurs, who are mostly Western actors working at the transnational level. Idea-shifters implies a broader group of actors, including non-Western agents and those other than norm entrepreneurs. Acharya emphasizes weaker/non-state actors in the global South as potential idea-shifters, such as ‘non-Western thinkers and practitioners’ (Acharya 2018: 66). This concept provides a new opportunity to shed light upon the normative leadership role of non-Western actors, which have been relatively disregarded in traditional global governance literature.

A newly-shaped global norm through a constitutive localization process may become a subsidiary norm to challenge or resist powerful actors and ideas (Acharya 2018: 53). The norm can be universalized

and become another global norm in the feedback loop of norm circulation. Acharya explains three reasons that local actors may make a subsidiary norm. First, when local actors are marginalized in global norm-making processes, they may develop a subsidiary norm against great powers imposing a global norm (Acharya 2018: 49). Second, when a global meta norm shaped by great powers violates a crucial local norm, local actors may make a subsidiary norm to limit the possibly unilateral norm violation (Acharya 2018: 50). Third, local actors may need to refine a global norm to match their local ideas and identities (Acharya 2018: 51). Meanwhile, there is a lack of understanding of some key components of Acharya's norm-circulation model. For instance, Bloomfield (2016) pointed out a lack of theoretical explanations of when and why specific outcomes appear in this model.

This research applies the norm circulation framework to the case of RCI, a Chinese-initiated TEGI and reveals how a transparency norm (one of the primary norms in global resource governance) circulates between the global and Chinese domestic levels. I use a process-tracing approach that includes a historical analysis of China's engagement in transnational extractives governance, specifically by focusing on the process of establishing the RCI. This analysis relies heavily on semi-structured expert interviews with people involved in drafting the Chinese transparency guidelines and establishing the RCI – for example, junior and senior staff of Chinese government agencies, an international NGO, and a Chinese CSR company.¹⁰ I apply a document analysis that compares a Chinese version of transparency guidelines (the 2014 Chinese Guideline for Social Responsibility in Outbound Mining Operations and the 2015 Chinese Due Diligence Guideline) to existing 'non-Chinese (Western)' global guidelines. In addition, official news documents published on the CCCMC website (from the year of 2013 to March 2020) are analyzed for data-triangulation (Yin 2014:120). I analyze the data abductively, following a reasoning process that pursues “a finding of surprise, puzzle, or anomaly” to contribute to the development of theory (Timmermans and Tavory 2012:180). This process helps to elaborate on the main theoretical framework – Acharya's norm circulation and two-way socialization – by finding major influencing factors as potential theoretical

¹⁰ I conducted in-person interviews in Beijing in July 2019 and January 2020, and supplemented with phone-interviews several times. Appendix 2 shows the semi-structured interview questions.

variables. The empirical dimension of my analysis elaborates upon Acharya's framework by demonstrating more specific conditions to define key concepts (local idea-shifters, constitutive localization, and universalization).

This research fills an empirical gap in both IR and Global Environmental Politics (GEP), where there is a marked lack of research on transnational extractives governance (Auld et al. 2018). Previous literature focuses on only a few representative cases of TEGI, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) (Russell 2014; David-Barrett and Okamura 2016; Ihugba 2016) or Kimberly Process (Haufler 2010a). More importantly, when it comes to global governance and its changes, the agency of actors in the global South, and especially China, are understudied (Hale and Held 2011). A few recent articles acknowledge the role of CCCMC, and the 2014 and 2015 CCCMC guidelines for responsible mineral sourcing, within global governance (Buhmann 2017; Guttman et al. 2018). While these studies contribute to our understanding of Chinese actors' growing role in addressing global environmental and social problems caused by extractives industries, they do not sufficiently explain under what conditions Chinese actors play a role in developing norms, nor China's broader impact on global governance. This gap seems to come from the lack of a theoretical grounding which can account for the normative role of China (in other words, the role of China as a norm-maker).

China's engagement in transnational extractives governance (early 2000s-2012)

In the first phase of transparency norm circulation, several transnational extractive governance initiatives (TEGI) were launched and served as institutionalized governance platforms for promoting transparency as one of the primary norms in global extractives governance (Acosta 2013). The Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), established in 2003, is perhaps the most well-known example and requires member companies and governments to disclose essential information regarding extractive projects, such as financial transactions and social and environmental impacts. David-Barrett and Okamura

(2016) claim that the EITI is a successful “reputational intermediary” diffusing a transparency norm to other international and domestic actors in resource policies.

During this period, Chinese government agencies and companies slowly began participating in several TEGIs that emphasized a transparency norm in the extractive sector. For instance, Lenovo joined the Responsible Business Alliance (RBA) in 2006, a global initiative encouraging members to follow a responsible code of conduct, including a clause of responsible mineral sourcing.¹¹ Anqing Shuguang Chemical Co. and Hebei Chengxin Co. joined the International Cyanide Management Code (ICMC) in 2008 and 2010, respectively. The ICMC aims to reduce hazardous impacts of the use of cyanide in mining sites (particularly in the mining of gold).¹² The Chinese government and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a member of the World Bank Group, launched the Green Credit Policy initiative in 2007 for stimulating responsible behavior of Chinese companies overseas (e.g., regular submission of social and environmental assessment reports) (China Daily 2012). The partnership between IFC and Chinese representatives, such as the Ministry of Environmental Protection and China Banking Regulatory Commission, encouraged Chinese banks to build a relationship with the Equator Principles (EP), a global initiative requiring financial institutions to monitor social and environmental risks in business projects, including massive extractive sector projects overseas.¹³ In addition, the Chinese government officially declared its support for the EITI during the 2009 G20 Summit in Pittsburgh (Economy and Levi 2014:108). Overall, more than 200 Chinese actors have engaged with 29 distinct TEGI since this period (Park, under review). Of note, Chinese actors have tended to gravitate to TEGI promoting a “thin” version of transparency, with limited requirements to share information with the public and to include civil society

¹¹ More information on the company’s CSR practice is available on the Lenovo website: “LONOVO: GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN,” https://www.lenovo.com/us/en/social_responsibility/global_supply_chain/ (accessed March 15, 2019).

¹² Information on each member company is available at the ICMC website. Anqing Shuguang Chemical Co. and Hebei Chengxin Co. are both cyanide producers. <http://cyanidecode.org/signatory-company> (accessed March 16, 2019).

¹³ More details can be found at: https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/f7117e804862f20e8ab5cff995bd23db/China+Green+Credit_English+Flyer_Eng.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (accessed September 14, 2019).

actors in decision-making processes. The increasing presence of Chinese actors in the realm of transnational extractive governance in this phase was driven by several international and domestic factors.

Increasing international pressure

Chinese actors began looking to global standards advocated by TEGIs as a strategy to cope with international criticism of the socially and environmentally negative impacts of Chinese overseas investments in the extractives sector, especially in other developing countries. The volume of China's investment and aid in the global South rapidly increased during this period, and China became more deeply involved in the global market since its official entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001. The Chinese government encouraged Chinese companies to invest overseas based on its "go-out policy" (or "go global strategy"), initiated in 1999 with the goal of securing resources located outside of China (China Policy 2017; Power et al. 2012). After the global financial crisis in 2008, the scale of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to Africa surpassed the size of the US FDI.¹⁴ NGOs and news media began to express concern over a lack of transparency of investment contracts and benefit-sharing processes based on intimate ties between China and government elites in poor resource-rich countries. This lack of transparency was associated with weak efforts to implement measures to address environmental and human rights issues (Shinn 2015).

China's growing influence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was one of the main stories that caused concern. China and the DRC agreed to develop massive, nationwide resource extraction and infrastructure projects in 2008. This contract especially fostered joint venture projects of copper and cobalt mining (Global Witness 2011). According to a Global Witness report, more than 90 percent of the minerals produced in the Katanga region were exported to China (Global Witness 2011: 13). This report accused Chinese mining companies of using child labor and failing to fairly compensate employees. The

¹⁴ Johns Hopkins University's China Africa Research Initiative provides this data on Chinese investment in Africa (<http://www.sais-cari.org/chinese-investment-in-africa>).

local Katangan government lacked the enforcement capacity to make Chinese corporations follow social and environmental regulations, and the 2008 agreement between China and the DRC did not address any environmental and social issues (Global Witness 2011). The media framed the situation in terms of a new Chinese imperialism (Jiamao et al. 2011: 26).

These criticisms prompted the Chinese government to take action to create a better international image to enhance its outbound investment projects and improve the quality of global economic cooperation with investment-recipient countries. Specifically, China recognized the value of transparency, as regards its social and environmental responsibilities, in establishing a good international reputation. For example, the State Council of China declared “Nine Principles on Encouraging and Standardizing Outward Investment” in 2006 that includes the following statement:

(the meeting stressed) complying with local laws and regulations, and adhering to fair, *transparent public works project contracts*, making a commitment to and *fulfilling the necessary social responsibility to protect the legitimate rights and interests of local employees, paying attention to environmental resource protection*, caring for and supporting the local community and people’s livelihood...Creating a friendly environment for public opinion, walking the road of peaceful development policy, and *preserving our good image and a good corporate reputation* (quoted in Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al. 2013: 11; emphasis added).

Similar language is found in a book published by a Chinese think tank and a government ministry, where the Vice Minister of Environmental Protection of China, Pan Yue, remarks that setting guidelines and rules for Chinese companies overseas is necessary for China to be “a big responsible country” in its “go global strategy” (Jiamao et al. 2011: foreword). The authors emphasize the necessity of “building a *good country image*, enhancing its *soft power*” and “(looking) at best practices of international organizations” (Jiamao et al. 2011: preface; emphasize added). Examining and learning some best practices of corporate social responsibility (CSR) for environmental protection and social issues, as framed by leading global institutions, became one of the major missions of Chinese government bodies and companies during this period. This was important in establishing a good national brand as a way to counter the growing

discourse that the rise of China entailed a negative influence upon global order. In addition, transnational actors began approaching Chinese actors to share policy ideas reflecting a global transparency norm.

Domestic CSR rules

In this period, Chinese government agencies enhanced their support of CSR as a primary policy agenda, specifically emphasizing environmental responsibility of the business sector since the Communist Party of China (CPC) proclaimed “ecological civilization (*Shengtai wenming*)” as one of the main national goals at the 17th Party Congress in 2007 (Gutman et al. 2018: 129). The 11th Five-Year-Guideline of the CPC (2006-2011) prioritized environmental protection as a major national policy issue.¹⁵ During this period, many CSR guidelines (including some transparency mechanisms) were published, such as Shenzhen Stock Exchange Social Responsibility Instructions in 2006, guidelines to the state-owned enterprises issued by the State Council’s State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Council in 2007, Green Guidelines of ExIm Bank in 2007, and the Shanghai Stock Exchange Guidelines in 2008 (Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al. 2013).

Jiamao et al. (2011) explain that China had not formally recognized the term “corporate social responsibility” or integrated the term in the Chinese legal system (Jiamao et al. 2011:108). China, as a “latecomer,” adopted the concept of CSR much later than Western actors (interview #1, July 31, 2019). The new Chinese CSR guidelines published in this period are thus key pieces of evidence that China started adopting a foreign CSR concept and internalizing global CSR standards in Chinese contexts. One of the major CSR policy tools recommended by those guidelines was a reporting system linked to companies’ environmental and social impacts. This reporting system shows how China started internalizing a transparency norm in its CSR policies. The first Chinese Law requiring an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) entered into force in 2003 and requires EIA reporting from the phase of project planning

¹⁵ A summary of the Guideline is available at <http://www.china.org.cn/english/2006lh/160403.htm>.

(Jiaman et al. 2011:86). The 2008 Standardization Administration (SAC) published guidelines for voluntary social responsibility reporting (Guttman et al. 2018:128). Interestingly, the development of a CSR reporting system in China has been facilitated by financial institutions, through reporting guidelines and assessment frameworks that strengthen due diligence in granting credit (Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al. 2013; Guttman et al. 2018). These new domestic rules emphasized information disclosure related to environmental and social risks of Chinese overseas business investments and resembled many global transparency policies. With encouragement from the CPC, Chinese companies looked to TEGIs to find appropriate CSR strategies during this period.

Constitutive Localization of a global transparency norm (2013 – 2015)

The growing concerns of international society about the negative impact of Chinese companies operating massive mining operations in poor resource-rich countries, and especially the DRC, triggered formal and informal interactions between China and transnational actors during the period 2013 – 2015. Several transnational and foreign institutions attempted to create a close partnership with relevant Chinese agencies so that China could adopt global CSR standards in the extractive sector, primarily emphasizing a transparency norm. The CCCMC played a crucial role in initiating and developing a cooperative relationship with foreign partners. Importantly, the CCCMC did not passively adopt and use the global standards. Instead, the CCCMC developed two Chinese versions of guidelines, incorporating Chinese versions of transparency norms: the Chinese Guidelines for Social Responsibility in Outbound Mining Investment in 2014 (the 2014 Guidelines), and the Chinese Due Diligence Guidelines for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains in 2015 (the 2015 Guidelines).

The process of developing the CCCMC guidelines illustrates how Chinese local agents learned a global norm/idea from transnational norm entrepreneurs and localized the norm. In Acharya's (2018) theoretical terms, this can be seen as a constitutive localization process, and the CCCMC acted as a local idea-shifter to re-shape a global norm based on local context. The development of the CCCMC guidelines

also shows “an evolutionary process based on creative synthesis between local norms and foreign ideas” (Acharya 2018: 46). The CCCMC developed its 2014 Guidelines by adapting the ISO Guidance and the UN Global Compact (UNGC) Guidance to Corporate Sustainability into Chinese socio-economic contexts. The 2014 CCCMC Guidelines then became a crucial part of the 2015 CCCMC Due Diligence Guidelines. The 2015 Guidelines represent a combination of these 2014 Guidelines and the OECD Due Diligence Guidance. Later, the two CCCMC guidelines became a prerequisite condition for the establishment of the Responsible Cobalt Initiative (RCI) in 2016 (Figure 10).




Figure 10. The development of the CCCMC guidelines and RCI

The 2014 Chinese Guidelines for Social Responsibility in Outbound Mining Investment

The 2014 Guidelines based on the ISO Guidance and the UN Global Compact Guidance were a result of the Sino-German CSR project (2007-2014) implemented by German Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ) and the WTO Department of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) (MOFCOM 2014). It aimed to enhance the social responsibility of Chinese outbound mining investment and targeted “any activities” related to the extractive industries sector that make profits for a Chinese company (CCMC 2014a: 28). A transparency norm was explicitly stated in the guidelines:

1.7. Strive for *Transparency*. Companies should report on their material impacts and *disclose their ethical, social, and environmental performance to their stakeholders* in ways that are appropriate and meaningful to their needs. They should give a comprehensive view of their policies, risks and results with regard to ethical, environmental, and social matters. (CCCMC 2014a: 29; emphasis added)

Under these guidelines, companies were required to disclose information on all payments to foreign government entities to cope with corruption issues, “*in line with global transparency standards*, in (host) countries where those apply,” such as the EITI standard (CCCMC 2014a: 32-33; emphasis added). The CCCMC was identified as the main body to monitor the performance of Chinese companies and to report its monitoring results regularly (CCCMC 2014a: 46). Despite this separate clause about implementation, the performance evaluation reports are not found in the CCCMC official website, perhaps reflecting the lack of capacity of the CCCMC to monitor all relevant companies due to its small staff.

Creating the guidelines involved a collaborative process among Chinese domestic and foreign stakeholders, with a public consultation stage (CCCMC 2014a: 53). Eight government agencies, five foreign embassies in Beijing, industrial associations, Chinese extractive companies (e.g., China Minmetals and Jiangxi Cooper Corporation), research institutes, transnational and global governance agents (e.g., ISEAL, ILO, and UNDP), and INGOs such as WWF and GW supported the process (CCCMC 2014a: 54-55). The CCCMC working group held domestic and international seminars on the sustainable development of China’s outbound mining investment with foreign and transnational agents, such as GIZ (CCCMC 2014b). Furthermore, working group members visited Chinese extractive companies (e.g. Chinalco, China Nonferrous Metal Mining Group and China Minmentals Corporation), and solicited their perspectives (CCCMC 2014c). The 2014 Guidelines reflect China’s attempt to combine both global rules and Chinese standards. The CCCMC relied heavily on the ISO 26000 Guidance and the UNGC Guidance in shaping the basic frame of the 2014 CCCMC Guidelines and analyzed more than twenty other relevant global rules such as International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labeling (ISEAL), International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), and Responsible Jewellery Council (RJC) standards to develop the Chinese guidelines. CCCMC also integrated Chinese regulations into the governance framework, such as the 2007 Guidelines to the state-owned enterprises issued by the State Council (CCCMC 2014a: 26).

The 2015 CCCMC Due Diligence Guidelines

The 2014 Guidelines evolved into the 2015 CCCMC Due Diligence Guidelines to enhance the responsibility of Chinese upstream and downstream companies in the global mineral supply chain (CCCMC 2015a: 10). The 2015 Guidelines provide more detailed rules about conflict minerals (Gold and 3T: Tin, Tungsten, and Tantalum) and supply chain due diligence (CCCMC 2015a: 8). The CCCMC and MOFCOM had come to recognize the seriousness of the conflict minerals issue as it pertained to Chinese companies mining in high-risk areas. For that reason, they started a project to draft a Chinese version of due diligence guidelines, working with the OECD and GW and based on the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (CCCMC 2015a: 3). While the OECD Guidance focuses on conflicts and human rights issues, the CCCMC guidelines cover those issues (Type 1 risks) and social and environmental risks (Type 2 risks) comprehensively by utilizing the 2014 Guidelines as a major source (CCCMC 2015a: 14). The CCCMC acted as a local idea-shifter by recreating existing standards through a synthesis of global rules and previously developed local standards.

The 2015 Guidelines are similar in many respects to the OECD Guidance regarding transparency policies. For example, some language was adopted verbatim:

5. Report on supply chain due diligence. *Companies should publicly report on their supply chain due diligence policies and practices and may do so by expanding the scope of their sustainability, corporate social responsibility or annual reports to cover additional information on mineral supply chain due diligence.* (The OECD Due Diligence Guidance, OECD 2016: 19; emphasis added)¹⁶

7.5 Report on process and results of supply chain risk management. *Companies should publicly report on their supply chain due diligence policies and practices, including on identified risks and steps taken to mitigate these risks, and may do so by expanding the scope of their sustainability, corporate social responsibility or annual reports to cover additional information on mineral resource supply chain due diligence.*” (CCCMC 2015a: 31; emphasis added)

¹⁶ The OECD Due Diligence Guidance published in 2016 is the third edition; OECD initiated the first edition in 2011.

As with the OECD Guidance, the 2015 Guidelines recommend that companies undergo independent, third-party audits and have certification validated by an independent oversight body (CCCMC 2015a: 32). Both standards suggest cost-sharing between upstream and downstream companies to conduct due diligence tasks, including audits (OECD 2016: 15; CCCMC 2015a: 30). The process of obtaining an independent audit and report on supply chain due diligence are key components (“5-STEP Framework”) of the due diligence process in both guidance documents (OECD 2016: 17; CCCMC 2015a:13). These OECD and CCCMC Guidelines emphasize that companies need to share information on any risks in their supply chain and their risk mitigation practices transparently to stakeholders, including the affected communities.

The OECD played a significant role in drafting the 2015 Guidelines as a primary foreign partner with the CCCMC, similar to how the GIZ worked with the CCCMC in developing the 2014 Guidelines. The CCCMC and OECD agreed on a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for developing a responsible mining supply chain in an international conference in Beijing (“Exploitation Exchange China 2014”), in which the 2014 Guidelines were released. Participants in this conference gave heavy weight to the issue of Chinese outbound mining investment based on the “going-out” policy (CCCMC 2014d). Since that time, CCCMC and OECD accelerated to draft a Chinese version of due diligence guidelines based on regular meetings and conducting a public consultation process. GW has been another primary partner informally supporting the CCCMC to draft the 2015 Guidelines, even though their partnership with the CCCMC was relatively limited due to its NGO status. GW as a norm entrepreneur helped the CCCMC to have a consultancy process and encouraged Chinese partners to reflect the OECD Guidance in the Chinese guidelines as much as possible (interview #2, July 23, 2019). In December 2015, the OECD and CCCMC held the 2015 International Workshops on Responsible Mineral Supply Chains. At this international meeting, they announced the 2015 Guidelines in the workshop about “(China’s) participating in global governance, identifying potential risks, and advancing China’s process and management capacity (CCCMC 2015b).”

Meanwhile, compared to other TEGI standards that have a strong transparency tool (e.g., the EITI),¹⁷ the Chinese standards seem to ‘lower a bar’ for companies (Gessler 2017) so that they can more easily establish a good reputation. Despite some Chinese delegates’ statements supporting the EITI in international meetings, Chinese agencies have rejected official engagement with the EITI, a transparency mechanism having ‘a high bar’ (Global Witness 2011:26). A senior official in a Chinese government agency said that many global standards limit Chinese companies’ economic growth because of their high standards (interview #1, July 31, 2019). Notably, the global standards which CCCMC adopted to develop the CCCMC guidelines in 2014 and 2015 (ISO, UNGC, and OECD) heavily rely on companies’ voluntary principles that are ‘thin’ transparency rules, compared to, for instance, EITI’s ‘thick’ transparency rules (e.g., a mandatory reporting system). In this sense, transparency standards supported by Chinese extractives governance agents strengthen a thin version of transparency that is favorable to private corporate actors (such as the weak or shallow transparency of Schleifer et al. 2019 and Bloomfield 2017). Thin transparency, unlike thick transparency, does not require members of a governance initiative to follow strict rules of disclosing full information about third-party audit/monitoring and their decision-making processes to the public.

International and domestic factors triggering constitutive localization

Throughout this period, the CCCMC reportedly led the effort for launching a Chinese version of the CSR guidelines and worked as an advocate for due diligence responsibilities of Chinese extractive companies (interview #2, July 23, 2019). Even though transparency regulations could be a sensitive issue for Chinese companies, the CCCMC agreed to insert transparency clauses consistent with global standards

¹⁷ In the case of the EITI, all member countries and companies are obliged to submit a report annually. If they do not fulfill the mandatory requirements (for instance, providing full and detailed disclosure of tax payments), their membership status will be deprived. When a government becomes an EITI member, EITI standards function as a more stringent soft law because foreign companies operating in the EITI member country are required to submit their report legally (even though the companies’ original countries not an EITI member). More details about EITI rules can be found at the EITI website: <https://eiti.org/>.

into both the 2014 and 2015 guidelines. One of my interviewees, who participated in the drafting process of the 2015 Guidelines, observed a high degree of consensus between the CCCMC and its foreign partners (interview #2, July 23, 2019). This raises the following questions: what were the driving forces behind the initiation of Chinese guidelines in this short period (2013 – 2015)? Why did China develop a Chinese version of these guidelines instead of directly adopting existing global guidelines (e.g., the OECD Due Diligence Guidance)?

One of the critical domestic shifts was the beginning of the Xi Jinping administration in 2013. Compared to previous leaders, Xi has emphasized a more active leadership role of China in global governance as a ‘big responsible country,’ which has served China’s continuous economic development based on its “going-out policy” and BRI projects (The Economist 2018). Close diplomatic partnerships between China and other BRI member countries provided more opportunities for Chinese companies and investors to access extractive resources in resource-rich BRI partner states. Both the CPC and Chinese companies shared an interest in enhancing the reputation of Chinese companies overseas and minimizing discourses that framed China as threat, and the Xi regime supported the globalized Chinese CSR rule-making process.

In addition, many countries started regulating companies to ensure the ethical sourcing of minerals. For example, the US Dodd-Frank Act required companies listed on US stock markets to disclose any use of conflict minerals.¹⁸ This US regulation had a direct impact on Chinese miners and refiners linked to US-listed companies. The companies asked for support from the Chinese government (particularly from MOFCOM, governing the CCCMC) to solve this issue, which was constraining their businesses and increasing investment risks (interview #2, July 23, 2019).

These domestic and international factors motivated MOFCOM and the CCCMC to develop the Chinese CSR standards, including transparency clauses. Developing the Chinese guidelines in 2014 and 2015, instead of translating and directly importing global standards, addressed the needs of both domestic

¹⁸ The original document is available on the website of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission: <https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank-section.shtml#1502>.

stakeholders and international audiences. By reflecting many existing global rules, the CCCMC Guidelines allow China to make a good impression upon the international community and mitigate their concerns about the alleged threat of Chinese FDI. Meanwhile, those Chinese guidelines became a practical alternative for Chinese domestic actors who were reluctant to follow ‘unfamiliar foreign rules’ outside China (interview #1, July 31. 2019) but needed to show their adoption of global norms.

A senior staff at one of the biggest Chinese CSR companies in Beijing, explained that localizing ‘Western CSR’ (through making Chinese rules) is important to spur Chinese companies to go global (interview #4, January 13. 2020). Another interviewee mentioned that there are too many global standards, and that many of these rules are not suitable to Chinese companies for several reasons. First, Chinese actors were not participants in developing dominant global standards. For example, China is not a member of the OECD and did not engage in drafting the OECD Guidance, implying that China does not have any obligation to follow their rules. Second, many rules set high bars for China. As a latecomer, China is disincentivized from adopting rigorous rules, implying that global standards are unattractive for reasons that extend beyond their normative value. Third, the global norms need to be re-interpreted in the Chinese language and cultural context. The interviewee emphasized that the CCCMC has more than 6,300 member companies and works based upon their trust (interview #1, July 31. 2019). These perspectives indicate that new Chinese guidelines represent a strategic choice for China. The re-created ‘Chinese’ rules were a justifiable norm for domestic stakeholders to follow, and at the same time, a positive rebranding of China for the international community.

Towards Universalization of a Chinese Transparency Norm? (2016 –current)

Despite Chinese efforts to develop their own guidelines, the international community continued to focus upon Chinese companies operating overseas and insist upon socially and environmentally responsible behaviors. Remarkably, Amnesty International raised the issue of the unethical mining of cobalt in the DRC and revealed severe human rights violations, including child labor in the local mining sites operated by

Chinese companies such as Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt (interview #2, July 23, 2019). In November 2016, the CCCMC initiated the Responsible Cobalt Initiative (RCI) with the OECD, drawing on the OECD Due Diligence Guidance and the 2014 and 2015 Guidelines. The RCI is a Chinese-led transnational extractives governance mechanism for all relevant stakeholders in the global cobalt supply chain, not just Chinese actors (Nieuwenkamp 2020). The establishment of the RCI has been a crucial starting point for China to take an active role as a norm-maker in global extractives governance.

The Responsible Cobalt Initiative (2016)

Currently, more than twenty upstream and downstream companies are members of the RCI such as Apple, Tesla, HP, LG Chem., Samsung SDI, Huawei, Sony, BMW, Volvo, Daimler, Beijing Easpring Material Technology Co., L&F, Tianjin B&M Science and Technology Join-Stock Co., Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt, and First Cobalt Corporation.¹⁹ The CCCMC serves as the Chair of the RCI, while Huayou Cobalt and BMW took the role of Vice-Chairs (MMTA 2018). CSR Europe, a global business network based in Europe, joins as an RCI board member (CSR Europe 2018).²⁰ It is notable that most member companies are linked to the growing electric vehicles (EV) market, perhaps indicating that the companies in the EV supply chain have a shared interest in reducing investment risks caused by unethical cobalt sourcing processes.

Transparency is one of the RCI's primary principles. For instance, the RCI is developing specific due diligence guidelines for cobalt smelters and refiners with the CCCMC and the Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI) through a pilot project (CCCMC 2018; CCCMC 2019a). This is similar to the process wherein the CCCMC Guidelines were developed in 2014 and 2015—in this case, the CCCMC's rulemaking

¹⁹ The RCI did not publish an official website providing its governance information. The member list was made based on CCCMC website sources, some news sources, and policy reports (e.g., Ali et al. 2018:22).

²⁰ Some member companies and associated partners of CSR Europe overlap with RCI member companies such as Samsung, Huawei, Volvo, and BMW. Several associated members of CSR Europe have supported RCI as a close partner (e.g., GIZ, Responsible Business Alliance, and GRI).

is based on a partnership with the foreign norm entrepreneur RMI. A spokesperson of Daimler, an RCI member company, said that the company expects to enhance transparency in the cobalt value chain with the RCI, as a reaction to the criticism about the company's lack of transparency of social and environmental risk assessments (Barrera 2018).

The status of the RCI as a 'global' cobalt initiative makes the RCI standards function as 'global' rules applied to all actors in the global supply chain, not only Chinese companies. This process shows that a locally re-constructed norm (the 2014 and 2015 CCCMC Guidelines) from a global norm (e.g., OECD Due Diligence Guidance) becomes another global norm infused by Chinese local contexts (RCI standards). The CCCMC and OECD aimed to have upstream and downstream companies follow the 2015 CCCMC Guidelines and the OECD Guidance when developing the RCI (CCCMC 2016b). The RCI's new due diligence standards for cobalt smelters and refiners, currently in the revision stage based on the pilot version, will reflect major components of the 2015 Guidelines, including similar global transparency policies, particularly the OECD Due Diligence Guidance (interview #5, January 15, 2020).

It is premature to evaluate whether the RCI transparency norm will be successfully universalized and become a stabilized *grundnorm* in global extractives governance in the long-term. However, considering the scope of RCI members in the cobalt supply chain, RCI appears to be a significant venue through which a transparency norm localized in Chinese context will be disseminated to more global audiences. This RCI case fits into Acharya's understanding of norm circulation, specifically as an example of the universalization of a subsidiary norm. In this case, the RCI appears to promote a subsidiary norm consistent with China's preferred thin version of transparency. The scope and quality of information disclosure is left to the discretion of individual companies. In this situation, the credibility of their disclosed information cannot be guaranteed. Even though the transparency clauses recommend sharing any social and environmental impacts of member companies, there is a lack of specific implementation and compliance rules, like other TEGI with 'thin' transparency rules. RCI's governance system depends on voluntary guidelines without an enforcement mechanism for members' compliance with the guidelines (Saegert and Grossman 2018). In addition, the current rulemaking process of the RCI appears to rely

primarily on member companies, with limited participation of civil society actors. In 2016, the CPC enacted the Foreign NGO Law which imposes stricter conditions for non-Chinese NGOs to register (interview #4, January 13, 2020). This domestic context could restrict the RCI's deeper interaction with INGOs such as GW, one of the key global advocacy groups working for transparency norm in the extractive sector. Moreover, due to the absence of an official website, relevant information about the RCI is shared among member companies only. This weak transparency mechanism emphasizing "business-to-business transparency" (Dingwerth and Eichinger 2014) risks leading to a 'greenwashing/ whitewashing' of the companies.

International and domestic conditions for universalization

The case of the RCI suggests some conditions that have enabled China to become a norm-maker at the global level. The evolution of the CCCMC's guidelines and the RCI is closely linked to the development of the BRI, which has facilitated multilateral cooperation between China and BRI countries. China's leadership has become a crucial factor in determining successful BRI outcomes. Through its BRI projects, China is reshaping its identity as a responsible global leader who provides common goods based on 'win-win' cooperation. For example, at the 19th National Congress of the CPC in 2017, Xi stated: "This new era will be an era that sees China moving closer to center stage and making greater contributions to mankind" (quoted in Pu 2019: 99). This statement reveals China's new identity as a powerful global leader; building a good international reputation became a critical national goal more than ever.

Ongoing international criticism about Chinese extractive companies, particularly operating in BRI member countries, weakens China's external legitimacy. In response, the CPC seeks to 'rebrand' BRI projects as socially and environmentally responsible to ensure that China can keep operating the projects. The 'Green BRI' is a new national strategy to mitigate negative environmental impacts and rebrand the image of BRI (interview #3, January 14, 2020). The central ideas of the Green BRI were summarized at the

second BRI Forum in 2019 by Xi, who emphasized China's commitment to "supporting open, clean and green development" and developing "a clean and green Silk Road" (Belt and Road Forum, 2019).

The CCCMC, the leading agent in the development of the RCI, has engaged in the process of rebranding the BRI, particularly regarding Chinese extractive projects. The role of the CCCMC in building a coalition between companies in China and BRI countries has been significant for enhancing international economic partnership. The Ministry of Commerce has given discretion to the CCCMC to act globally so that BRI policies can be better implemented. The CCCMC started working in the One Belt and One Road Traders Alliance as a founding member and the Belt and Road Service Connections (BNRSC) as a co-founder (CCCMC 2015c). One of my interviewees emphasized that "after Chinese president Xi Jinping proposed to support Chinese companies in Africa to forge alliance of CSR in the China-African forum in 2018, MOFCOM entrusted the CCCMC to prepare for that" (interview #1, July 31, 2019). Since then, CCCMC has been working as the Secretariat of the Chinese Alliance of Responsible Business in Africa as a part of "China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2019-2021)" (Sun 2020). CCCMC website documents show that the CCCMC has been actively advertising their efforts to enhance China's CSR, particularly the CCCMC and RCI guidelines, in international conferences and meetings since the BRI was initiated. Many transnational actors (e.g., Red Cross and ICMM) and government delegates from other developing countries have approached the CCCMC to discuss the issue of CSR in extractive resource sectors and industrial cooperation during this period.

The RCI was established upon the desire of the Chinese government to take a leadership role on the international stage. RCI (with the CCCMC as Chair) expects to set standards of supply chain management so that both Chinese companies and international companies can meet international standards (interview #5, January 15, 2020). The establishment of the RCI seems to be a useful tool for rebranding China's image undermined by the issue of cobalt mining in the DRC. The CCCMC proclaimed the establishment of the RCI at the UN Annual Forum on Business and Human rights in Geneva in 2016 (Sun 2020). Choosing the UN instead of a local venue to introduce the RCI was likely a symbolic gesture targeting international audiences to display the image of a responsible China supporting human rights and

other CSR principles. In the same year, the CCCMC Chairman shared the story of the RCI at a meeting in Davos, another high-visibility international venue (CCCMC 2017). Similarly, CCCMC's executive director introduced RCI/CCCMC's guidelines and the current activities at CSR Europe's SDG Summit and the UN Forum on Business and Human Rights in 2020.

The accumulated experience of transnational interactions of the RCI/CCCMC appears to help China move forward to play a leadership role in global extractives governance. For the first time, the RCI/CCCMC hosted an international conference on the sustainable mineral supply chain in December 2020 to share policies and trends about global governance in the global supply chain of mining sectors (interview #5, January 15, 2020). The Chinese agents invited a wide range of guests among international stakeholders, including upstream and downstream companies, intergovernmental organizations (e.g., OECD), investment companies, consulting companies, and NGOs. Notably, vice Chair of CCCMC introduced its major achievements, including CCCMC and RCI standard formulations through an "achievements release ceremony" in front of more than 2,000 international and domestic audiences (CCCMC 2020). The growing presence of the RCI/CCCMC in the realm of global governance indicates their increasing confidence to act as a global norm-maker.

This historical evolution of the RCI suggests that local idea-shifters (the CCCMC/RCI) bring their subsidiary norms (CCCMC/RCI standards) into global governance platforms (UN or Davos meetings) or build their own venue (the 2020 conference on sustainable mineral supply chains) when they need to obtain legitimacy from external audiences. The role of the Chinese government in supporting the CCCMC/RCI and granting them sufficient autonomy and authority seems to be crucial for the local idea-shifter to become a normative leader at the global level. The strong political willingness of the Chinese government for rebranding China has opened a window of opportunity. As Guttman et al. (2018) argue, crises (such as the report of Amnesty International criticizing Chinese companies) also play a motivating role, in this case spurring the Chinese government and relevant companies to support the CCCMC/RCI norm and promote it in a global venue.

Conclusion

China's engagement in global extractives governance shows that China is not only a norm-taker but also increasingly a norm-maker. China's early interactions with TEGI since the 2000s paved the way for Chinese idea-shifters (mainly the CCCMC) to create Chinese CSR guidelines (the 2014 and 2015 CCCMC Guidelines) reflecting Chinese values and ideas by both learning and re-shaping global standards and transparency norms projected in the standards. The CCCMC guidelines were created through a constitutive localization process in which global norms and ideas were re-shaped and synthesized with Chinese domestic regulations. The 2014 Guidelines informed the 2015 Guidelines, and the 2015 Guidelines led to the RCI and new global standards for cobalt refiners and smelters. RCI, as a global initiative, seeks to govern not only Chinese companies but also all companies in the global cobalt supply chain. RCI can thus be understood as a process of universalizing a locally re-constructed Chinese transparency norm in global extractives governance. As suggested by Acharya (2018), this analysis rejects the idea of a fixed universal norm and rather sees global norms as continuously tested and re-shaped by local actors through an evolutionary process.

The major findings of this research support the two-way socialization framework (Acharya 2018; Pu 2012) and show its utility in explaining the specific case of China as an emerging power in global extractives governance and transparency norm development. Primarily, this case study shows under what conditions China acts as a norm-maker. First, the role of the CCCMC as a local idea-shifter is crucial in China's norm-taking and norm-making processes. One of the most significant roles of the CCCMC is its intermediary role between transnational and local actors and between government actors and private companies. International partnerships between the CCCMC and global agents (e.g., the OECD and GIZ) function as a significant opportunity for diverse actors to interact and develop a norm. At the same time, the CCCMC plays a pivotal role in reflecting local contexts (e.g., Chinese norm, culture, and specific interests of Chinese companies and the government) into its rule-making processes.

The CCCMC's position as an influential idea-shifter has been facilitated by support from Chinese government bodies, particularly MOFCOM, eager to rebrand China for ongoing BRI projects. It suggests a shadow of the state (Guttman et al. 2018) may be essential in enabling a local Chinese actor to play a normative role. Considering China's top-down governance structure, a wide extent of autonomy of CCCMC seems to be more important to be a local idea-shifter compared to other local actors in relatively horizontal democratic societies. For instance, the number of days a CCCMC staff member can travel overseas is restricted by the government (interview #1, July 31, 2019). On the other hand, CCCMC's status as a quasi-governmental institution (registered in MOFCOM) seems to provide credibility as an intermediary communicating between governmental agencies and private companies. CCCMC plays an important role in collecting industry associations and companies' demands and delivering their messages to MOFCOM, for instance. In other words, CCCMC sits between governmental and non-governmental realms. This hybrid feature seems to eliminate barriers for transnational and non-Chinese 'norm entrepreneurs' (mostly from the West) to build a partnership in the Chinese political context.

Second, China's norm-making arises out of its need for enhancing legitimacy for both domestic and international audiences simultaneously. Increasing international pressure and criticism about Chinese extractive companies overseas caused growing demands for policy solutions from both international advocacy groups and Chinese companies. Adopting existing global standards could have generated problems from the perspective of Chinese actors, especially given that China was excluded from previous global norm-making processes related to extractives governance. Those rules have therefore been perceived as 'Western/foreign' rules that do not represent the interests and ideas of China. At the same time, China has been required to show that it is adopting global norms and principles to achieve acceptance by the international community. The development of the 2014 and 2015 CCCMC Guidelines can be interpreted as a practical strategy of synthesizing both global and local norms to appeal to both domestic and international audiences, thereby ideally increasing China's internal and external legitimacy. This case resonates with Pu's understanding of China's "selective and pragmatic approach to learning Western ideas" (Pu 2019:48).

China's new identity as a 'responsible big leader' in global governance based on the BRI and Xi's strong political leadership has triggered attempts to universalize locally re-constructed norms. The RCI is one of these cases. Having a good international image has increasingly become a driving force behind successful BRI projects. Rebranding the BRI as Green BRI and projecting an environmentally and socially responsible image of China have become meaningful policy measures to cope with ongoing criticism about Chinese companies overseas. Unethical cobalt mining by Chinese companies in the DRC has been but one of the more serious issues that have commanded global attention. As a part of China's effort to recover its image, the establishment of the RCI could provide a positive signal to the international community, showing that China has become an ethical leader in the global cobalt supply chain. This finding is consistent with the argument of Buhmann (2017) that CCCMC guidelines reflect China's interest in increasing soft power. The strong political willingness of the Chinese government to gain external legitimacy facilitates a process of shifting from localization to universalization.

Third, the growing normative influence of China as a norm-maker through the RCI may strengthen a thin transparency norm in global extractives governance. Globally influential corporations such as Apple and BMW have joined and adopted RCI norms, and more big market players are expected to participate as members. Transparency clauses in Chinese guidelines do not have specific implementation and compliance rules, relying instead on the voluntary obligations of individual companies. The strong governing role of corporations in a 'closed-door' rule-making setting in the RCI, with a lack of civil society participants, does generate concerns about the risk of green/whitewashing. Despite a few participation routes available to the public and civil society (e.g., public consultation processes), it is questionable whether NGOs/INGOs in China take the role of powerful watchdogs as much as they do in other societies (Guttman et al. 2018: 133). This weak bottom-up governance structure could facilitate the current marketization of transparency that hinders addressing the actual needs of the affected communities in mining sites.

The role of China as a norm-maker is increasing in global extractives governance. The BRI and CPC's strong political willingness to enhance China's new identity as a responsible leader facilitates the normative influence of Chinese actors at the global level. The case of the RCI shows how China strengthens

thin transparency norms which may cause accountability and legitimacy issues within the current global extractive governance architecture. For example, an advocacy group within the U.S. sued a number of big tech- and car companies for their alleged use of child labor in DRC cobalt and copper mining sites (Kelly 2019). Some of the U.S. companies are RCI member companies such as Apple, HP, and Tesla. A report of the lawsuit also named Huayou Cobalt, one of the Chinese leading members of the RCI (International Rights Advocates 2019). The international community now pays attention to see how the RCI will cope with this crisis and improve its governance principles. Understanding the evolving process of the RCI is a necessary basis for understanding whether, how, and why China will successfully universalize its transparency norm and obtain moral legitimacy in global extractives governance.

CHAPTER 5. CHINESE POWER IN NORM-MAKING: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL EXTRACTIVE GOVERNANCE

Introduction

As empirical analyses of China's engagement in transnational extractives governance initiatives (TEGI) and the Responsible Cobalt Initiative (RCI) in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 reveal, China increasingly acts as both a norm-taker and a norm-maker in transparency norm development in global extractives governance. This provides enhanced understandings of the role of China as an emerging actor in multilevel norm development processes in global governance. Meanwhile, it raises a question of how China's growing power affects China's role in the norm development processes. Even though Acharya's norm-circulation framework suggests useful theoretical measures to explain non-Western actors' norm-making role, it does not clearly describe how power impacts specific outcomes in this model. This chapter aims to initiate a discussion about how power matters in global norm development processes building upon the current norm contestation literature (e.g., Acharya 2018; Wiener 2018; Bloomfield 2016) and Acharya's (2018) norm-circulation model. Drawing on Barnett and Duvall's (2008) power framework, this chapter examines how China's institutional and structural power affect the role of Chinese actors in transparency norm development in global extractives governance.

Previous IR and global governance literature show a theoretical gap in explaining how power interlinks to norm development processes because most studies focus on either power or norms. Dominant discussions about the rise of China in IR emphasize China's material power as a challenge to the current world order—i.e., a power-shift (see chapter 2). There is a lack of studies examining how China's power affects global norm development—i.e., idea-shifts. Although a few studies pay attention to China's role in norm development in GEG literature (Jinnah 2017; Liu 2020), they do not clearly show specific processes in which China's power shapes China's norm-making activities. Meanwhile, conventional norm literatures (such as Risse-Kappen 1995; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) insufficiently account for norm contestations,

particularly caused by asymmetrical power relations among actors. Even though Acharya's norm-circulation model, the main theoretical framework in this dissertation, considers norm contestations as a crucial part of norm development and recognizes the various types of actors involved in norm development dynamics, it also does not fully explain the impact of asymmetric power relations among different actors. This tendency seems to reflect paradigmatic fragmentations in IR, following the "isms," particularly a collision between realism focusing on power/material matters and constructivism highlighting norms/ideational matters. For that reason, realist constructivism emphasizing both power and norm (Barkin 2003) can provide useful insights to bridge the fragmented debates regarding the rise of China and global norm development.

Drawing on the realist constructivist perspective, this chapter examines the question of to what extent China translates its increasing material resources into power in global norm development. Specifically, this analysis focuses on China's institutional and structural power based on Barnett and Duvall's (2008) typology of power. In so doing, this chapter aims to elaborate on Acharya's (2018) norm-circulation model by examining how these different forms of power affect the ability of Chinese actors to shape norm development processes through various phases. This chapter will conduct this analysis based on the empirical case studies in chapters 3 and 4 and supplementary information about the RCI case. I assume that power will operate differently across the phases of norm development (e.g. constitutive localization and universalization) and that different actors may have varying capacities to shape norm development processes based on their particular power resources. In other words, I view power as one of the significant variables explaining individual actors' distinct roles as a norm-taker or a norm-maker in the norm-circulation model. For instance, the role of powerful actors from the global South, like a Chinese extractive company, would be different from relatively weaker actors from the global South, such as an NGO in the DRC. In this way, this analysis provides more specific answers to Acharya's original question: "whose ideas matter" (Acharya 2009).

The first part of the chapter will introduce a brief overview of power and norms in the IR and global governance literatures. The second section will discuss different types of power exhibited by Chinese actors in the RCI case and reflect on how power affects China's growing norm-making role in global extractives governance. I suggest that China's growing material resources support the institutional and structural power of Chinese local idea-shifters in the constitutive localization and universalization processes. The third section discuss some overall implications of China's growing norm-making role based on its institutional and structural power in global extractives governance. From a global governance perspective, I particularly emphasize how China's increasing institutional and structure power facilitate transnational alliances in support of a 'thin' transparency norm that could lead to legitimacy and accountability crises of global extractives governance.

Power and Norm Development in Global Governance

Many global governance scholars regard norms as one of the primary elements of global governance mechanisms (Risse 2004; Biermann et al. 2009; Weiss 2013). For that reason, global governance studies (including GEG literature) and IR norm studies share many theoretical assumptions and closely influence each other's theory-building processes. For instance, conventional constructivism emphasizing the role of norm entrepreneurs (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Checkel 2001; Holzscheiter 2005; Park 2006) has heavily influenced the debates about the significant role of non-state actors, particularly NGOs, in norm diffusion in global environmental governance (Angstadt and Möller 2020). Although this group of scholars contributes to understanding non-state actors' norm entrepreneurship, they overlook power politics among various actors supporting and/or resisting norms. This is mainly because their ideas are based on moral cosmopolitanism claiming that norms advocated by transnational agents are universal (Hall 2014). Also, they believe that global norms can constrain powerful states' behaviors.

Alternatively, the growing literature on norm contestation in IR (e.g., Acharya 2018; Wiener 2018; Bloomfield 2016) challenges the notion of universally ‘good’ norms and focuses on political tensions and struggles in global norm development. These scholars reject the idea of one-way socialization indicating smooth and peaceful norm diffusions from moral norm entrepreneurs to enlightened norm-takers. In other words, they bring “politics” back to norm debates in IR, as an important factor. Particularly, Acharya’s (2018) norm-circulation model, the main theoretical framework in this dissertation, highlights that norm contestations occur across levels and involve non-conventional norm-makers especially in non-Western regions—in his terms, local “idea-shifters”. Acharya’s norm-circulation framework provides useful analytical lenses to examine various types of norm-makers and conflictual political dynamics in norm development processes in global governance. However, it does not fully explain how power matters in conflictual norm-development processes. For instance, his theory doesn’t consider whether powerful non-Western actors influence norm-making processes distinctively compared to weaker non-Western actors. Most global governance research reflects this tendency in the current IR norm literature, disregarding power and power politics (Ba and Hoffmann 2005: 251). In sum, there is a lack of global governance studies or IR norms literature generally that debate power politics and norm development comprehensively.

Reinhold (2012: 4) also points out this gap in IR literature broadly and explains that it is because “the dominant paradigms in IR-theory have long conceptualized power and norms as two mutually exclusive categories.” In contrast, realist constructivism emphasizing both norms and power (Barkin 2003; Barkin 2010; Jackson et al. 2004; Guzzini 2005) could provide useful theoretical tools to fill the gap and examine how power matters in global norm development. According to Barkin (2003), realist constructivism “would look at the way in which power structures affect patterns of normative change in international relations and, conversely, the way in which a particular set of norms affect power structures” (Barkin 2003: 337). It is “a constructivism in which a concern for power politics, understood as relational rather than structural, is central” (Barkin 2010: 169).

This chapter applies the realist constructivist perspective to Acharya's norm-circulation framework and elaborates on the model by analyzing how power affects transnational norm development. More specifically, this new theoretical lens enhances Acharya's model by explaining how different types of power impact local idea-shifters' constitutive localization of a foreign norm and universalization of a localized norm. In so doing, this analysis expands the understanding of norm development in global governance and supports an idea that global governance itself is not 'good' or 'politically neutral' to achieve global common goods smoothly (Abbott and Snidal 2009:47; Avant et al. 2010:7).

In global governance studies, Barnett and Duvall (2008) is the most well-known effort to bring power into global governance debates. One of the key dimensions of Barnett and Duvall (2008)'s conceptualization is that power works through social relations and interactions. This approach to power overlaps with realist constructivists' understanding of power being relational, not structural (Barkin 2010). Barnett and Duvall (2008) categorize four different types of power dependent on distinctive characteristic of actors' relations. The first type of power is *compulsory* power, which is defined as the ability of A to make B do something that B would not have done without A's mobilization of material and ideational resources (Barnett and Duvall 2008: 13). This type of power works in interactions of specific actors and in the direct control by one actor over the another (Barnett and Duvall 2008: 12). Second, Barnett and Duvall define *institutional* power as an actor's control over others in indirect ways through formal and informal institutions (including diverse institutional arrangements, such as decision-making rules) (Barnett and Duvall 2008: 15, 16). Third, *structural* power constructs asymmetrical relations between actors based on different social capacities and positions as determined by constitutive social structure, primarily the global economic system. Historical materialists, such as Cox, emphasize the impact of the global liberal and capitalist structure in creating different structural power positions among actors in global governance (Barnett and Duvall 2008: 19). Fourth, *productive* power is about social capacities of actors that are socially produced in diffused social processes, particularly related to discourse processes and practices and the knowledge systems producing social identities and meanings. Even though it shares many similar

characteristics with structural power, productive power works through diffuse constitutive relations (Barnett and Duvall 2008: 12) while structural power works through direct structural relations (Barnett and Duvall 2008: 20).

The empirical analyses in chapter 3 and 4 suggest that Chinese actors deploy institutional and structural power in the transparency norm development process in global extractives governance. RCI, a new Chinese-led transnational governance initiative established based on Chinese versions of transparency principles, seems to work as an important institutional platform strengthening China's institutional power and its transparency norm-making role in global extractives governance. Furthermore, Chinese corporations and the Chinese government deploy their structural power through their close tie with foreign business-oriented actors in the global supply chain of extractive resources—i.e., a 'transnational liberal alliance.' Notably, these Chinese actors tend to reshape and strengthen 'thin' versions of transparency norms in global extractives governance, which provide asymmetrical benefits to the private sector. The next section will delve into more details regarding China's institutional and structural power in global extractives governance and how power affects China's transparency norm-making role based on Acharya's norm-circulation framework.

China's Power

The IR debates on the rise of China have focused on China's material resources – military and economic capabilities primarily (Ikenberry 2008; Mearsheimer 2010; Christensen 2018). Regarding global extractive resources governance, China's growing economic power as the biggest supplier and consumer in the international mineral resources market has been the main focus of resource security debates, notably shaping the dominant discourse of US-China resource competition (Johnson and Gramer 2020). However, these storylines fail to provide a comprehensive picture of the rise of China in global extractives governance.

Ho's (2020) research on the effects of Chinese power in BRI projects shows how China's material resources do not directly translate into power and influence over other states. Instead, power works through China's non-material capabilities, particularly in Xi Jinping's New Era emphasizing China's leadership based on its ideas, aspirations, and *norms* (Ho 2020:1465, emphasis added). Ho's approach resonates with the main theoretical perspective of this paper in that she sees a connection between different types of power. However, Ho's study defines 'Chinese power' as 'the Chinese government's power' because her research is situated in traditional foreign policy studies rather than global governance studies. Meanwhile, power politics in global governance needs to be understood in a broader context given various types of governance actors, including both state and non-state actors. For that reason, the previous literature about the theoretical concepts of Chinese government's 'hard power' and 'soft power' provides only partial explanations about China's power in global extractives governance.

The main research findings in the previous chapter (Chapters 3 and 4) show that China's growing power resources are translated into institutional and structural power supporting China's norm-making role in global extractives governance. Particularly, chapter 4 shows that when China faces legitimacy crises triggered by international criticisms about Chinese extractive companies' social and environmental harms in poor resource-rich countries, China started playing a norm-making role based on its material resources through creating CCCMC's 2014 and 2015 transparency guidelines and establishing RCI. As Avant and Westerwinter (2016) argue, these findings challenge the idea of Waltz's structural realism treating power resources (e.g., military and economic capabilities) as power itself. They argue that power is an integral part of global governance and focus on "the new power politics" that is "the management of relationships" among various types of agents—both state and non-state actors, beyond too narrowly conceptualized power and power politics in traditional IR literature (Avant and Westerwinter 2016: 2).

Institutional Power

During the last decade, China has started taking a leadership role in creating international institutions, such as the BRICS Forum, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The Xi Jinping administration particularly has been emphasizing China's growing role in providing global common goods through newly established international and regional regimes instead of working in pre-existing liberal international institutions, which are mostly led by the U.S. and its European allies. This unique trend of the current Chinese foreign policy appears also in global extractives governance. China's growing power operates through newly created institutions in which China influences developing and diffusing grounding norms, rules, and principles of governing actors in the global extractive resource supply chain transnationally. RCI, a transnational voluntary initiative established to mitigate negative social and environmental impacts of mining cobalt, primarily in the Democratic Republic of Congo, is the most recent case indicating China's increasing institutional power in transparency norm development in global extractives governance.

Barnett and Duvall (2008) explain that institutional power is an actor's control and influence over another actors through rules and procedures of formal or informal institutions that mediate the actors' choices and behaviors based on the ability to set agendas and establish institutional arrangements (Barnett and Duvall 2008:15). Institutions are used to construct rules of game among actors, rules that "advantage some while disadvantaging others." In other words, institutional power creates winners and losers (Barnett and Duvall 2008: 17). Importantly for this dissertation research, actors with institutional power also influence other actors by privileging particular norms, such as the US emphasis on "reciprocity" shaping trade relations through the WTO (Shaffer 2008). In that way, global governance institutions generate greater benefits to powerful participants thereby strengthening their institutional power.

In global extractives governance, China's recently growing institutional power facilitates its norm-making role through RCI. RCI seems to work as a useful institution for China to transnationally advocate

and disseminate its preferred version of a transparency norm as reconstructed by Chinese actors (a subsidiary norm in Acharya's norm circulation framework). Based on Acharya's theoretical approach (Acharya 2018), the RCI case notably shows that China's institutional power supports the efforts of Chinese local idea-shifters (e.g., CCCMC) to universalize a Chinese version of transparency at the transnational level. This observation delivers a new insight that institutional power can help explain how the norm localization process transitions toward universalization.

RCI was established in 2016 by CCCMC, a Chinese industrial association, in partnership with the OECD as a transnational governance initiative (see Chapter 4). RCI is an interesting case indicating China's intention to join global extractive governance processes and showing its leadership for the sustainability of the global cobalt supply chain. This case is differentiated from relatively passive behavioral patterns of Chinese actors' participation in other TEGIs such as EITI (see Chapter 3). There are two significant points regarding China's institutional power and its transparency norm-making role in this RCI case.

First, RCI has become an important venue for the exercise of China's institutional power in transparency norm development in global extractives governance. More importantly, this venue seems to support CCCMC's efforts as a local idea-shifter to universalize the localized transparency norm at the transnational level. Since the RCI was established, increasing number of Chinese and non-Chinese companies have been joining RCI as members—such as BMW, Daimler, Samsung SDI, and Sony—and adopted CCCMC/RCI guidelines, which are Chinese versions of transparency guidelines based on a thin transparency norm. These companies participating in RCI, both in and outside China, could be seen as norm-takers. For instance, an audit company contracted with LG Chem. started applying the CCCMC due diligence guidelines to their verification work (DNV GL 2018). At the same time, in a few cases, even non-RCI member companies have adopted the RCI standard when entering into a contract with a RCI member company. GEM, a Chinese battery company, also a RCI member, recently updated its contract with Glencore, a multinational commodity trading and mining company and non-RCI member by agreeing to implement annual audits regarding responsible sourcing, specifically under the RCI's Cobalt Refiner

Supply Chain Due Diligence Standard (Radford 2020). This example shows RCI's increasing transnational influence, as a new norm-making venue, and China as the leader of RCI is increasing its norm-making role through the RCI which provides growing institutional power to Chinese actors, particularly CCCMC and Chinese companies.

In addition, the Chinese government has actively initiated international meetings and conferences through the RCI as part of its broader BRI strategy aimed at helping more Chinese companies to go overseas. The increasing international interactions between Chinese governmental agencies, Chinese companies, and non-Chinese stakeholders have provided important opportunities to advertise the newly developed CCCMC/RCI standards and improve China's image as an environmentally and socially responsible global leader. In 2020, CCCMC and RCI hosted the 2020 Forum on Sustainable Mineral Supply Chains, the first high-level comprehensive event on supply chain governance. Transparency was one of the core issues debated in the forum, and CCCMC reviewed its achievements over the past ten years, including CCCMC and RCI standard formulation in the forum's ceremony with more than 2,000 attendees (CCCMC 2020). It seems to be a new and unique case compared to previous patterns that mostly US and Europe-based actors have taken a leadership to initiate such international events regarding the issue of sustainable supply chains (e.g., an annual conference of CSR Europe). In this way, China is likely to continue to play a significant role in agenda-setting and rule-making through RCI and advance its efforts to advertise its due diligence standards characterized as thin transparency norm.

Second, CCCMC has become the primary agent of institutional power and acts as a local idea-shifter with the support of the Chinese government, particularly the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. It reveals the disaggregated nature of Chinese agency in transparency norm-making processes. Based on delegated authority from the Ministry of Commerce, CCCMC has developed several guidelines for a responsible mineral supply chain, including information disclosure policies emphasizing a transparency norm, and new standards directly related to the cobalt supply chain through RCI. In 2014, CCCMC created the Guidelines for Social Responsibility in Outbound Mining Investment, then published the CCCMC Due

Diligence Guidelines in 2015 aligned with the OECD Due Diligence Guidance and the 2014 guideline. Later, the RCI adopted the 2015 guidelines as one of the major governance principles.

Moreover, CCCMC has been serving as the Chair of the RCI and acting as the primary leader in the operation of RCI, in close ties with the Chinese government and Chinese extractive companies such as Huayou Cobalt. As the Chair of the RCI, CCCMC actively led the development of the Cobalt Smelter and Refiner Supply Due Diligence Standard, a transnational rule which is applicable to both Chinese and non-Chinese companies, based on the 2015 CCCMC Due Diligence Guidelines and the OECD Due Diligence Guidance. In 2020, the latest version developed based on the partnership between RCI, CCCMC, and Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI) has been released, and it is at the final revision stage (Sun 2020).

In sum, this current history of RCI linked to transnational extractives governance shows that the influence of CCCMC as China's local idea-shifter and a norm-maker has been growing in/through a new institution—RCI, based on the Chinese government's financial and political support for CCCMC. China is likely to be taking a more prominent norm-maker's role through RCI, that reflects China's institutional power through such newly created Chinese-led venues. Also, the venue seems to be a new platform where China's preferred thin transparency norm and related standards are diffused. In other words, this demonstrates the operation of institutional power in the process of universalizing China's localized transparency norm.

Structural Power

Barnett and Duvall (2008) see structural power as a more nuanced concept of power than institutional power, shaped by mutually constituted relationships. It determines social capacities and interests in both direct and indirect ways based on actors' structural positions in international relationships—such as master-slave relationship (Barnett and Duvall 2008:18). Gramscian scholars focus

on relational power determined by classes and social structure embedded in the world economy, and how the structural power positions of actors shape political dynamics in global governance (Rupert 2008).

These critical researchers argue that many existing global governance institutions, such as the World Economic Forum (WEF), strengthen a “globalizing capitalist bloc” (Rupert 2008:214) or “global historic bloc,” which consists of people in the capitalist class and powerful state actors. This bloc reproduces the powerful actors’ structural power at the global scale. Rupert points out that this type of global governance institution often has a democratic deficit that causes a legitimacy crisis. For instance, he claims that WEF “repackaged its brand of public-spirited but privately managed capitalism as a solution” (Rupert 2008: 226). For instance, they invite some NGOs to their meetings, but provide them only a limited role. The following quote of one of the WEF directors represents the character: “We invite whoever we believe is relevant to open dialogue...We are not the United Nations. We are a private organization” (quoted in Holligdale 2001, cited in Rupert 2008: 226).

The RCI shows a similar pattern to WEF. Above all, the RCI is a business-centric governance mechanism in which primary participants and members are companies and CCCMC, a Chinese industrial association. Although RCI/CCCMC open a few discussion venues to international civil society actors (e.g., international conferences or consultation meetings), NGOs or other multi-stakeholders from civil society are not directly engaging in decision-making processes (see Chapter 4). In addition, there seems to be a lack of interactions between RCI/CCCMC and Chinese domestic NGOs. This picture contrasts with the active participation of Chinese companies in the RCI governance structure, notably, Huayou Cobalt, engaging as a Vice Chair of RCI. Under this governance structure, the major Chinese business actors took a norm-making role in developing RCI transparency standards. Meanwhile, as explained in chapter 4, NGOs and other external stakeholders can send their policy suggestions to the RCI through an official public consultation process. However, information about the consultation processes is not shared with the public, so it is not so clear that to what extent the public’s opinion has resulted in new standards. For instance, since the RCI announced its public consultation request to develop its Cobalt Refiner Standard in

2018 through CCCMC's official website, there hasn't been any open and follow-up information about the consultation process.

In this sense, China's structural power does not mean the power of China as a whole; instead, it seems to refer to the power of the Chinese government sponsoring Chinese business actors and Chinese companies supported by the government—i.e., the Chinese government-market alliance's structural power. This view on China, not as a monolithic actor, brings a new perspective that 'China's emerging power' in global governance needs to be understood much more contextually. The RCI case shows that emerging Chinese actors are limited to Chinese government agencies and companies, and they are the major actors that decide to let someone in or out. This nuanced understanding of China's power is missing in many IR debates about the rise of China and China's emerging power.

In addition, this Chinese government-market alliance works closely with non-Chinese, big market actors through RCI, primarily companies in the global electric vehicle (EV) supply chain, such as car companies (e.g., BMW, Volvo, Daimler, etc.), and EV battery companies (e.g., LG Chem and Samsung SDI). This transnational cooperation in RCI—between CCCMC (affiliated with the Chinese government), Chinese companies, and non-Chinese companies—may create a new transnational alliance which represents business-interests and a business-centric approach to governance. Based on this transnational business alliance, RCI/CCCMC standards incorporate many business-oriented terms and policies, for instance, “risk management approach.” Importantly, the primary actors in this transnational alliance follow less stringent transparency rules, based on a thin transparency norm consistent with the Chinese version as discussed in chapters 3 and 4. It is “less detailed about specific disclosure items that would be made public,” even compared to the OECD Guidance (Bayer and Cooper 2009: 27). China's thin transparency norm embedded in CCCMC and RCI guidelines without strong compliance measures, therefore, seems to support Chinese companies' and other industrial actors' interests matching with their reluctance to follow strict regulations. The increasing structural power of this Chinese government-market alliance strengthens China's norm-making role.

Moreover, as Chapter 3 shows, those Chinese actors mostly interact with TEGIs operating based on a thin transparency norm, and that characteristic seems to be continuing. For instance, even though CCCMC declared its acknowledgement of some TEGIs supporting a thick transparency norm (e.g., IRMA and EITI)—emphasizing more democratic, multi-stakeholder governance and stringent compliance rules, CCCMC and other major Chinese RCI member companies (e.g., Huayou Cobalt) did not join the thick transparency-based TEGIs. Instead, they communicate and work more actively with TEGIs based on a thin transparency norm and market mechanisms related to responsible extractive resource sourcing, such as the London Metal Exchange (LME). Huayou Cobalt got the LME Brand certificate in 2019, and one of the RCI/CCCMC directors participated in the process of formulating the new LME regulation (Sun 2020). In the current phenomenon, it is difficult to find that the major Chinese actors closely work with civil society actors or local people from the most affected communities in order to develop effective transparency standards and specific guidelines/regulations for the implementation of those standards.

Therefore, the RCI case shows the asymmetrical power positionalities between the transnational coalition of Chinese government-market alliance and powerful non-Chinese business actors compared to less empowered Chinese and non-Chinese civil society actors or the affected local communities. Consistent with Barnett and Duvall's explanation of structural power, most of RCI's primary members who developed transparency standards are economically powerful actors, and they produce/reproduce their ideas and values within quite exclusive governance arrangements, thereby operating like a new type of global hegemonic bloc. Although an analysis of the ultimate outcome of RCI/CCCMC transparency standards is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it appears that the emerging Chinese government-market alliance structural power in the existing global extractive governance links to weak agency of civil society actors and the most affected/marginalized stakeholders in mining sites and, particularly, their role in developing a transparency norm.

This analysis also reveals that structural power facilitates or constrains the agency of particular actors in Acharya's norm circulation model. In the RCI case, the Chinese government and business actors

enjoy more opportunities to take a norm-maker's role in global extractives governance, based on their structural power supported by their exclusive governance network and their material capacities in the world economy. This indicates different levels of agency among potential local idea-shifters to take a norm-making role in norm-circulation.

Discussion

Regarding China's growing power in world politics and its influence in global extractives governance, Barnett and Duvall's theoretical concepts of institutional and structural power provide a more nuanced understanding of how power matters in norm development processes. This research implies notably the mechanisms through which China's material resources lead to its role in transnational norm development through institutional and structural power. The analysis of the RCI case shows that Chinese actors have used institutional and structural power to advance a thin transparency norm, emphasizing business-centric approaches such as less stringent compliance measures and limited civil society actors' participation in decision-making process. There are several major implications from this finding.

First, China's growing material power does not directly determine the norm development process as expected by realism. Rather, China's material capabilities must be translated into institutional and structural power because existing global norms also affect how power works. As I discussed in Chapter 4, China's growing prominence in world politics and the global economy created a legitimacy crisis and prompted the Chinese government to rebrand the state as a responsible global leader. Regarding China's increasing supply and demand of extractive resources along with China's economic power, the legitimacy crisis occurred because of strong suspicion that Chinese major market actors do not follow globally shared norms, such as transparency, human rights, and sustainability. China's reaction to the international pressure was to strategically develop its own version of a transparency norm that could then be diffused through the China-led RCI, which strengthens China's institutional power. In that way, power and norms mutually interact, challenging conventional perspectives of many realists and constructivists who focus on either

power or norms as the primary factor shaping actors' behaviors. This analysis also resonates with realist constructivism's understanding of power and norms, as an alternative theoretical approach to go beyond the dualism between realism and constructivism in IR (Barkin 2020).

Second, different types of power support the agency of certain groups of actors in playing a norm-maker's role in global extractives governance. This story of power and agency in global governance provides supplementary answers to the questions who governs the globe? (Avant et al. 2010) and whose ideas matter? (Acharya 2009). Avant, Finnemore, and Sell (2010) recognize making rules (both formal and informal rules such as the basis of past practice) as one of the major roles of global governors. Considering rules in a broader sense, global governors are the agents who have sufficient authority to make norms. In that context, this dissertation's analysis reveals that China as a newly emerging power has become a global governor in global extractives governance by playing a norm-maker's role. More importantly, Chinese government agencies (especially CCCMC) and business actors are the primary actors having agency in transparency norm development processes, based on their institutional power in RCI and structural power in their relations with other actors in the global cobalt supply chain.

Of note, these actors' institutional and structural power is linked to China's material resources in at least two ways. First, the Chinese government provides direct and indirect sponsorship for these actors. For instance, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce strongly supported CCCMC so that CCCMC could initiate RCI, alongside close partnerships with Chinese companies. Moreover, CCCMC has been able to access multiple governance venues to introduce and advertise RCI/CCCMC transparency standards through BRI, the Chinese government's most significant institution for its grand national strategy. In so doing, the government empowered CCCMC and other Chinese member companies in RCI so that they could take a role of transparency norm-makers. Regarding Acharya's (2018) theoretical framework, it is noteworthy that not every group of Chinese actors could become a local-idea shifter involved in the universalization process. The government-market alliance is likely to provide sufficient authority to market actors exclusively, particularly strengthening their institutional power.

Second, China's material resources have shaped the transnational relationship between the major Chinese norm-makers and non-Chinese business-oriented actors in global supply chains—especially, the global EV supply chain and the global cobalt supply chain (e.g., German car companies' participation in RCI as members). These actors share common market interest in maximizing profits from the EV- and extractive resource sectors. In so doing, they have built a strong transnational market alliance/transnational liberal alliance to facilitate the exchange of information and co-evolution of governance principles. The emerging status of the Chinese business actors in the world economy, based on rapidly increasing economic capabilities (material power resources), has reinforced their agency as norm-makers in global extractives governance. Therefore, like Acharya's (2009) argument, China, as one of non-Western agents, has taken a norm-maker's role much stronger than in the past. But not all Chinese actors are norm-makers and local-idea shifters. As TJ Ma, a leader of a Chinese environmental NGO, mentioned, "China is not a monolithic actor" (Ma 2019) and, currently, Chinese government agencies and some big corporations are the primary Chinese actors in transparency norm development. So, their ideas matter in the global extractives governance.

The final implication of the current analysis concerns the version of a transparency norm being promoted by the major Chinese agents through their growing institutional and structural power. As detailed in chapters 3 and 4, Chinese actors seem to reinforce a thin transparency norm more than a thick transparency norm, and accelerate asymmetrical power relations, particularly between business actors and civil society actors. This could lead to China facing another legitimacy crisis and raise questions about accountability in the China-led transnational governance mechanism. This analysis revealed that the concerns of Chinese and non-Chinese civil society actors and the most affected communities have been largely disregarded in RCI/CCCMC's governance procedures—e.g., lack of decision-making procedures to develop basic transparency standards and a stringent accountability measure, such as sharing social and environmental impact data to the public. No civil society actors are official members in RCI who can participate in the governance processes. Under this type of governance system, it is highly possible that civil society actors and the most affected local people remain weak agents who must passively adopt a thin

transparency norm developed by the Chinese government-market alliance and the transnational business-centric coalition due to the major actors' growing institutional and structural power. This ongoing asymmetrical power relations might make RCI a governance venue of "global monologue," instead of "global multilogue" (Wiener 2018:88) representing a democratic feature of global multi-stakeholder governance ideally (Gleckman 2018).

This type of legitimacy issue in transnational governance has been actively debated among global governance scholars, and many point out the importance of "stakeholder democracy" and increasing public participation at all governance levels (Bernstein 2005; Bernstein and Cashore 2007). Without a deliberative public process among various actors, including NGOs, it might be challenging for the RCI to achieve input legitimacy (representation and accountability) and output legitimacy (effectiveness) (Risse 2004 and Bäckstrand 2006). In the case of RCI, the democratic deficit caused by the exclusion of civil society actors' participation could lead to a legitimacy crisis, such as the failure of implementing transparency standards, based on a lack of monitoring process and watchdog.

While most transnational voluntary-based governance mechanisms face legitimacy challenges (Lebaon and Lister 2015), a Chinese-led governance initiatives may encounter even greater scrutiny due to China's unique characteristics as an authoritarian state. Most transparency standards developed by China do not link to a state regulation (a legalized rule) as a supplementary compliance tool (Sun 2020) and the role of Chinese NGOs as a domestic watchdog to monitor governance outcome is limited. In the RCI, China's authoritarian-based social culture seems to keep Chinese civil society actors in a weak status. This phenomenon resonates with Li and Shapiro's (2020) research finding that China's environmentalism is closer to "environmental authoritarianism" rather than "authoritarian environmentalism"—i.e., "authoritarianism in green clothing". From this perspective, Chinese-led transnational governance initiatives such as RCI and China's growing power through the initiatives reinforce China's "authoritarianism and capitalism in green clothing" continuously, particularly alongside strengthening a thin transparency norm.

Of note, the RCI recently joined the Impact Facility, a non-profit organization created to improve local communities' livelihoods that works closely with international and local NGOs, such as Fairtrade Africa and Solidaridad. Interestingly, China's Huayou Cobalt initiated Fair Cobalt Alliance (FCA) with Fairphone and Signify under The Impact Facility. RCI also joined as a member in the FCA (The Impact Facility 2021). This was a significant step for the major Chinese actors in cobalt governance because of FCA's primary focus on social and environmental challenges in Congolese cobalt mining sites, particularly artisanal mining activities, where China sources a high volume of cobalt. However, it is not clear yet whether the most affected and marginalized local agents (e.g., women) and civil society actors have sufficient authority to participate in influential decision-making processes through this new platform, and to what extent RCI would be willing to hear their voices. FCA operates based on a voluntary-based approach with a lack of compliance rules that is likely to be following a thin transparency norm. In addition, the Impact Facility primarily targets ASM's capacity building procedures through 'investment-led approach' as an alternative solution of an advocacy work, that focuses on strengthening local small and medium-size mining companies by providing technical assistance or helping them to access and market (The Impact Facility 2021). This practical approach emphasizes a market solution to empower local communities, instead of transforming structural power imbalance between Chinese business actors and the most affected/non-business actors who can be a watchdog of companies' irresponsible behaviors. From this perspective, it seems unlikely that this new platform will lead to advancing a thick transparency norm encouraging deliberative public participation and sharing data of environmental- and social impact to the public.

Conclusion

This chapter examines different types of power affecting different Chinese actors' roles in transparency norm-making in global extractives governance, particularly through the RCI case. The major findings show the importance of institutional and structural power, based on a transnational liberal alliance

among Chinese and non-Chinese market agents. RCI, a Chinese-led transnational extractive governance initiative, operates as a new governance platform reinforcing the major Chinese actors' institutional and structural power. At the same time, they seem to strengthen and universalize a thin transparency norm through multiple venues by advertising the norm through RCI. This new phenomenon shows norm-making processes among business-centric agents in the RCI that limits civil society actors' participation and further reinforces market-oriented governance mechanisms based on a thin transparency norm.

Based on this analysis, this chapter contributes to advancing a more nuanced understanding of power in norm development. Many scholars in global governance studies and IR in general do not provide sufficient explanations about the relations between power and norms (Barkin 2020). Moreover, previous governance studies often apply a concept of power without a specific definition or focus only on a particular mode of power, following each theoretical tradition (Gerlak et al. 2020). In this sense, this research seeks to fill those gaps and support the realist constructivist approaches by showing co-constitutive interactions between power and norms in global governance.

Furthermore, this analysis brings power into Acharya's (2018) norm circulation model so that it provides supplementary ideas regarding some key concepts in the theoretical framework. First, power facilitates or constraints the agency of particular actors in norm development processes; not every actor can become local idea shifters, particularly in the case of China as an authoritarian state. CCCMC became an active local idea shifter based on the Chinese government's sponsorship and its close ties with powerful business actors. Second, this analysis shows how institutional and structural power of local idea shifters stimulates the universalization process of a locally re-constructed norm. This point clarifies under what conditions a constitutive localization process moves to a universalization process in the norm-circulation model.

In addition to these theoretical contributions, the major findings in this chapter provide some empirical considerations regarding China's growing institutional and structural power supporting China's norm-making role, particularly in strengthening a thin transparency norm. The RCI case shows that the Chinese government-market alliance enjoys greater opportunities to advance a thin transparency norm

benefiting their status, while civil society actors and the affected local communities are excluded in decision-making and verification processes. This mode of governance based on the asymmetrical power relations in the RCI resonates with ‘liberal environmentalism’ (Bernstein 2001) and risks of business actors’ greenwashing. However, greenwashing could harm China’s international reputation and the state’s legitimacy. From this perspective, the Chinese government and CCCMC might need to support more civil society actors’ participation in the RCI’s governance mechanism to overcome a potential legitimacy crisis. Some institutional design changes in RCI would help, for instance, accepting more Chinese and non-Chinese NGOs as official members. In so doing, RCI could empower the agency of the marginalized voices with weaker institutional and structural power in global extractives governance. Otherwise, China may continue to face legitimacy crises.

Since Chinese president Xi declared his goal of making China a responsible great leader, China has become more active in various global governance arenas by establishing new institutions and taking a norm-maker’s role through the platforms. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is likely to be another venue that provides Chinese government agencies (particularly CCCMC) and companies a privileged position to promote China’s transparency norm in the relationships with other actors in the mineral supply chain. Based on Xi Jinping’s proposal, CCCMC became the main agency taking in charge of initiating “Chinese Alliance of Responsible Business in Africa” which has become a significant part of China’s BRI projects and China’s new vision of Green BRI. As the Secretariat of the Alliance, CCCMC aims to enhance China-Africa cooperation through BRI as a way of improving corporate social responsibility and achieving the UN SDGs. It targets China’s major investment areas, including the mineral industry sector, covering 50 African countries so far (Sun 2020). Even though it is premature to conclude, the increasing partnerships between CCCMC and other countries based on BRI and China’s emphasis on CSR values seem to show CCCMC’s growing opportunity to disseminate its transparency standards internationally. Since BRI has been launched, more BRI countries and CCCMC have built informal or formal partnerships, such as a newly agreed MoU between CCCMC and the State Committee of Uzbekistan on Geology and Mineral in 2019 (CCCMC 2019b). Given this new development, future research could explore the BRI as another platform for China’s

institutional and structural power and see whether similar norm development processes occur in various global governance areas.

CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION

This dissertation examines China as a newly powerful actor in transparency norm development in global extractives governance by focusing on the following three questions (see chapter 1): 1) Is China a norm-taker or a norm-maker in transparency norm development processes of global extractives governance? 2) Under what conditions is China a norm-taker or a norm-maker? 3) How does power matter in norm development in global extractives governance? Previous chapters provide answers to these questions drawing on Acharya's (2018) norm-circulation model. This chapter summarizes how the major empirical findings directly speak to the main research questions and discusses theoretical contributions to current debates about the rise of China and norm development the IR/global governance literature. It also speaks to the dissertation's practical contribution in understanding China's role in global extractives governance. Lastly, the concluding section explains limitations and suggest future research directions.

Summary of Main Findings

As discussed in chapter 2, the empirical analysis in chapters 3, 4, and 5 are organized around the three stages of Acharya's norm-circulation model (learning and taking a global norm, constitutive localization, and universalization) and focus on the role of China in transparency norm development processes in global extractives governance. Differentiated from previous conventional norms literature in IR that emphasizes one-way socialization, Acharya's norm-circulation model views norm development as a two-way socialization process that involves multi-level and multi-agency dynamics. Below I review the main findings for each research question.

Chapters 3 and 4 speak to the first question of whether China is a norm-taker or a norm-maker in transparency norm development processes of global extractives governance. Collectively, the mapping exercise looking at China's participation in 48 TEGIs (chapter 3) and the RCI case study (chapter 4) confirmed that transparency is a core norm within the current transnational extractive governance landscape.

All 48 initiatives include basic rules and principles regarding the disclosure of information. These chapters also demonstrated that China acts as both a norm-taker and a norm-maker in this governance area. Chapter 3 revealed that as of 2019, Chinese actors participate in more than a half of the 48 TEGIs, suggesting that Chinese actors play a norm-taker's role by engaging in those initiatives. Furthermore, as explained in chapter 4, China has developed Chinese versions of transparency standards for the sustainable mineral supply chain by synthesizing international transparency rules and Chinese domestic regulations to create a Chinese version of a transparency norms. The CCCMC's 2014 and 2015 Guidelines, and RCI's new standards are examples revealing Chinese actors' norm-making role in global extractives governance.

Importantly, these research results showed that Chinese actors tend to take and make a thin transparency norm. In other words, China is a norm-taker and a norm-maker of a particular version of transparency. As outlined in chapter 3, a thin version of transparency norm fails to meet all of the following criteria: 1) the disclosure of information about decision-making processes to the public, 2) the presence of an independent third-party auditor in monitoring processes, and 3) the disclosure of the verification information to the public. The mapping exercise in chapter 3 showed that Chinese actors tended to join more TEGIs emphasizing a thin transparency norm. In addition, chapter 4 discussed that the new Chinese transparency guidelines initiated by CCCMC and RCI also advance a thin transparency norm, characterized by a lack of stringent verification processes and disclosure of its decision-making processes to the public. For that reason, China's support for thin transparency could create legitimacy and accountability issues in global extractives governance because of potential "green-washing" by companies and governments using the thin transparency norm-based standards.

Regarding the second main research question, chapter 4 identified particular conditions under which China acts as a norm-taker and a norm-maker. The RCI case study notably documented the important role of the CCCMC as a Chinese local idea-shifter that adopted and localized international transparency standards (e.g., OECD Due Diligence Guidance) as a part of a norm-taking and norm-making process that was designed to cope with China's legitimacy crises caused by international and domestic pressures. The empirical analysis suggests that China's constitutive localization occurred when Chinese local actors

(particularly extractive companies) were pressured to adopt a global norm by international advocacy groups, but reluctant to follow a “foreign rule” disadvantaging China’s interest and mismatched with China’s culture. In such a challenging situation, developing Chinese versions of transparency guidelines was a pragmatic solution to satisfy both international and domestic stakeholders, as discussed in chapter 4. Moreover, the Chinese government’s political willingness under the Xi Jinping’s regime to rebrand China as a responsible leader in global governance, particularly for its going-out policy and BRI projects, seems to be another essential factor triggering CCCMC’s engagement in the transparency norm development processes as a Chinese local idea-shifters.

Third, chapter 5 examined how power matters in norm development in global extractives governance by applying Barnett and Duvall’s (2008) typology of power to the RCI case. The findings suggest that China’s growing material power resources are translated into institutional and structural power, which in turn facilitate China’s norm-making role. One of the key findings is that China does not behave as a monolithic actor in the norm development process. Specifically, institutional and structural power support the agency of particular Chinese actors in taking on the role of a local idea shifter. In the case of the RCI, CCCMC was empowered to act as a local idea shifter because of the Chinese government’s sponsorship and its close connection to powerful business actors both domestically and internationally. These relationships reinforce and strengthen CCCMC’s structural power. In addition, the RCI case showed that CCCMC, supported by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and other RCI members (mostly private companies), attempts to universalize China’s localized transparency standards through the RCI platform, e.g., RCI’s international conference and meetings. RCI thus provides a source of the Chinese local idea-shifters’ institutional power. In this way, the institutional and structural power of the Chinese government-business alliance facilitates the universalization process at the transnational level in Acharya’s norm-circulation model. Meanwhile, all of the empirical chapters commonly found that Chinese civil society actors tend to be excluded in the norm-making process, revealing that there are asymmetrical power relations among Chinese actors that affects their norm-making role. These findings challenge the dominant

approach treating China as a single powerful actor in world politics, particularly in “the rise of China” debates in the previous IR and global governance literature.

Theoretical Implications

This dissertation’s empirical findings expand theoretical understandings of multilevel norm contestations and the interlinkages between norm development and power politics in IR and global governance studies. In addition, based on the previous norm contestation literature in IR, this research examining the case of China as an emerging power advances our knowledge about a new powerful actor’s normative role in transnational norm development. These broad theoretical implications offer new insights to enhance GEG theories regarding agency, norms, and power. This section elaborates the theoretical implications of this dissertation.

New understandings of China as an emerging power in world politics

First, this dissertation expands our understanding of an emerging power in global politics, particularly China, and adds nuance to the binary debates on whether China is a threat to existing world order, including the dominant norms that underlie that order. In finding that China is neither exclusively a challenger nor a passive follower, this dissertation contrasts with many previous debates about China in IR and global governance studies. As chapter 2 explained, many IR realists expect that China uses its growing material power capacities to challenge the current order, causing conflicts with the existing status-quo power (e.g., Mearsheimer 2006; Brooks and Wohlforth 2016). On the other hand, liberals and conventional constructivists highlight China’s smooth integration into the current world order (e.g., Ikenberry 2008; Johnston 2008). However, this dissertation aligns with the relatively recent perspective among global governance scholars that China as an emerging power tends to be a reformist, standing in between a threat and a follower (e.g., Stephen 2017; Zürn 2018; Kennedy 2018). In chapter 3, the mapping exercise showed

that Chinese actors have been integrated into the existing global extractive governance architecture through their engagement with in TEGIs, but they engage “selectively” and “partially.” Chapter 4 found that instead of adopting global transparency rules directly, Chinese governmental agencies have developed their own versions of standards by reflecting China’s interest and culture. They have subsequently taken on a greater leadership role in creating new transparency principles at the transnational level. These findings suggest scholars should better acknowledge the multidimensional aspects of “the rise of China” and other emerging states in world politics and global governance.

The non-binary approach raises new questions about China, such as how China exercises its growing power in global governance and what forms of power does China have. Also, this perspective rejects the notion of seeing China as a monolithic actor and enables researchers to ask what particular types of Chinese actors exercise their power in global governance and in what ways. This dissertation showed that the normative influence of Chinese governmental agencies (particularly CCCMC) and powerful business actors in global extractives governance has been growing through their increasing role in transparency norm-making processes. This role is based on their institutional power (e.g., agenda-setting power in the RCI) and structural power from their privileged positionalities in the global market (see chapter 5). This result indicates that “the rise of China” applies to particular Chinese actors, and not “weaker” Chinese NGOs or other civil society actors. The new understanding of China’s various forms of power fills the gap in previous literature about the debates on the rise of China, which have mostly focused on China’s military and economic (material) power (e.g., Ikenberry 2008; Christensen 2018).

Multi-level and multi-agency norm development in IR and GEG

Second, this research advances understandings of the multi-level and multi-agency dynamics of norm development in global governance as articulated in Acharya’s norm-circulation model. Differentiated from conventional cosmopolitan/liberal constructivist knowledge in IR, the empirical chapters explicitly show that a global transparency norm circulates and is contested as it moves across levels. These findings

confirm the primary theoretical assumptions of Acharya's norm-circulation model to explain transnational norm development processes. As analyzed in chapter 3 and 4, Chinese actors have interacted with various types of TEGIs and transnational norm entrepreneurs, adopted a transparency norm, and developed Chinese versions of transparency guidelines. This process fits neatly with the concept of "constitutive localization" in Acharya's model. In that process, the role of a local idea-shifter (CCCMC) was crucial, as Acharya's model highlights. Beyond the localization, chapter 4 and 5 showed that the Chinese local idea-shifter has attempted to disseminate the Chinese localized versions of transparency rules at the transnational level through the RCI, congruent with Acharya's concept of "universalization" in a norm-circulation. In sum, the findings support Acharya's norm-circulation model as an appropriate theoretical tool to understand various transnational norm development cases.

Consistent with Acharya's model, this dissertation's finding challenges the idea that global norms diffuse through a one-way process as advanced by most liberal constructivists (e.g., Risse-Kappen 1994; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Alternatively, this research supports the two-way socialization approach (Pu 2012) and norm contestation scholars' emphasis on the agency of multiple actors, particularly local actors from the "non-Western" regions, in norm development processes (Wiener 2014; Bloomfield 2016). The detailed analysis of China's transparency norm-taking and norm-making shows that there is no moral "teacher" and fixed "socializee" in Epstein's terms (2012). Rather, the research supports Acharya's view of global norms as a political outcome shaped by multiple actors and at the multiple levels, rather than a politically neutral and universal moral standard. In so doing, Acharya's model helps us understand political dynamics around transnational norm diffusions among various types of actors across levels.

This research also suggests that Acharya's theoretical approach can be a useful tool for examining other norm development processes, particularly in GEG scholarship. Except for a few studies (e.g., Jinnah 2017; Liu 2020), there is a lack of research to understand how China and other emerging countries contribute to norms in global environmental governance. Moreover, most previous literature sheds light on norm development at the international level by disregarding multilevel interactions. For that reason, this

dissertation speaks to the gaps and suggests examining diverse types of actors' roles in norm development in global environmental governance studies.

Interlinkage between power and norm development in IR and GEG

Third, this research addresses an important gap in Acharya's norm-circulation model. As Bloomfield (2016) explains, the current version doesn't clearly explain when and why specific outcomes appear. By questioning under what conditions China's norm-taking and norm-making occur, this dissertation found that power and legitimacy issues are crucial factors affecting Chinese actors' behaviors and outcomes in transnational norm development processes. In so doing, this research affirms the value of realist constructivism as a conceptual bridge between theories of power and theories of norm development in IR and GEG.

Based on a process-tracing and an in-depth analysis of the RCI case, chapter 4 and 5 provide some insights to understand the linkages between power-shifts and idea-shifts in Acharya's norm circulation model. The chapter 4 analysis shows that China's growing economic influence in the global mineral supply chain and its environmental and social impacts on mining sites overseas created legitimacy crises that restrained China's exercise of material power. Chapter 5 more explicitly explains that, under these circumstances, China translates its growing material power resources into institutional and structural power to facilitate its engagement in norm-making processes. CCCMC as China's primary local-idea shifter localized a global transparency norm and is trying to universalize their locally constituted norm at the transnational level based on their institutional and structural power supported by the Chinese government's sponsorship and its close ties with powerful business actors. These findings, notably, suggest that power facilitates or constrains the agency of certain groups of actors seeking to play a norm-maker's role. In addition, the RCI case study highlights that institutional and structural power are particularly important in the universalization process.

These findings resonate with realist constructivists' understanding of world politics, emphasizing both norms and power. This ontological approach opens up greater possibilities to bridge the fragmented debates between realists and constructivists in IR. Even though Barkin's (2003) idea of realist constructivism generated theoretical debates among IR theorists, there has been a lack of empirical studies applying the theoretical approach so far with a few exceptions (e.g., Reinold 2013). In this regard, this dissertation shows an exemplary research case of following the new theoretical approach which rejects paradigmaticism in IR (Barkin 2020).

Moreover, this theoretical emphasis on bridging power and norm development enables GEG researchers to focus on co-constitutive processes between global environmental norms and power politics, and to consider asymmetrical power relations among various types of actors in global environmental governance. This view challenges a cosmopolitan approach to understanding environmental norms as universal moral standards. In so doing, it can expand GEG scholars' perspective to see environmental norms and norm-development processes as political outcomes caused by unequal power relations.

Practical Implications

Global society faces increasing calls to develop global extractives governance to cope with the multidimensional environmental and social issues caused by increasing demands for extractive resources for low-carbon industries and green products. In addition, China must play a significant role in developing better governance mechanisms given the considerable planetary impacts stemming from its position as one of the biggest players in the global extractive resource supply chain. In this regard, this dissertation provides some practical implications contributing to global policy-oriented debates about relevant issues among GEG scholars and policymakers.

Global extractives governance and transparency

First, global extractives governance has been developed through various forms of initiatives, and the significance of the governance architecture will be growing along with the current green industry boom worldwide. The transparency norm that underlies the global extractives governance architecture has evolved from covering relatively narrow concerns related to corruption and conflict to include broader social and environmental issues. This dissertation sheds light on the importance of studying global extractive governance and the related transparency norm, topics that have received relatively less attention from GEG scholars compared to other environmental governance sectors.

While most previous studies focus on a few particular cases of TEGI such as EITI (Haufler 2010a; David-Barrett and Okamura 2016; Ihugba 2016; Papyrakis et al. 2017; Sovocool et al. 2016), this dissertation provides a more comprehensive snapshot of the current global extractives governance landscape based on the mapping exercise of 48 TEGIs (see chapter 3). This analysis found that global extractive governance consists of different types of initiatives, including intergovernmental regimes (e.g., OECD) along with transnational hybrid (e.g., IFC, UNGC) and private initiatives (e.g., ICMM, EP, ASI), run by state and/or non-state actors collectively. Moreover, these initiatives interact with each other and advance their policies through exchanging their ideas and experiences. Sovacool et al. (2020) highlight that utilizing these various types of governance platforms should continue as a way to manage increasing environmental impacts from critical mineral extractions for low-carbon technologies related to climate change mitigation policies, for instance, solar photovoltaics and EVs. In this context, this dissertation provides useful background information to further advance the nascent research on global extractives governance.

In addition, this research found that most TEGIs emphasize a transparency norm to achieve their broad governance goals, primarily, through various information disclosure policies: i.e., disclosing information about social and environmental impacts, financial information, and conflict/security-related information. However, a large number of TEGIs operate based on a thin version of transparency with a lack

of disclosing information on results (see chapter 3). Thin transparency may have limitations to guarantee companies' responsible behavioral changes. These findings echo the argument of Sovacool et al. (2020: 31) that "transparency of supply chains is a means to an end." In this regard, this dissertation emphasizes a need of defining and studying closely different types of transparency norms which can affect the effectiveness of global extractives governance.

China's increasing role in global extractives governance

Second, this dissertation highlights that Chinese actors' engagement in global extractives governance has increased for the last decades, even though it is still limited compared to other governance stakeholders based in North America and Europe. It is noteworthy that Chinese actors participate in more than 50 percent of the 48 TEGI analyzed in chapter 3 and have started playing a transparency norm-making role (not only a norm-taking role) through a new China-led initiative (chapter 4). This is significant given China's large impact on the global extractive resource market as the biggest supplier and consumer. This finding contributes to filling the gap of the lack of understanding about China and China's role in "transnational" environmental governance, particularly beyond intergovernmental environmental regimes. There have been only a few studies on examining the issue in GEG (e.g., Hale and Roger's research on China in transnational climate governance in 2018) despite Chinese actors' increasing environmental impact.

In addition, this research identified factors that constrain or facilitate Chinese actors' participation in global extractives governance. As chapter 4 discussed, international pressure on China from global advocacy networks through naming and shaming strategies (e.g., Global Witness' report regarding irresponsible behaviors of Chinese companies in the DRC) has triggered Chinese actors' interactions with TEGIs and other foreign governance agents, such as GIZ and OECD. Along with this international pressure, this research also found that the Chinese government's strong political willingness to re-shape its international image as a responsible leader led to Chinese actors' advanced involvement in global extractive

governance processes. This government's approach has been connected to sustaining Chinese companies' business operations overseas and increasing China's soft power, particularly related to China's BRI project (see chapter 4). For that reason, this dissertation suggests that China's growing participation in the current transnational governance system and its contribution to transparency norm-making has been driven by given both international and domestic factors based on both the logic of consequences (i.e., calculating costs and benefits) and the logic of appropriateness (i.e., considering norms and values). This finding could help GEG researchers better understand China's role in transnational environmental governance for other issue areas, such as climate change and biodiversity, and policymakers in the current TEGIs or other stakeholders in the global extractives supply chain to build close governance partnerships with Chinese actors.

China's preference for thin transparency

Third, this dissertation found that Chinese actors prefer a thin transparency norm, which could lead to accountability and legitimacy problems for existing global extractive governance mechanisms. Specifically, Chinese companies and government agencies are participating more in TEGIs based on a thin version of transparency norm (chapter 3). Moreover, Chinese versions of transparency guidelines of CCCMC and the RCI reflect a thin version of transparency norm—e.g., a lack of information disclosure related to decision-making processes and monitoring results (chapter 4). This tendency may further strengthen a thin transparency norm in global extractives governance because of China's growing influence at the transnational level.

Governance policies based on a thin transparency norm usually lack stringent implementation and enforcement measures. For that reason, relevant companies can enjoy benefits from such transparency tools by disclosing a limited extent of information (or unverified information) and getting a better image without actual making meaningful behavioral changes. It seems to suggest a marketization process of transparency captured by powerful market actors (Mason and Gupta 2014; Mol 2014). Park and Kramarz (2019: 7) frame

this type of phenomenon as an “accountability trap” indicating that more accountability governance measures, including the rise of transparency, do not lead to more environmental benefits. In this sense, China’s growing influence in global extractives governance, particularly through thin transparency norm-making, may create accountability issues in global extractives governance and keep strengthening “liberal environmentalism” prioritizing liberal economic interests (Bernstein 2001) in global environmental governance.

As I discussed in chapter 5, China’s thin transparency norm-making processes particularly are based on the structural power of Chinese government-market alliance being reluctant to be regulated by stringent international rules. Government agencies (e.g., CCCMC and the Ministry of Commerce) strongly support Chinese business actors’ needs in close partnerships with foreign market agents who share similar interests (e.g., US and European electric and car companies in the RCI). Meanwhile, Chinese civil society actors lack access to participate in transparency norm development. The overall weakness of Chinese civil society hinders their role in working as a watchdog to check powerful actors’ behaviors in following voluntary rules. This finding reveals China’s unique “top-down” and “market-oriented” governance style, as an authoritarian regime. In addition, it resonates with the previous literature discussing China’s strong government-led environmental governance approach, i.e., “authoritarian environmentalism” (Li and Shapiro 2020, see also Zhao et al. 2020). In this regard, this dissertation suggests that China’s continuous taking and making a “thin transparency norm” in global extractives governance may foster the business-elite centric governance traits while weakening the legitimacy and accountability of the current global extractive governance architecture, due to a lack of representation of diverse civil society actors and effective policy outcomes. For that reason, policymakers need to consider how the transparency norm and particular transparency policies in global extractive governance can advance transformative behavioral changes of Chinese corporations to mitigate their negative environmental and social impacts.

Limitations of this research

Despite theoretical and practical contributions of this dissertation as discussed above, there are some limitations of this research that could be addressed in follow-up studies. First, this dissertation was primarily focused on theory development rather than theory testing. Following George and Bennett (2005), this study selected the RCI case as a “crucial case” supporting heuristic theory development and testing multiple observations from a single case (George and Bennett 2005:32). This approach also supports the main idea of abductive analysis aiming at theory construction based on “anomalous and surprising empirical findings against a background of multiple existing sociological theories” (Timmermans and Tavory 2012: 169). From this perspective, this research’s orientation of a single case study was an optimal decision to advance a norm-circulation framework in global extractives governance, given the representation and anomaly of the RCI case. That said, there are limitations in relying on a single case study. There is a need to examine additional cases to determine whether China’s constitutive localization and universalization of its localized norm following Acharya’s norm-circulation model can be generalized. A large *n* study would validate this dissertation’s result more explicitly.

Second, this research explains China’s norm-taking and norm-making based on Chinese actors’ behavioral patterns and changes (e.g., creating transparency clauses in CCCMC guidelines) and lacks an investigation of their psychological perceptions about transparency norm. Even though some interviewees provided some relevant information, the scope of the interviews was limited to a target group, not a broader range of Chinese stakeholders. For that reason, the main analysis may be weak to argue that Chinese actors adopt a transparency norm because they feel like they “ought to” do so based on the logic of appropriateness. Previous norm studies in IR emphasize a moral sense of oughtness as an important part of consisting a norm (Jurkovich 2020). To uncover a clearer rationale behind Chinese actors’ norm-taking and norm-making, follow-up research is needed. This could be accomplished by conducting more in-depth interviews with a much broader range of Chinese participants in global extractives governance.

Third, this dissertation limitedly describes China's power in norm development, particularly related to a universalization process of a Chinese localized norm due to a lack of examining non-Chinese actors' perspectives. In this sense, Chapter 4 and 5 showed an overall tendency that Chinese local idea-shifters create a localized norm and attempt to universalize it based on their institutional and structural power. It does not determine whether the universalization has been successful. As chapter 5 explained, the concepts of institutional and structural power are "relational" power so that understanding of how non-Chinese actors recognize and react to China's influence and to what extent they adopt Chinese norms (e.g., through in-depth interviews or surveys) might be an important next step. For now, China's transparency norm-making as constitutive localization and universalization is at a very early stage. For instance, the RCI's transparency standards are at the final stage for their official publication. Therefore, there was a lack of access to sufficient data to make judgements about the effectiveness of China's universalization of a local norm while conducting this research. This gap can lead to a future research agenda, particularly to trace continuous evolutionary trajectories of China's norm-taking and norm-making in global extractives governance.

Future research directions

The major theoretical and practical findings and the limitations discussed in the previous section suggest some potential future research directions. First, GEG scholars can investigate the evolution of the current global extractives governance architecture related to its transparency norm and transparency policies. As chapter 3 analyzed, there are various types of initiatives for the sustainability of global extractive sectors, and they are evolving through interactions between them (e.g., sharing transparency guidelines and specific policy tools). For instance, the CCCMC/RCI guidelines were developed based on the OECD due diligence guidance, and the EU recently initiated the EU Conflict Minerals Regulations which is also designed based on the OECD guidance and the US Dodd-Frank Act Section 1502. These processes show complex dynamics between different types of existing governance regimes—intergovernmental agreements, regional, and domestic laws and regulations, and transnational voluntary

rules. Moreover, notably, policymakers and sustainability researchers recently attempt to link the extractive governance to transnational climate change governance due to the soaring global demand of mineral resources for climate change mitigation measures, such as building massive renewable energy infrastructure and growing EV markets (cf. Sovacool et al. 2020). The World Bank's Climate-Smart Mining Initiative is one such example. In addition, some governance platforms started applying blockchain technology for better transparency of companies in the global mineral supply chain, such as the World Economic Forum's Mining and Metals Blockchain Initiative and Better Cobalt Program in the RCS Global. Regarding the new phenomena, future research could examine the questions of how the current global extractive governance architecture evolves through issue-linkages in regime complexes and how new technology affect transparency norms and policies in global extractives governance.

Second, future research could examine more thoroughly how China's current emphasis on a thin version of transparency affects governance outcomes across levels. This dissertation found that Chinese government agencies and businesses actors prefer less stringent voluntary governance measures, and there is a lack of interaction with civil society actors to develop and implement transparency policies. In addition, Chinese actors seem to be passionate to advance green finance mechanisms as their transparency tools. China's market-oriented approach could foster "liberal environmentalism" (Bernstein 2001) in which liberal economic norms are institutionalized in global environmental governance, and hinder transformative changes and effective policy outcomes at the local level, particularly in least developed resource-rich countries in Africa and Latin America (e.g., cooper and cobalt mining sites in the DRC). On the other hand, as some of my Chinese interviewees argue, China's current orientation of a thin transparency norm could gradually transform Chinese actors' behaviors in a more responsible way, based on their step-by-step approach, and eventually lead to positive policy outcomes. In this regard, future research should investigate how China's growing influence in transparency norm development impacts the accountability of global extractives governance and how China's support for a thin transparency norm affect nature and people at the local level (e.g., through a fieldwork study). This issue could contribute to extending the debates about "the accountability trap" which indicates a mismatch between increasing accountability governance

mechanisms (including transparency measures) and effective sustainable policy outcomes (Park and Kramarz 2019). In addition, this research agenda could contribute to the discussion about transparency “for whom” (Gupta and Mason 2014).

Third, the norm-circulation model elaborated in this dissertation should be applied to broader global environmental governance cases (e.g., climate change and biodiversity governance). This theoretical model could reveal more complex multilevel governance dynamics and the detailed processes involved in development global environmental norms that support the governance architecture. Particularly, as chapter 5 showed, power is an important component of this norm-circulation process. In this regard, this theoretical model could be used to examine the role of China and other emerging countries in other various governance sectors. In addition, a comparative analysis studying traditionally powerful actors (e.g., the US and the EU) and emerging states (e.g., China, India, Brazil, and Russia) could be an innovative research direction given their large political and environmental impacts. This approach resonates with Bernstein’s (2020) recent argument that GEG scholars need to pay more attention to great power politics and develop theoretical debates about powerful states’ responsibilities in global environmental governance.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1. CODEBOOK OF TEGI ANALYSIS

Basic Information of an initiative	
The name of TEGI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What’s the full official name of each TEGI?
Transnational Extractive Governance Initiatives (TEGI)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Excluded regional initiatives, such as ICGLR Supply Chain Initiative in Great Lakes region, given a research purpose of observing global transparency norm development processes. • For the same reason, I excluded initiatives primarily targeting domestic actors in the extractive sector only (e.g., Whitehorse Mining Initiative in Canada). • TEGIs are defined as a cooperative platform setting global rules/standards or organizing other activities, which has an impact on the oil, gas, metal, and/or mineral sector • The selected cases are only the initiatives that are currently active. Some initiatives were active in the past and became extinct. Sometimes, more than two initiatives merged into one initiative. On the other hand, some initiatives had divided into several new initiatives. For instance, Global Mining Initiative (GMI) and the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development Initiative (MMSD) worked actively between 1998 and 2002, and this cooperative project was phased out after the establishment of ICMM in 2001. Given the evolutionary pattern of TEGIs, this analysis focuses on mapping the current TEGIs. • In the case of TEGI operating based on Stock Exchanges, I select only the platforms being operated globally (for instance, having regional branches). For that reason, I didn’t include Chinese Stock Exchanges even though its impact on Chinese extractive corporations seems considerable.
The Type of Initiative (corporation members; government members; other types of actors; hybrid)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Corporation members</u>: a case when an initiative invites only companies as its official members so that they are main participants in the TEGI • <u>Government members</u>: a case when an initiative invites only governments as its official members so that they are main participants in the TEGI • <u>Hybrid</u>: a case when an initiative invites all kinds of actors (companies, government agencies, NGOs, people from academia, etc.) as its official members so that they are main participants in the TEGI • When there is no membership system, I examine which type of actors are the primary participants to build transparency rule/standards are, such as the case of FTSE Indices.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This distinction implies the core characteristic of each initiative regarding the following question: who/what type of actors are norm-maker or norm-shaper in TEGIs? Particularly, it helps to observe different engagement patterns of Chinese companies and Chinese government agencies.
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China in each TEGI	
Types of Chinese participants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Specify the type of Chinese participants (e.g., government agencies, banks, civil society, academics, or companies, etc.) • Are they private companies? Are they downstream companies or upstream companies? • Is there a government agency? I defined a government agency in this research as an organization belong to the government so that it relates to national policy-making and policy-implementation. In this sense, the authority of a government agency is endowed to pursue national interest of the government. For instance, a central bank (such as Bank of England) has its authority to make national monetary policy; it is regarded as a government agency in this analysis. • For this criterion, I selected Chinese participants only related to the extractive sector (especially if an initiative works broadly, not only targeting extractive resource-related businesses). <u>Corporations:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When Chinese participations are companies or an association of companies (industrial/market entities) • Business associations are included in this category as well. <u>Banks/financial institutions:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This category includes diverse financial institutions as well such as Chinese metal exchange markets (e.g., China Gems and Jade Exchange and Chinese Gold and Silver Exchange in DMCC) <u>Government agencies:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • when a Chinese participation work as a representative of one of the Chinese bureaucratic bodies. These participants should have public authority related to policy-making or implementing
The List of Chinese participants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Selected companies which are owned by person/people with Chinese nationality even in the case of the location of their headquarters outside China (categorized based on the company ownership) • Excluded a case when Chinese and non-Chinese personals have join-ownership of a company, but the

	<p>Chinese person is not a primary leader of the company's management.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Selected Chinese participants who are more directly related to each initiative. For example, even though several Chinese governmental agencies and NGOs are member of IUCN, there are not participating in Global Business and Biodiversity Programme (an initiative for governing extractive companies of IUCN).
The number of Chinese participants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> When an initiative is led by a Chinese government agency, the initiative itself is counted as one Chinese participant (ex. the Responsible Cobalt Initiative).
Types of Engagement (e.g., member)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <u>Active engagement</u>: a case when a company is a member in TEGI. In this analysis I use the term, members, broadly so that it also includes the case of a company listed in a Stock Exchange Market (FTSE Russell) or the case of a company involving as a signatory party (ICMC). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are they official members? <u>Passive engagement</u>: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are they accredited companies based on a certification mechanism? Are they engaging based on their informal status such as an MoU?
The level of China's engagement (Active/Passive) of each different types of Chinese participants (particularly corporations and governmental agencies)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chinese corporations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Active engagement: Chinese companies participate based on an official member status. Passive engagement: Chinese companies participate without an official member status even though the initiative invites companies as its members. Chinese governmental agencies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Active engagement: Chinese government (or a Chinese government agency) participate with an official member status. Passive engagement: Chinese government (or a Chinese government agency) participate without an official member status even though the initiate invites governments as its members internationally (Instead, Chinese government agencies participate in TEGIs, based on MoU, their observer status, or temporary projects for instance.)

Transparency in each TEGI	
Transparency 1 (Thick/Thin)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Only if an initiative fulfills all three conditions below, it refers to the high level of transparency. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The three conditions reflect the transparency measures of Schleifer et al. (2019), distinguishing shallow and deep transparency, and the different stringency levels of private governance initiatives (First-Party, Second-Party, and Third-Party Initiative) in Bloomfield 2017.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Three required conditions of a thick version of transparency <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) <u>the disclosure of information about multi-stakeholder rule-making processes to the public</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - this variable shows whether the substantial information about meetings of a decision-making body or a rule-setting body is shared with the public (e.g., minutes of major meetings or comments from stakeholder consultations, See Schleifer et al. 2019, p. 4). 2) <u>third-party monitoring (independent monitor/auditor)</u> 3) <u>the disclosure of substantial verification/monitoring information to public</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - These criteria show the level of stringency binding companies mainly. If the governance mechanism of an initiative aims to build dialogue or standard-setting, not to enforce members to disclose their information, the initiative was sorted out as a case of thin transparency.
<p>Transparency 2 (Broad/Narrow) - particularly regarding environmental aspects of ‘transparency’</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The spectrum of defining ‘transparency’ in each TEGI <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. financial information b. conflict information c. social information d. environmental information

APPENDIX 2. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

I. The role of the informant and the organization

1. About the informant
 - What's your specific task related to China? How long have you been working with China?
 - What was your role in drafting/publishing CCCMC/RCI guidelines?
2. Who are the major Chinese partners? (e.g., Chinese government agencies such as CCCMC, Chinese extractive companies, other Chinese NGOs etc.)
Is there any regular meeting/communication process with them?

II. The CCCMC's guidelines

1. Initial stage of developing the guidelines
 - How could China get an interest in drafting the CCCMC guidelines?
 - What might have been the driving forces externally and internally?
2. Process
 - Who was the major Chinese participant in the drafting process? Did CCCMC have enough authority?
3. Process
 - While you were participating in the drafting process, could you observe different positions and perspectives among Chinese participants? (Chinese government agencies, companies, civil societies, people from academia, etc.) Was there any observable difference between Chinese government agencies and Chinese private corporations?
4. Process
 - What's the major obstacle of reaching an agreement related to making and publishing the guidelines?
5. Process
 - What factor(s) facilitated the drafting process and helped participants to reach common grounds/agreements? (e.g., the leadership of a charismatic person: a norm entrepreneur)
6. Transparency norm
 - What was the Chinese actors' view on transparency rules?
 - Wasn't there any reluctance or any specific discussion about the rules of disclosing information on financial transactions and environmental impacts? (particularly given its authoritarian social culture and system)
 - Could you see any different perspectives between the Chinese government participants and Chinese companies regarding transparency regulations?
 - Was there any 'active' suggestion of Chinese actors related to transparency rules/policies?
7. New 'Chinese' norm
 - Was there any innovative norm/idea suggested by Chinese actors to govern extractives industries globally?
8. Output
 - From your perspective, why did China develop its own guidelines, instead of using the pre-existing guidelines such as the OECD Due Diligence guideline?

III. China's role in global extractives governance (initiatives)

1. Do you think China is a passive learner or an active rule-maker in global extractives governance (given the recently initiated Responsible Cobalt Initiative)?
 - If China is not a passive learner, could you say that Chinese leadership in this governance realm is growing? (e.g., suggesting innovative policies; creating discussions about a specific norm, etc.)
2. How about China's role related to transparency norm/regulations? Is China an active supporter (norm-disseminator?) or a challenger? Are there any differences dependent on each type of Chinese actors?