THESIS

FRAGILITY ASSESSMENT OF BRIDGE SUPERSTRUCTURES UNDER HYDRODYNAMIC FORCES

Submitted by

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ABSTRACT

FRAGILITY ASSESSMENT OF BRIDGE SUPERSTRUCTURES UNDER HYDRODYNAMIC FORCES

On September 11-17, 2013, Colorado suffered devastating and widespread flash flooding which spread 150 miles, from Colorado Springs north to Fort Collins impacting 24 counties. The flood damaged several bridges as well as over 400 miles of state roads. As a result of the transportation damage, residents of Drake, Colorado were isolated and had to be evacuated via helicopter. This thesis aims to determine the failure risk associated with the inundation of bridge superstructures.

A linear network of eight bridges near Drake, Colorado is selected for analysis which includes three unique structural configurations. Flood analysis is performed using the design equations presented by Kerenyi et al. (2009) which follows the same equation format that is listed in AASHTO. Fragilities are developed for the most critical internal and external composite girders for each bridge. The results obtained from fragility analysis are then used to determine the elevation adjustments needed to reach a target beta value of 3.5. Based on the analysis conducted in this thesis, it was found that the forces associated with bridge deck inundation, more specifically, in fast-moving mountain rivers is substantial and needs to be considered in design. Currently, bridge superstructures are designed based on the 100 year flood, which in the case of the bridges in this study, would not have resulted in any inundation of the bridge deck at the time of construction based on the knowledge at that time. To counter this, bridge superstructures should be designed based on the 500 year flood which would incorporate

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inundation forces in the initial design. The methodology presented in this thesis can be used to assess and improve the flood vulnerability for any communities' bridge network.

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LIST OF SYMBOLS

A _{ps}	Area of prestressing steel
A _s	Area of mild steel
C _D	Drag coefficient
C _L	Lift coefficient
C_{M}	Moment coefficient
F _B	Buoyancy force
f'c	Compressive strength of concrete
F _D	Drag force
F_L	Lift force
\mathbf{f}_{ps}	yield stress of prestressing steel
$\mathbf{f}_{\mathbf{y}}$	yield stress of mild steel
g	gravity
h*	Inundation ratio
M_{CG}	Moment about the center of gravity
R _n	Nominal capacity of a member
S	Deck thickness
W	Width of the bridge deck
V	Velocity
Vol _{dis}	Displaced volume of water
ρ	Density of water
φ	Resistance factor that takes into account material strength variability

- γ Load factor that takes into account the uncertainties in the load
- $\phi(.)$ Standard normal cumulative distribution function
- λ_R Logarithmic mean of capacity R
- $\xi_R \qquad \qquad \text{Logarithmic standard deviation of capacity } R$

1 Introduction

On September 11-17, 2013, Colorado suffered devastating and widespread flash flooding which spread 150 miles, from Colorado Springs north to Fort Collins impacting 24 counties. The flooding resulted in considerable erosion, realigning of stream channels, transport of rock and debris, failures of dams and impact to several residential and commercial structures (Jacobs, 2014). High-velocity floodwater resulted in ten lives lost (Jacobs, 2014) and more than 18,000 people evacuated (Ulccellini, 2014). Approximately 19,000 homes and commercial buildings were damaged with more than 1,500 destroyed (Ulccellini, 2014). Also, an estimated 485 miles of roads and 50 bridges were damaged or destroyed in the impacted counties (Ulccellini, 2014).

The focus of this thesis is on the community of Drake, Colorado located in Larimer County with a population of a little more than 1,000 people. Drake is located in the Big Thompson Canyon west of Loveland, Colorado. This flood isolated the community due to copious road and bridge damage along US 34 and county road 43. As a result of the damage, the residents had to be evacuated via helicopter. This scenario led to the current research focusing on what would be required to make the bridges along US 34 from Estes Park to the mouth of the canyon more resistant to flood damage, thereby improving the resiliency of Drake. The concept and approach used herein is focused on a specific community, but could be applied to other similar small communities that rely on bridges in a series system.

The most recent flood frequency analysis for the Big Thompson River was completed in August 2014 by Jacobs Engineering Group. Based on the drainage basin characteristics, rainfall amounts and rainfall intensities measured during the storm, the discharge estimates provided by Jacobs are greater than expected (Jacobs, 2014). This post assessment by Jacobs along with field observations by Bob Jarrettt led to the conclusion that dam failures, which include woody debris dams, road-embankments, beaver dams, stock ponds, and landslides played a large role in the September 2013 flood (Jacobs, 2014). This assessment was verified by post-flood aerial imagery. The images showed evidence of dam failures, mostly from debris flow, but there were also signs of releasing of groundwater caused by landslides (Jacobs, 2014).

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) found that the intensity of rain events, specifically the proportion of total precipitation that falls during lower probability events, has increased and it is plausible that the proportion will continue to rise in the future (Solomon et al. 2007). The IPCC concluded that higher precipitation intensity could also increase the risk of flooding (Parry et al. 2007). In 1981, effective regulatory flow rates documented by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the 2013 Flood Insurance Study (FIS) were developed (Jacobs, 2014). These discharges were used for Larimer County to designate the 100year floodplain and informed bridge construction decisions. A 100 year event is described as having a 1 in 100 or 1% chance of occurring in any given year. The most recent hydrologic evaluation of the Big Thompson watershed, completed in August 2014, produced larger discharges for the 100 and 500-year flood on the order of 1,400 to 8,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) respectfully (Jacobs, 2014). However, for the 10 and 50-year storms, the discharges were lower than the FIS values. Over a span of 33 years, the discharge values for the lower probability events increased by 13.5% for the 100-year flood discharge and 46.7% for the 500year discharge. If this trend continues to increase, it will have catastrophic effects on the current infrastructure.

An analysis by Wright et al. (2012) found that approximately one-fourth of the more than 500,000 bridges in the National Bridge Database are currently deficient and therefore are more

vulnerable to climate change than other bridges (Wright et al., 2012). The total cost for adjusting bridges in response to the threats from climate change throughout the course of the 21st century vary from approximately \$140 billion to \$250 billion (Wright et al., 2012). The large range of cost is attributed to the emissions scenario and assumptions about adaption. Only rainfall amounts were allowed to change in the analysis. Consequently, no land use changes were altered and all other hydrologic conditions were assumed to remain unchanged (Wright et al., 2012). There were several assumptions made in the estimate which leads to the numbers provided being quite conservative. Nonetheless, the estimate provides an implication of the potential effect of climate change to bridges in the United States.

This region of Colorado is no stranger to destructive flash floods. The 1976 Big Thompson Canyon flood resulted in discharge values at the mouth of the canyon on the order of a 500-year flood event. In comparison to the 2013 flood which resulted in discharge values at the mouth of the canyon around the 100-year flood event. However, the 2013 flood did result in discharge values close to a 500-year flood in some locations along the Big Thompson as shown below in Table 1.1. The fact that two low probability flood events occurred within 37 years of one another demonstrates the importance of having infrastructure that can withstand the forces associated with floods.

Estimated Annual Change Peak Discharge (cfs)					Estimated		
Location	Discharge (cfs)	10%	4%	2%	1%	0.2%	Recurrence Interval (yr)
Lake Estes	5,330	850	1,980	3,420	5,550	13,370	≈100
Big Thompson at Loveland Heights	9,300	940	2,180	3,750	6,060	14,520	100 to 500
Big Thompson above Drake	12,500	960	2,280	3,960	6,450	15,690	100 to 500
Big Thompson below Drake	14,800	2,120	4,540	7,500	11,800	26,990	100 to 500
Big Thompson at Mouth of Canyon	15,500	3,040	6,250	10,050	15,450	34,000	≈100
North Fort Big Thompson 4.5 miles above Drake	18,400	1,100	2,090	3,200	4,640	9,500	> 500
North Fork Big Thompson at Drake	5,900	1,540	2,870	4,340	6,240	12,600	≈100

Table 1.1.1. Estimate of September 2013 peak discharge return interval (Generated from Jacobs,
2014).

The total sum of the flood-related damages is approximately \$2.9 billion (Aguilar, J., 2014). The majority of the structure losses were uninsured due to damage being done outside of designated flood zones. Flood zones are denoted as areas that become inundated by a 100-year flood. Historically, the portion of homeowners whom purchase flood insurance outside of designated flood zones is small. The total sum includes damage done to housing, infrastructure and economic sectors. Due to the scale of the flooding, the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) issued notice of a \$62,800,000 allocation of federal recovery funds to the State of Colorado in December of 2013 (Disaster Recovery, n.d.). These funds were allocated to assist recovery in the most impacted counties. FEMA designated eleven counties as Presidential Disaster Areas which were to receive the funds. Boulder, Larimer, and Weld County were three of the hardest hit counties and received 80% of the funds (Disaster Recovery,

n.d.). Floods rank second behind hurricanes in insurance-based loss estimates with \$7.97 billion per year (Hydrologic Information Center - Flood Loss Data, 2015). The loss estimates exclude damage done by coastal flooding caused by tropical cyclones and the monetary values are adjusted for inflation.

This flash flood event in northern Colorado came together through a collection of ingredients. The ground was saturated with heavy rainfall, there was a deep moisture source, a slow moving pressure system was present and there was instability and lift in the atmosphere. On September 9 and 10 radar showed that parts of the Front Range picked up over an inch of rain both afternoon and evenings. This saturation prevented any further infiltration by ensuing rain storms. Moisture present in the atmosphere is measured by the observed percipitable water (PW) values. These values represent the depth of water in the atmosphere that could condense and fall as rain. Values between 1.2 and 1.4 inches during the peak of the heavy rainfall events exceeded the all-time maximum values for September as illustrated by Figure 1.1 (Ulccellini, 2014). The atmospheric state involved an upper-level low pressure center above the Great Basin, which due to a large dome of high pressure over the Pacific Northwest and southwest Canada, was blocked from moving east or north (Erdman, J. 2013). This setup allowed moist air to be transported northward and westward from the Gulf of Mexico as well as the tropical east Pacific Ocean (Ulccellini, 2014). The presence of a stationary cold front brought about the initial instability. The combination of the stagnate low pressure center and the cold front generated the upslope flow along the foothills (Bolinger, 2013). This lift, instability and moisture combination lead to the 1000-year rainstorm event starting from the higher elevations east of the Continental Divide, across the foothills and into the Front Range. It should be noted that a 1000-year rainstorm event doesn't directly correlate to a 1000-year flood event.




Figure 1.1. Precipitable water data from the weather balloon in Denver as collected from 1948-2012. The seasonal fluctuations are attributed to warm air being able to contain more water vapor (Excerpted from Colorado Climate Center, Bolinger, 2013).

The topography of the Drake is one of the most important factors as to why the community is so vulnerable to flooding. It is characterized by narrow valleys bordered by side slopes generally ranging from 10 to 80 percent (Figure 1.2). Rugged rock faces of even steeper slope occur at many locations along the canyon floors, which is most noticeable at the mouth of the canyon with near vertical faces. Soils are shallow consisting of coarse material resulting from both colluvial and alluvial processes (McCain et al., 1979). Soil grade varies from gravelly near the ridges to sandy gravel near stream levels. The Big Thompson River headwaters are located on the Continental Divide at an altitude of about 11,000 feet. The altitude of the area of interest from Estes Park to the mouth of the canyon ranges from 7,500 feet to 5,200 feet. Tributaries in the Big Thompson River basin west of Drake range in altitude from 7,000 feet to 9,000 feet with extremely steep gradients on the order of 700 feet per mile or a 13.2% slope (McCain et al., 1979). The Big Thompson River streambed has gradients ranging from 31 feet per mile at Estes Park to 100 feet per mile at the mouth of the canyon which is 0.6% to 1.8%

slope. On the North Fork Big Thompson River, the average streambed gradient is 128 feet per mile in the reach between Glen Haven and Drake which is a 2.4% slope (McCain et al., 1979). Combining the steep streambed with the lack of an escape for excessive flows leads to a community with high vulnerability to flooding.



Figure 1.2. Topography the Big Thompson Canyon with elevations ranging from 8100-7150 feet located slightly downstream from Estes Park at bridge C-15-AM. This was generated via ArcMap in combination with LiDAR data provided by Colorado GeoData.




Figure 1.3. Plan view of the Big Thompson canyon with bridges and other key features labeled.

Figure 1.3 presents a plan view of Drake, CO which is centralized at bridge C-15-Y, but the residents live along US 34 from Estes Park to the mouth of the canyon. The end goal of this

research is to identify what elevations the most critical bridges would need to be raised to such that all eight bridges in the canyon along US 34 meet a target reliability criterion. While such an approach may not be cost effective or practical for an existing bridge network, it would prevent a future low probability flood from causing the isolation of the residents of Drake, which serves as an example for future planning. Providing a uniform hazard for the bridges would ensure that the post flood construction be minimized and therefore not disrupt the flow of traffic due to closures. Cost would also be lowered due to the bridge components that would be undamaged. As shown from the figure, the residents only avenue of escape is via US 34 eastbound toward Loveland or westbound toward Estes Park. County road 43 running along the North Fork Big Thompson River would potentially be an escape route; however, the damage suffered due to the September flood was catastrophic which led to US 34 being the most flood resilient route available.

1.1 LITERATURE REVIEW

Bridges are vulnerable to water forces associated with extreme storms. These storms can cause mild to sometimes catastrophic damage to the bridge sub or superstructure. Many state departments of transportation have recognized this and have funded numerous research efforts over the years to quantify said forces. This literature review will be divided into two sections: the work related to flood forces on inundated bridge decks, and an overview on structural reliability.

Research into flood loads on bridge superstructures, more specifically bridge girders, was first conducted by Tainsh (1965). Tainsh (1965) analyzed the force on the girders of a three and four girder bridges under the condition of a partially submerged and totally submerged. The bridge deck elevation was adjusted such that the influence of the channel floor was negligible.

The forces were calculated by measuring the pressure distribution on the girders located at the middle of the flume. Shear stresses along the surface of the bridge deck were not included. Testing was done on a scale model and the results were scaled up to the parent bridge using Froude similarity, with the assumption that the Reynolds number, R, was within the range of 4 X 10^4 to 5 X 10^5 .

Denson (1982) was the first to conduct an experimental study of the lift, drag, and moment coefficients on three different types of bridge decks under the condition of partially and fully submerged. Denson studied the force coefficients dependence on a bridge relative inundation depth, h/l, Froude number, $\frac{V}{\sqrt{gl}}$, and relative thickness of the bridge, s/l. Where V is the average upstream velocity, s is the total bridge thickness, g is gravity, h is the inundation ratio and l is the bridge length. The moment, drag and lift coefficients were evaluated using l^2 , s, and l respectfully. Even though several data sets were given, no evaluation of the physical meaning of the dependencies was presented in this study. Tainsh (1965) and Denson (1982) both assumed that the parameters were independent of the Reynolds number.

Naudashcer and Medlarz (1983) used a dynamometer to measure the drag acting on bridge girders. They analyzed the effects of the elevation of the bridge, the angle between the flow and the bridge and the number and length of the girders. They observed that the flow through bridge girders generates an unsteady vortex formation which gives rise to a variation in the dynamic force acting on the bridge. A relationship between the drag coefficient, C_D, and the governing parameters was also presented.

Matsuda et al. (2001) determined that the value of the drag, lift, and moment coefficients was independent of the scale of the model. Three different bridge deck scale models were

analyzed in a wind tunnel at different angles of attack in the low Reynolds number range of 1.1 $\times 10^4 < R < 1.5 \times 10^6$. When comparing different angles of attack there was variation in the coefficients, however, at the same angle of attack there was no variation in C_D, C_L and C_M between the different models.

Okajima et al. (1997) analyzed the effect of the blockage ratio on the drag coefficient for a rectangular bridge deck. The blockage ratio is defined as the ratio between the upstream area of the bridge deck that is inundated by the free surface stream and the total area of the free surface stream measured at a reference section located upstream of the bridge. They concluded that there is a linear relationship between the blockage ratio and the drag coefficient.

Tainsh (1965) and Denson (1982) both investigated the effects of free surface flow on specific bridge deck structures. Whereas Malavasi and Guadagnini (2003) modeled the bridge deck as a rectangular cylinder in their study. Evidence was provided on the nature of the dependence of the time-averaged force coefficients (lift, drag, and moment coefficients) on a normalized cylinder submersion, $h^*=(h-h_b)/s$ and the Froude number. Where *h* is the water depth upstream of the bridge deck h^* is the inundation ratio and h_b is the elevation of the low chord of the bridge girder relative to the channel floor. They deduced that the values of the mean force coefficients were much different when in free surface flow vs. an unbounded domain. The presence of a free surface changed the coefficients by a factor of 2 or even lower than the values of an unbounded domain. They found that the worst situation for bridge stability occurs when the bridge's inundation ratio is slightly greater than 1.0 which is a common and realistic situation. The authors established drag coefficient values up to 3.4 and lift coefficient values up to -10.

Kerenyi et al. (2009) developed experimental tests as well as Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) models to develop force coefficients for different bridge deck geometries that can be used in design. The project was funded by the U.S. Department of Transportation and was conducted at the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) labs in McLean, VA. They tested three different bridge types which included a six-girder, three-girder and prototype streamlined deck shapes designed to reduce the force associated with inundation. The equations developed for the lift, drag and moment forces are what were used in the assessment of the bridges along US 34 in this thesis. Below are the design equations and the nomenclature used herein.




Figure 1.4. Scaled six-girder bridge deck used in the development of the force coefficients with the dimensions and forces labeled (Kerenyi et al. 2009).

$$\frac{F_L}{L} = 0.5 \ C_L \ \rho \ W \ V^2 \tag{1.1.1}$$

$$\frac{F_D}{L} = 0.5 \quad C_D \quad \rho \quad s \quad V^2 \tag{1.1.2}$$

$$\frac{M_{cg}}{L} = 0.5 \ C_M \ \rho \ W^2 \ V^2 \tag{1.1.3}$$

The forces are expressed as a force per length in the units of lb/ft and lb-ft/ft. The values of the coefficients are driven by the inundation ratio as well as the Froude number (F_r) . For the experimental setup all three models were tested in the same flume to minimize the experimental error. They were tested under four approach velocities ranging from 0.82 to 1.64 ft/s (0.25 to 0.5 m/s) as well as a constant flow depth, h_{μ} , of 0.82 ft 0r 0.25 m. Under these settings, the F_r varied from 0.16 to 0.32. The bridge deck model was mounted on a bracket which was then attached to a platform via four ball-beared pendulums. The pendulums movement was resisted by two pairs of flat springs in each direction. The tension in the springs was measured by strain gauges which gave the forces associated with the drag and lift forces. Unevenly distributed forces on the bridge decks lead to moments about the center of gravity about the bridge deck. The values of the drag, lift and moment coefficient obtained by Kerenyi et al. (2009) are presented in the Figures 1.1.2, 1.1.3 and 1.1.4, respectively. For this research, the fitting equation that corresponded to a higher Froude number was used in developing the bridge forces. This is due to the bridges' hydraulic models Froude number output being greater than 0.32 which is the highest Froude number tested in the study.




Figure 1.5. Drag coefficient vs. inundation ratio for the six-girder bridge (Kerenyi et al. 2009).




Figure 1.6. Lift coefficient vs. inundation ratio for the six-girder bridge (Kerenyi et al. 2009).




Figure 1.7. Moment coefficient vs. inundation ratio for the six-girder bridge (Kerenyi et al. 2009).

In the calculation of the integrated vertical force, F_L , its component associated with buoyancy force is excluded. The general equation for buoyancy force can be written as follows $F_B = Vol_{dis} \rho g$ (1.1.4)

where Vol_{dis} is the volume of water displaced by the bridge, ρ is the density of water with a value of 1.92 slugs/ft³ and *g* is gravity with a value of 32.2 ft/s². Force balances were calibrated for zero lift under no-flow conditions. The hydrostatic buoyancy force F_{BH} is used to determine the appropriate displaced volume calculation for the correct buoyancy force acting on the bridge (Jenson, 2000). F_{BH} is calculated using a level free surface and is the force on the bridge in the hydrostatic state. There were three methods proposed by Jenson (2000) to calculate the displaced volume. The method adopted in this research involves using the water level at the upstream face, i.e. h*, to calculate Vol_{dis} (Jenson 2000). When calculating the design lift force, first the value from equation 1.1.1 would be obtained for a specific h* value, then the

corresponding buoyancy force would be calculated via equation 1.1.4 and the values would be summed. Inundation ratio is readily available in the force calculations due to the analysis method used in this research. The main error in the Vol_{dis} value would come from flows at high Froude numbers when the water level at the upstream face is fluctuating.




Figure 1.8. An example of the applied net lift force on the bridge superstructures.




Figure 1.9. Failure locations for the girders in this study.

Development of probability-based design began with the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard A58 (Ellingwood et al. 1980). This was the first use of reliability theory to determine load and resistance factors for design of civil engineering structures and was widely accepted. However, Load and Resistance Factor Design (LRFD) wasn't introduced into bridge construction until the 1994 when The American Association of State Highway Transportation Officials (AASHTO) published the first edition of AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design Specification (AASHTO 1994). In LRFD, the safety performance requirement is expressed by the following equation (AASHTO LRFD-BDS 1994) where:

$$\phi R_n > \sum \gamma_i Q_i \tag{1.1.5}$$

Rn = nominal capacity of a member, connection, or a component; ϕ = resistance factor that takes into account the uncertainties in the material strength; Qi = load effect such as moment, shear, or axial load; γi = load factor that takes into account the uncertainties in the load.

Reliability analysis starts with the formulation of a limit state function, g(x), such that failure corresponds to g(x) < 0, where x=vector of basic variables (e.g. material properties, geometric properties, etc.). The form of the limit state function is often expressed as

$$g(x) = R - S \tag{1.1.6}$$

where R = structural resistance and S= load effect. Both can either be a random variable or a function of multiple random variables. The failure probability, p_f , can be calculated using any one of several numerical techniques (e.g. MCS, FORM, etc.). Lastly, the reliability index, β , can be determined by

$$\beta = \phi^{-1} \left(1 - p_f \right) \tag{1.1.7}$$

where ϕ^{-1} = the inverse of the standard normal distribution function. A target reliability index is selected in this study such that all structures have a uniform reliability index. For example, the target reliability for girder bridges in the AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design Specification is 3.5 (Nowak 1995). This research applies the same target reliability value of 3.5 when assessing the p_f of inundated bridge decks which ensures that only 2 out of 10,000 design components will have the sum of the factored loads greater than the factored resistance during the design life of the bridge. An example of beta values and their corresponding p_f can be seen below in table 1.1.1.

Reliability index	Probability of failure
0	0.5
1	0.159
2	0.0228
3	0.00135
4	0.00003167
5	0.000002867

Table 1.1.1. Reliability index and probability of failure values.

2 Fragility Modeling

2.1 Fragility Analysis

Fragility modeling provides a structured outline for evaluating performance, including uncertainty, and reliability of a structural system subjected to a loading condition. The first step is to identify the conditions or limit states in which the structural system fails a certain performance objective, which can be either strength or deformation related (as well as a number of other states not discussed herein). The probability of a limit state or a function subjected to loading can be expressed as

$$P(LS) = \Sigma P(LS|D = x) P(D = x)$$
(2.1.1)

where *D* is a random demand on the system, e.g., inundation ratio, wind speed, or spectral acceleration, and P(LS/D = x) is the conditional probability of demand equaling the limit state. The hazard is defined by the probability P(D = x) and the fragility is defined as the conditional probability P(LS/D = x). If the hazard is expressed as a continuous function of *x*, then the summation in Eq. (2.1.1) is replaced by the convolution integral of structural reliability theory (Rosowsky and Ellingwood, 2002).

Eq. (2.1.1) demonstrates that a fully coupled risk assessment cannot be performed without a structural fragility analysis. Rosowsky and Ellingwood (2002) state that the fragility provides a less informative measure of safety than a fully coupled risk analysis; however, there are numerous benefits from solely a fragility analysis. A fragility analysis is less complex than a fully coupled risk analysis and the hazard probability is not required. In addition, it is independent of location since only the structure and loading intensity are used in its development.

The fragility of a structural component or system is often modeled by a lognormal cumulative distribution function, CDF,

$$FR(x) = \Phi\left[\ln\left(\frac{x}{\lambda_R}\right)/\xi_R\right]$$
(2.1.2)

in which λ_R is the logarithmic mean of capacity, R, and ξ_R is the logarithmic standard deviation (Rosowsky and Ellingwood 2002).

When performing a risk analysis, hazard curves can be obtained from a number of sources or from a statistical analysis. For example, flood discharge values can be obtained from the insurance agency in the area of interest, or data regarding wind can be obtained from the National Weather Service (NWS). Figure 2.1.1 displays a set of fragilities based on a certain demand. In this study, the demand would be a range of inundation ratios from 0 to 1 with tick marks every 0.1 increment.




Figure 2.1. Example fragilities for illustration

2.2 Limit States

For this research, only the bridge superstructure was considered (i.e. the girders and bridge deck). The three flood induced forces were applied to the SAP2000 bridge models to determine what mode of failure would govern. It was determined that the drag and moment forces were negligible and the lift force governed. Under this condition, the negative moment capacity of the girders was used for the strength limit state and the deflection was used for serviceability. The basic limit state function Eq. 1.1.6 is used for both cases. For negative moment, the resistance is replaced by the nominal moment capacity, M_n , of the girder and the load effect is replaced by the maximum negative moment from the SAP model. The equation used for the negative moment capacity for prestressed concrete girders was taken from AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design Specification 4th edition Eq. (5.7.3.2.2-1).

$$M_n = A_s f_s \left(d_s - \frac{a}{2} \right) + 0.85 f'_c \left(b - b_w \right) h_f \left(\frac{a}{2} - \frac{h_f}{2} \right) + A_{ps} f_{ps} \left(d_p - \frac{a}{2} \right) - A'_s f'_s \left(d'_s - \frac{a}{2} \right)$$
(2.2.1)

Where A_{ps} =area of prestressing steel, f_{ps} =average stress in prestressing steel, d_p =distance from extreme compression fiber to the centroid of prestressing tendons, A_s =area of mild tension steel, A'_s =area of mild compression steel, b=width of compression face member, b_w =width of web, a=depth of equivalent rectangular stress block, and h_f =compression flange depth. The presented equation in AASHTO was for positive moment capacity and was adjusted for negative moment.

The serviceability limit state was set as a displacement equal to the span length/100. Ghosn and Moses (1998) defined several limit states in the formulation of a methodology for bridge redundancy factors. Among them, a functionality limit state was set as span length/100. This is defined as the maximum perceptible displacement that the public will accept. It is proposed on the basis of engineering judgement and is consistent with displacement levels used by engineers and researchers. The demand in Eq. 1.1.6 was set equal to a constant value of span length/100 and the load effect is equal to the respective displacement values pulled from the SAP model under varying lift forces.

2.3 Resistance Statistics

Moment capacity of prestressed girders and steel W sections are influenced by several variables. The steel component areas and yield strength were the most influential i.e. the mild and prestressing steel. The compressive strength of the concrete was also an important factor. Table 2.3.1 shows the parameters used in the Monte Carlo simulation for generating a Weibull distribution of the nominal moment capacity i.e. the resistance in the equation 1.6. In Monte Carlo simulation, a system is simulated a large number of times (e.g., 10000) where each simulation is equally likely to occur, which is often denoted as a realization of the system. Several random numbers are generated between 0 and 1 which then pull values from the uncertain variables CDF function. This results in a large number of separate and independent

values, each representing a probable outcome for the system. The final results are fitted to probability density function, PDF, which represents all the possible values the system can take. In this research, the system is equal to Eq. (2.2.1) and the resulting PDF is the nominal moment capacity of the girder. An example of a PDF generated via Monte Carlo simulation can be seen below in figure 2.3.1. The variables were either a normal or a lognormal distribution which require the input of two parameters: the mean and standard deviation. The mean used in the simulation was equal to the nominal area calculated via the construction drawings multiplied by a factor. For the standard deviation, the calculated mean would be multiplied by the coefficient of variation.

	Distributio		Coefficient of	
Variable	n	Mean	variation	Reference

Table 2.3.1. Statistical information for the variables used in the monte carlo simulation.

	Distributio		Coefficient of		
Variable	n	Mean	variation	Reference	
As	Normal	0.9As	0.015	Siriaksorn and Naaman (1980)	
$\mathbf{f}_{\mathbf{y}}$	Lognormal	$1.13 f_{yn}$	0.03	Nowak et al. (2008)	
f_c	Lognormal	1.2f'cn	0.525625	Biondini et al. (2006)	
A _{ps}	Normal	A_{ps}	0.0125	Naaman and Siriakson (1982)	
\mathbf{f}_{ps}	Normal	\mathbf{f}_{ps}	0.025	Mirza et al. (1980)	
-ps	- • • • • -	-ps	0.000		




Figure 2.2. Nominal moment capacity for an external girder for bridge C-15-Y.

2.4 Hydraulic Modeling

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers River Analysis System (HEC-RAS) developed by the Hydrologic Engineering Center was used to generate a discharge-water height rating curves for the 8 bridges along US 34. HEC-RAS is designed to preform one-dimensional hydraulic calculations for a full network of constructed and natural channels (Brunner (a), 2010). The steady flow water surface profile component was utilized to create the rating curves. The steady flow module is capable of modeling subcritical, supercritical, and mixed flow water regimes. For the computational procedure, the solution to the one-dimensional energy equation is used. Energy losses are calculated by friction (Manning's equation) and the contraction/expansion coefficient multiplied by the change in velocity head (Brunner (a), 2010). Losses through a bridge are calculated based on the standard step method, i.e. the energy equation.

When developing a bridge rating curve, there are four unique cross sections needed to compute the energy losses due to the structure. Figure 2.4.1 displays a plan view of said cross sections. Cross section 1 is located a distance downstream from the structure where the flow has fully expanded. The HEC-RAS User's Manual provides a table which provides an estimate of the expansion reach length based upon the degree of constriction, level of the flow, shape of the constriction, and the velocity of the flow. In the case of this research, changing the downstream parameters such as the location of cross section one and the expansion ratio had little to no effect on the rating curve at cross section four. Cross section 4 is located upstream where the flow lines are roughly parallel and the full cross section is effective and is also known as the approach section (Brunner (b), 2010). In general, flow contractions occur over shorter distances than flow expansions. There are regression equations and contraction ratio limits which require an iterative process to correctly model the location of cross section 4. Due to backwater effects, the bridge discharge-water height rating curve should be generated at cross section 4. Cross section 2 should be placed such that it represents the natural channel and floodplain of the modeled reach. The cross section is on the order of 10-30 feet downstream of the bridge opening for this research. It is placed enough distance downstream to allow for some flow expansion due to piers, or pressurized flow coming out of the bridge (Brunner (b), 2010). Cross section 3 is similar to cross section two, except on the upstream face of the bridge. It is placed at the toe of the upstream embankment allowing for abrupt acceleration and contraction of the flow (Brunner (b), 2010).

Both cross sections 2 and 3 should include ineffective flow areas such that lengths AB and CD in figure 2.4.1 are not included in the active flow area. The ineffective flow area option is used to keep the active flow in the area of the bridge opening until the elevations associated

with the ineffective flow areas are exceeded by the computed water elevation (Brunner (b),

2010). The station locations should be placed to allow for the expansion and contraction of the flow that occurs at the bridge. A rule of thumb is to assume a 1:1 contraction and expansion rate in the immediate vicinity of the bridge (Brunner (b), 2010). For example, if cross section 2 is 15 feet downstream from the bridge face, the ineffective flow areas should be placed 15 feet wider than the location of B and C on figure 2.4.1. The same is true for cross section 3. The elevation used for the ineffective flow area at cross section 3 should be equal to the top of the road or curb (Brunner (b), 2010). For the downstream side, the elevation used should be equal to the average elevation between the low chord and the top of the road or curb (Brunner (b), 2010). Using the ineffective area option allows the overbank areas to become effective once the ineffective area elevations are overtopped. Figure 2.4.2 shows an example of the geometric data view in HEC-RAS with the 4 cross sections specified in figure 2.4.1. It is important to note that bridge wing walls were not included in the HEC-RAS models. Bob Jarrett, an expert in paleoflood and flood hydrology, stated that this modeling assumption was reasonable because debris and erosion around bridges can introduce errors and uncertainty. The modeling results also confirmed this by being similar in magnitude to the published rating curve on the construction drawings.




Figure 2.3. Cross section locations at a bridge (excerpted from Brunner, 2010).




Figure 2.4. Geometric data plan view of HEC-RAS model for bridge C-15-AM.

When developing the rating curves for the eight bridges along US 34, six of them had rating curves available from the construction drawings. In most cases, the plan curves didn't

include an overtopping discharge value which was needed in determining the flow rates associated with an inundation ratio between 0 and 1. The plan curves simply gave a good measure of the accuracy of the generated rating curves via HEC-RAS. Some difference is expected due to the September 2013 flood altering the channel and the large sediment transportation. Nonetheless, the generated curves were similar in magnitude to the plan's curves which validated the models.

For generating the cross sectional elevations, post-flood LiDAR data was used. LiDAR, which stands for Light Detection and Ranging, is a remote sensing method that uses light in the form of a pulsed laser to measure variable distances to the Earth. A pulse of near-infrared laser light is fired at the ground via an aircraft borne laser (Bradbury et al. 2005). The laser pulse spreads as it descends forming a circular footprint at the ground level. The reflection as well as the timing of the return pulse is used to derive a measure of the elevation. These measurements are combined with data on the position and altitude of the aircraft by a global positioning system (GPS) and an inertial navigation unit which measures the roll, pitch, and yaw enabling the position and elevation of each point to be identified (Bradbury et al. 2005). When scanning an area with high levels of vegetation, the ground elevation values are usually interpolated through the known ground points. LiDAR radiation doesn't transmit through a structure such as a leaf, but it will transmit through holes in the structure (Bradbury et al. 2005). The footprint size of each pulse is usually on the order of < 1 meter with a pulse rate of a 100 kHz (Bradbury et al. 2005). This high sampling rate allows sampling densities of up to 10-20 footprints per square meter (Bradbury et al. 2005). For this research, there were only 2 bridge locations where there was copious vegetation present. To counter this, field observations were supplemented with the LiDAR data to generate the HEC-RAS cross sections.

Figure 2.4.3 displays an example of the procedure followed to generate the cross sections necessary to input into HEC-RAS. The locations needed for cross sections 1 and 4 required an iterative process to make sure the expansion and contraction reach lengths were correct as specified in the HEC-RAS User's Manual. Figure 2.4.4 displays the raw data elevation graph which can be exported into excel for conversion into feet and elevation adjustments if warranted by the field investigation.




Figure 2.5. An example of the cross sections pulled from ArcMap with LiDAR data obtained from Colorado GeoData at bridge C-15-AM.




Figure 2.6. The profile graph of the elevation data pulled from cross section 1 (the furthest right line on figure 2.4.3).

Field measurements were needed to supplement the LiDAR data. Steven Griffin from CDOT supplied the constuction plans and hyraulic information for the eight US 34 bridges. His consulting ended up defining the criteria for the field measurements. The criteria for elevation adjustments were as follows: If there was significant aggradation in the streambed, then CDOT would excavate the channel to adhear to the elevations listed in the construction drawings; If there was degradation greater than 1-2 feet, then CDOT would fill the streambed to the construction drawings elevation to meet bridge scour concerns. The data was collected by measuring the height difference between the low chord of the bridge and the channel bottom every 4 feet on the upstream and downstream side. These measurments were then compared to the data on the construction drawings to determine if any aggradation/degradation had occurred.

Comparing the numbers to the construction drawings converted the field measurements into elevation data which could be directly compared to the LiDAR data shown in figure 2.4.4. If any adjustments were warrented to the channel bottom, then the LiDAR data would be altered accordingly. It was assumed that the channel would have similar aggradation/degradation along the strip from cross section 1 to 4. For example, if 2 feet of aggradation was measured, then all 4 cross sections would uniformly be adjusted by -2 feet.

2.5 Flood Frequency Analysis

The flood frequency analysis was necessary in determining the hazard associated with the delveloped rating curves' discharge values. In August of 2014, CDOT and The Colorado Water Conservation Board (CWCB) funded a report titled *"Hydrologic Evaluation of the Big Thompson Watershed"* which was compiled by Jacobs Engineering Group, Muller Engineering Company, Parsons Brinckerhoff, and Ayres Associates. The most recent flood frequency analysis prior to this report was published in 1981. These flow rates were put into question after the devestating September 2013 flood.

The final predictive model which gave the discharge estimates for the Big Thompson River, North Fork Big Thompson River, and Buckhorn Creek involved several steps. Peak discharge estimates for the September flood were made, an updated flood frequency analysis was performed, a rainfall/runoff model was developed for the September 2013 event, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) rainfall for a number of return periods was used to develop the final values (Jacobs, 2014).

Estimates of peak discharges based on field observations were undertaken by Bob Jarrettt of Applied Weather Associates (AWA). Over a long career with USGS, Bob has developed techniques for making peak discharge estimates based on paleoflood evidence and high water

mark observations. The discharge estimates provided by Bob Jarrettt and other available estimates were compared to current regulatory discharges gage the severity of the September flood (Jacobs, 2014). This information is documented in a memo titled *CDOT/CWCB Hydrology Investigation Phase One-2013 Flood Peak Flow Determinations*, dated January 21, 2014 (Jacobs, 2014).

Flood frequncy analyses (FFA) were conducted to supplement the hydrologic evalutaion of the Big Thompson River (Jacobs, 2014). The analyses followed the methods described in the document "*Guidelines for Determining Flood Flow Frequency*" published by the USGS on September 1981 (Jacobs, 2014). This document is referred to as *Bulletin 17B*. FFA by Bulletin 17B involves inputting the highest peak flow discharge at gage stations for every year and a regional skew coefficient. CDOT and CWCB analyzed 24 gage stations along the northern front range with gage records ranging from 9 to 89 years (Jacobs, 2014). These records were then analyzed using a log-Pearson Type III distribution as recommended in Bulletin 17B. Values for the 2, 5, 10, 50, 100, 500 year flood were then produced at a location for each reach. Based on the results, the 2013 flood was slightly larger than a 100-year event at the mouth of the Big Thompson Canyon and on the North Fork Big Thompson at Drake (Jacobs, 2014).

A hydrologic analysis was performed on the Big Thompson watershed to evaluate and try to replicate the September flood event. The September 2013 flood event was modeled using the United States Army Corps of Engineers Hydrologic Engineering Center's Hydrologic Modeling System (HEC-HMS) to calculate the peak runoff experienced during the flood within the three reaches (Jacobs, 2014). Topographic data used was 10 meter Digital Elevation Data (DEM) shaded relief and Digital Raster Graphic (DRG) dataset which is essentially LiDAR data (Jacobs, 2014). The topographic data that was imported via HEC-GeoHMS is used to develop watershed

boundaries and flow paths (Jacobs, 2014). In total, the watershed is approximately 460 square miles. The first step in the model calibration process was to calibrate the rainfall data from 2013 to ground measurements (Jacobs, 2014). The second step involved calibrating the model to the estimated 2013 peak discharges with the help of information on the stage storage-discharge relationship for Lake Estes (Jacobs, 2014)

Once the rainfall-runoff model was calibrated to represent the September 2013 flood, the model was used to predict peak discharges based on NOAA rainfall (Jacobs, 2014). The NOAA Atlas 14, Volume 8 was used to determine point precipitation frequency estimates for the basin (Jacobs, 2014). Isopluvials, or lines of equal precipitation, for 24-hour precipitation depths from NOAA were used to divide The Big Thompson watershed into four rainage zones to account for the variability of precipitation (Jacobs, 2014). The rainage depths were then applied to the standard 24-hour SCS Type II rainfall distribution and incorporated into the HEC-HMS model to evaluate peak discharges for the predictive storms (Jacobs, 2014). The revised predictive model results were compared to the FFA at the mouth of the canyon and the expected unit discharges in order to check the accuracy (Jacobs, 2014). Figure 2.5.2 shows the final output from the predictive model. The dashed lines represent the previous 1981 regulatory discharge values and the solid lines represent the updated values. The 100 and 500-year values are significantly larger in most locations along the stream, most noticeably at the confluence with North Fork Big Thompson which is at bridge C-15-Y.

The eight bridges of interest start from slightly downstream of Lake Estes all the way to the mouth of the canyon. The log Pearson type III distribution was used as recommended by Bulletin 17B for the FFA. In order to fit the three parameters to the distribution, the statistical program R was utilized. From the figure, values would be pulled from the solid lines for the 10,

50, 100, 500-year return intervals at the location of each bridge. Nonlinear least squares was used in R to minimize the square distance between the log Pearson type III survival function and the known four return intervals. Table 2.5.1 shows the resulting fitted parameters used in the generation of the hazard probabilities. The bridges are listed in location order starting from near Lake Estes (C-15-AM) to just before the mouth of the canyon (C-16-DI).

Table 2.5.1. Log Pearson type III distribution fitted parameters used for the hazard probabilities.

Bridge	C-15-AM	C-15-AL	C-15-0	C-15-U	C-15-Y	C-15-C	C-15-AN	C-16-DI
Iterations	26	26	24	25	30	24	28	31
Shape	5.864	5.855	5.852	5.876	7.457	7.014	7.721	7.766
Location	2.169	2.164	2.158	2.169	2.956	2.272	2.551	2.550
Threshold	2.732	2.726	2.726	2.743	3.595	3.115	3.458	3.456

When running a Monte Carlo simulation there needs to be a distribution for the resistance as well as the load or demand. The resistance statistics discussed in chapter 2.3 explain how the variability in the resistance was modled. Variability in the demand was handled a little differently. The published report for the updated FFA gave discharge estimates for different return intervals. However, there is uncertainty associated with the provided discharges due to high and low-outliers, mixed-population sources of flooding, effects of long-term variability on flood estimates, and several other factors (Jacobs, 2014). The rule of thumb is that hydrologic uncertainty associated with estimates is within the range of 15 to 25 percent (Jacobs, 2014). The report estimates that uncertainty can be as high as +/- 20% (Jacobs, 2014). After consulting with Bob Jarrettt, a good way to account for the variability in the demand is to use a normal distribution for the discharge value expected and a standard deviation of 0.20 * the expected discharge. For example, say a discharge value of 10,000 cfs resulted in an h*=0.5. When running the Monte Carlo simulation, 100,000 values between 0 and 1 would be generated and

different possible discharge values associated with that 10,000 cfs would be pulled from the PDF function for the discharge. Those discharge values would then be converted into an h* value and any number less than 0 or greater than 1 would be thrown out. This results in many possible h* values arrising from the initial 10,000 cfs assumption. There would then be several different h* values that would be plugged into the Mu graph on Figure 2.5.1 which is a fitted polynomial line to the resulting negative moment values from the SAP2000 model. Next, the numerous Mu values would be fit to a Weibull distribution. Finally, using the resistance and the demand distribution would allow a Monte Carlo simulation to generate several possible values for each and determine how many times the member would fail. The fail counter would be divided by the total number of simulations which results in a probability of failure value at a specific inundation ratio.




Figure 2.7. Applied negative moment for an external girder on bridge C-15-Y.




Figure 2.8. Peak discharge profile for the Big Thompson River (Excerpted from Jacobs, 2014).

2.6 Finite Element Modeling

SAP2000 was the finite element program used for the modeling of the bridge superstructures. The deck was modeled using quadrilateral shell elements with 6 degrees of freedom (DOF) at each node and the girders and diaphragms were modeled as frame elements with 6 DOF at each node. In order to properly model the composite action, the shell and frame elements were each modeled at their respective center of gravity and connected via rigid links. All of the bridges in this study were integral abutment bridges which equates to fixed supports at the abutments. The barriers' stiffness was not included in the analysis.

In order to verify the approach for modeling a composite beam, a test section was modeled as a fixed-fixed condition with a 10' beam and a 6'x10'x0.5' slab. A shell load was applied which equated to a distributed load of 22 kips per foot (k/ft). The maximum positive moment was calculated by the equation $\frac{w*L^2}{24}$ where w is the distributed load. Next, the max mid span moment from the beam was subtracted off to determine the moment carried by the slab. This resulted in the slab picking up 354 k-in of the total 1100 k-in. Lastly, the shell stress was calculated by the flexure stress formula $\sigma = \frac{M*y}{l}$, where y is the distance to the neutral axis, I is the second moment of area about the neutral axis x, and M is the moment about the neutral axis. With the values of y=3.594", I=221 in⁴, and M=354 k-in for the top of the slab, the resulting stress calculated equals 5.76 kips per square inch (ksi). Figure 2.6.1 displays the SAP2000 results for the slab stresses. The model gave a stress value of 5.96 ksi which is a 3.4% error and was felt to be an acceptable result. Therefore, the same procedure for composite beam modeling was followed for the eight bridges in this study.




Figure 2.9. Shell stresses for the modeling procedure check.

Variation in elevation between the abutments and piers was accounted for as well as the bridge skew. For cases where the upstream and downstream elevations were different, the upstream elevation was applied to the downstream side. Some bridges had partial-depth precast concrete deck panels between girders which varied from 3" to 4". The panels act as a form to support the wet concrete of the cast in place deck. This expedites the construction process due to avoiding any formwork. For constructing a reinforced concrete deck, the installation of the formwork takes the most amount of time (Culmo, 2009). Instead of modeling two separate shell elements, the area of the panels were converted into an area for the lower strength cast in place deck using the modular ratio. This resulted in an additional 0.31" of deck thickness in the model which took into account the added stiffness the panels had on the overall system.

The rigid links acted as shear studs in the model transferring the load and moment from the slab to the girders. Due to this behavior, the placement and number of links was directly related to the shear stud spacing in the construction plans which resulted in a 3' or 4' spacing in the model. The link location also dictated the location of the shell elements nodal location. The X and Y grid location for the nodes on the girders and the slab had to line up to ensure that the load was transferred without an additional moment from eccentric loading.

Once the grid and the material properties were input for a bridge, the modeling followed these steps: the frame elements were drawn and special joints were added at the locations of rigid links; the diaphragms were drawn with a pin-pin connection; the joint restraints were assigned (fixed for abutments, roller for bearing plates, and pin for bolted connection); the prestressing tendon was added as a tendon element with the force equaling the jacking force after all losses as stated in the construction plans; the shell elements were drawn and divided based on grid marks at link locations; rigid links were drawn connecting the shell with the frame elements. Next, the meshing of the shell elements was selected such that the shell length/width aspect ratio was less than 5 as per AASHTO-LRFD recommendations. Finally, the loading was applied as a uniform shell load based on the total lift force for each respective inundation ratio.

Figure 2.6.2 displays the elements utilized in SAP2000. The shell elements will be meshed once the analysis is run. Also, note that the frame, tendon, and shell elements are drawn at their respective elevation. Figure 2.6.3. is an extruded view of the same bridge as Figure 2.6.2 post analysis. C-15-Y is a rectangular composite prestressed box girder bridge.




Figure 2.10. Labeled example of SAP2000 elements used.




Figure 2.11. Extruded view of bridge C-15-Y under the loading for h*=0.3.

All models were analyzed as static linear-elastic. Ghosn and Moses (1998) stated for the definition of the member failure limit state, an elastic analysis of the structural system should be performed to be consistent with evaluation techniques at the time. A linear-elastic analysis results in more conservative force results, however the deflections tend to be underestimated, but was deemed appropriate for this research. For example, the steel girder bridge C-15-C under a

loading corresponding to h*=0.3 resulted in a negative moment of 2,515 k-ft with a stress of 59 ksi. The member is still in the linear-elastic range, but the applied negative moment is much greater than the plastic moment capacity of 1,580 k-ft as shown in Figure 2.6.4. When generating the probabilities of failure, an applied moment of 1,600 k-ft or 20,000 k-ft would both be treated as failed. Therefore, a less robust approach, linear-elastic, was adopted for this research.




Figure 2.12. Negative plastic moment capacity for an internal girder on bridge C-15-C.

Also, out of all of the bridges analyzed, only four had deflection beta values less than 3.5. Of those four, the beta values corresponding to negative moment was 0.14-0.42 less than the deflection values. For this reason, the negative moment criterion was deemed the most critical. Once the bridges are adjusted for the more critical ultimate strength capacity, then the deflection criterion will be met.

2.7 Procedure

Figure 2.7.1 presents a flow chart displaying the steps followed for the analysis of the bridges. The flowchart is organized such that the log Pearson type III parameters and construction drawings were already obtained. The analysis and results chapter will summarize the values obtained for each respective bridge following the procedure in Figure 2.7.1.





Figure 2.13. Flow chart of the procedure followed for calculating the beta values.


3 Results and Discussion

The methodology for developing fragilities for the bridge superstructure under flood induced loads was thoroughly explained in the previous chapter. This chapter will go through the full procedure for each bridge as well as a discussion of the results. The discussion will start with the furthest upstream bridge C-15-AM and work downstream following the list in Table 2.5.1.



3.1 Bridge C-15-AM results

Figure 3.1. Longitudinal view of C-15-AM (CDOT see Appendix A).



TYPICAL CROSS SECTION

Figure 3.2. Cross sectional view of C-15-AM (CDOT see Appendix A).




Figure 3.3. Typical integral abutment layout (CDOT see Appendix A).

Figures 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 are typical construction drawings for the bridges analyzed in this study. The bridges include prestressed bulb tee (most common), prestressed box girder, and steel I beams. A full list of the construction drawings are provided in Appendix A. Figure 3.1.3 shows the structural configuration of an integral abutment bridge. The girders are embedded two feet into the cast in place concrete which leads to a fixed condition.

C-15-AM had 1-2 ft of aggradation in the channel. The LiDAR raw data was adjusted such that the channel elevations were the same as the construction plans. Damage due to the September flood was minimal at this location. There was minor erosion behind the wingwall at abutment 2, abrasion and scaling on abutment 2 and a crack in the asphalt at abutment 1.




Figure 3.4. Cross sections generated in ArcMap for C-15-AM.




Figure 3.5. HEC-RAS geometric plan view for C-15-AM.




Figure 3.6. Plan rating curve for C-15-AM (CDOT see Appendix A).



Figure 3.7. HEC-RAS generated rating curve for C-15-AM.

A comparison of the actual configuration and the HEC-RAS model can be seen in figure 3.1.4 and 3.1.5. Using the required four cross sections for generating a rating curve at a bridge was sufficient enough to capture the interaction between the natural stream and the bridge. Figure 3.1.6 and 3.1.7 are the rating curves from the construction plans and the HEC-RAS model. The contact and overtopping discharge for the plans is 2,500 and 5,200 cfs respectfully. In comparison, the HEC-RAS curves' values are 1,900 and 9,200 cfs. The velocity values for the model are 2 ft/s higher in magnitude. The model shows close agreement with the construction plans and slight differences are expected.




Figure 3.8. SAP2000 model for C-15-AM.




Figure 3.9. Plan view of C-15-AM (CDOT see Appendix A).

Figure 3.1.8 is a plan view of the SAP2000 prestressed bulb tee bridge C-15-AM. The girders are labeled starting with the northern most girder, G1, down to the southern most girder, G7. For the fragility analysis, the most critical external and internal girder was selected. In the case of this bridge, G7 and G2 were the most critical. It should be noted that the beta values for the internal girder was always equal to or slightly greater than the external girders for every bridge in this study. Therefore, once the external criterion is met, the internal criterion is also satisfied.

Figure 3.1.9 is a plan view taken from the construction drawings for bridge C-15-AM. The SAP model compares well with the construction plans. The skew angle is 63.15° on the plans versus 63.17° on the model. Also, the length of the bridge, girder spacing and the diaphragm locations are identical to the actual bridge. These similarities allow the model to transfer the loads and behave in the same manner as the constructed bridge.




Figure 3.10. Applied negative moment felt by girder G7 for C-15-AM.

Figure 3.1.10 displays the SAP2000 results for bridge C-15-AM. The reason for the decrease in magnitude after $h^*=0.7$ is attributed to the sharp increase in positive buoyancy force at $h^*=0.8$. At that value, the bridge deck is inundated and the displaced volume increases from 5,660 to 8,700 ft³/ft. Another reason for the decline is due to the shape of the lift coefficient which peaks at $h^*=0.8$ and slightly decreases at $h^*=0.9$ and $h^*=1.0$ which can be seen on figure 1.1.2. For this bridge, a polynomial best fit line did not result in a good fit to the Mu values. To counter this, a for loop was used to determine where each unique h^* value fell. For example, if

the simulated h* value was 0.235, then the resulting Mu value would be linearly interpolated from the data points on Figure 3.1.10.




Figure 3.11. Negative nominal moment capacity for an external girder for C-15-AM.

Figure 3.1.11 is a Weibull-fitted PDF function to the Monte Carlo simulation for the negative moment capacity. A goodness of fit test was performed to determine how well the fitted distribution matched the Monte Carlo simulation values. The normalized root mean square error was used where a value of negative infinity is a bad fit and a value of 1 is a perfect fit. The fitted parameters resulted in a value of 0.9146 which is a very good fit for the data.




Figure 3.12. Fitted lognormal CDF function to the fragility values for C-15-AM.

Utilizing the resistance and the demand distributions a Monte Carlo simulation was then run to determine the fragility values for this specific bridge configuration. Fragilities do not incorporate hazard probabilities which are very convenient for designers and stakeholders since they are, in theory, independent of location. If this bridge was built in any other location with the hazard probabilities and stage-discharge relationship known, then the bridge could be built to satisfy any target beta value. However, in the case for all of the bridges in this study, the fragility curves are a function of the velocity in the channel. Equations 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 have a velocity squared term which significantly affects the magnitude of the flood forces on bridge superstructures. If this bridge was built in the plains with shallow channel slopes, then the velocity values would obviously be less. This phenomenon limits the fragility curves in this study to steep fast moving mountain streams or rivers. The fragility curve could be applied to a

slower stream, but it would be overly conservative. Notice the velocity range on Figure 3.1.12. The range corresponds to the velocity at $h^*=0$ to $h^*=1$. Also, note that the two curves are for the most critical external and internal girder. The shape is the same, but the external girder is a scaled up version of the internal girder due to the lower capacity of the external composite girder.




Figure 3.13. Hazard probabilities used to generate the probability of failure curve for C-15-AM.




Figure 3.14. Probability of failure curve for C-15-AM.

Due to the hazard being a continuous function of x, defined herein as the inundation ratio, the convolution integral was used to generate the probability of failure curve listed in Figure 3.1.14. The fragility values from Figure 3.1.12 were convolved with the hazard probabilities from Figure 3.1.13 to get the failure values. The value at h*=1 was then used in equation 1.7 to calculate the reliability index. For this bridge, the reliability indices are 2.55 and 2.59 for the external and internal girders. In order to reach the target beta value of 3.5 for the 100-year flood, the bridge would have to be raised 2 ft. For the 500-year flood, the bridge would have to be raised 12.5 ft, which is likely infeasible. These values are calculated assuming the same stage-discharge relationship as the original bridge elevation.

3.2 Bridge C-15-AL results

The adjacent bridge downstream from C-15-AM is bridge C-15-AL. The length, number of girders, and structural configuration is the same as bridge C-15-AM minus a few differences which are the skew angle and the slope of the bridge. Figure 3.2.1 displays the difference in slope and figure 3.2.6 shows the opposite skew relative to C-15-AM.




Figure 3.15. Longitudinal section of C-15-AL (CDOT see Appendix A).

The LiDAR data showed 2 ft of aggradation, but the field measurements showed 2 ft of degradation at abutment 1 and no change at abutment 2. Due to scour concerns, it was assumed that CDOT would adjust the channel bottom such that it would match the construction drawings. The LiDAR data was adjusted to reflect that assumption. No rating curve was provided for this bridge, so the bridge hydraulic information from C-15-AM was used to help gauge the accuracy of the developed HEC-RAS model for C-15-AL. The bridge geometry and distance between the low chord and the channel bottom were similar enough to deem this acceptable. The generated rating curve was not altered to match the plan curve due to the differences in the channel

geometry where bridge C-15-AL had a higher level of meandering. The damage suffered at this bridge was limited to a crack in the asphalt.



Figure 3.16. Cross sections generated in ArcMap for C-15-AL.




Figure 3.17. HEC-RAS geometric plan view for C-15-AL.


Figure 3.2.2 is an aerial view of the cross sections exported from ArcMap for the HEC-RAS model. The LiDAR data layer is turned off to give a good view of the vegetation and the shape of the channel. An extra cross section up and downstream was used for this reach to account for the meandering of the reach. In most cases, deleting the furthest upstream and downstream cross sections had minimal effects on the produced rating curve. For this bridge the extra cross sections resulted in a more reasonable rating curve when compared to the curve for bridge C-15-AM. Figure 3.2.3 is the geometric data view for the cross sections inputted into HEC-RAS. It should be noted that the blue reach lines have no factor in the model output. If the reach was drawn as a straight line, the rating curve yielded would be identical to the one in Figure 3.2.4.




Figure 3.18. HEC-RAS rating curve for C-15-AL.

The rating curve in Figure 3.2.4 gave reasonable values when compared to the contact and overtopping discharge values for bridge C-15-AM. The low chord and top of curve elevations are 7314.05' and 7319.30' which yields discharge values of 3789 and 9400 cfs. This

compares well to the values for C-15-AM of 3454 and 7866 cfs. The velocity values range from 11.27 to 10.03 ft/s. The decrease in velocity can be attributed to the high friction losses from the furthest upstream cross section to the approach section in figure 3.2.2. There is a shallow transition from the top of the right bank to the road. This gradual slope engages more of the floodplain for the increased discharge values associated with overtopping of the bridge.








Figure 3.20. Plan view of the bridge deck for C-15-AL (CDOT see Appendix A).

Figure 3.2.5 and 3.2.6 are plan view comparisons of the FE model and the construction plans. The skew for the model is 63.17° which compares well with the plans' skew of 63.15°. There are 7 prestressed bulb tee 42 (BT 42) girders with a span of 108' and diaphragms located

mid span. The slab was modeled with a thickness of 8.31" with an extra 0.31" to account for the higher strength prestressed panels. The model has same slope, skew, girder and shear stud spacing as the actual bridge which allows the model to transfer the loads and behave in the same manner as the constructed bridge.




Figure 3.21. Applied negative moment felt by girder G1 for C-15-AL.

Figure 3.2.7 presents the negative moment felt at each inundation ratio due to the lift force for the critical external member G1. The reason for the slight drop in moment from $h^*=0$ to $h^*=0.3$ is because the net lift force is positive due to the small lift coefficient relative to the positive buoyancy force. The slight dip occurring after $h^*=0.8$ is attributed to the volume of the slab being included in the buoyancy force which lowers the applied load.




Figure 3.22. Negative nominal moment capacity for an external girder for C-15-AL. Figure 3.2.8 displays the resulting fitted Weibull PDF to the Monte Carlo simulation for the negative moment capacity. The normalized mean square error test resulted in a value of 0.8927 which is a good fit.




Figure 3.23. Fitted lognormal CDF function to the fragility values for C-15-AL.

Figure 3.2.9 displays the fragility curve for C-15-AL under the velocity range of 11.27 to 10.03 ft/s. The shape and magnitudes are similar to C-15-AM which is expected due to the similarities in structural configuration and location along the Big Thompson River.




Figure 3.24. Hazard probabilities used to generate the probability of failure curve for C-15-AL.




Figure 3.25. Probability of failure values for C-15-AL.

The beta values are 2.67 and 2.70 for the external and internal girders. In order to satisfy the target beta value criterion for the 100 and 500 year flood event, the bridge would need to be raised by 1' and 9' respectfully. These values are very similar to C-15-AM which is to be expected.

3.3 Bridge C-15-O results

C-15-O is a 2 span prestressed box girder bridge located 2.65 miles downstream from C-15-AL. The floodplain has limited vegetation and the river approaches with little meandering. This leads to higher velocity values when compared to the previous bridges. Field measurements determined that there was 1.5' of degradation at the bridge exit which led to altering the LiDAR data to reflect the post flood repairs by CDOT.



Figure 3.26. Cross sections generated in ArcMap for C-15-O.




Figure 3.27. HEC-RAS geometric plan view for C-15-O.

The cross sections used for the HEC-RAS model only required the four necessary cross sections for generating a rating curve at a bridge. When adding an additional cross section further up or downstream, the produced curve values stayed the same. This makes sense for the downstream cross section due to the flow having already fully expanded and there are little obstructions to affect the flow at the approach section. The additional upstream cross section had no affect for this bridge due to the channel slope and floodplain topography being identical to the already present cross sections. Damage suffered at C-15-O as a result of the September flood was 2.5' of erosion at abutment 1's retaining wall, 4-12'' of exposed caisson top for two of the pier columns, crack in asphalt overlay at abutment 1 and multiple minor cracks throughout the wingwalls and retaining walls.




Figure 3.28. Plan rating curve for C-15-O (CDOT see Appendix A).




Figure 3.29. HEC-RAS rating curve for C-15-O.

Figure 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 display the rating curve from the bridge hydraulic information sheet and the generated curve from HEC-RAS. The contact and overtopping discharge values for the plans' curve are 7800 and 11900 cfs respectfully, whereas the HEC-RAS curve values are 6400 and 12300 cfs. This compares very well and the main difference lies with the velocity values. The bridge information gives a single value for velocity of 10.6 ft/s which is considerably lower than the HEC-RAS values of 14.32-16.19 ft/s. Channel and floodplain alterations since the time of the construction can lead to this discrepancy.




Figure 3.30. SAP2000 model for C-15-O.




Figure 3.31. Plan view of the bridge deck of C-15-O (CDOT see Appendix A).

This bridge had several different skew angles at each bent which made it difficult to mesh uniformly and not have any misaligned rigid links. When comparing the skew at abutment one, the models skew is 40.76° as opposed to the plans value of 46.62°. At the pier the angle stayed the same which resulted in a difference of 1.86°. At abutment 3 the model skew was 38.84° versus 39.99° from the plans. Overall, there is good agreement with the FE model and the actual bridge.




Figure 3.32. Applied negative moment felt by G1 span 2 for C-15-O.

Figure 3.3.7 is a polynomial best fit line for the resulting negative moment on G1 due to the applied negative lift force. The overall trend is expected and follows the lift coefficient shape. The initial dip at $h^*=0.2$ is due to the buoyancy force controlling and exerting an uplift force on the bridge.




Figure 3.33. Negative nominal moment capacity for an external girder for C-15-AL.




Figure 3.34. Fitted lognormal CDF function to the fragility values for C-15-AM.

Figure 3.3.8 displays the resulting fitted Weibull PDF to the Monte Carlo simulation for the negative moment capacity. The normalized mean square error test resulted in a value of 0.9512 which is a good fit.

Figure 3.3.9 displays the fragility curve for C-15-O under the velocity range of 14.32 to 16.19 ft/s. The curve is very steep which is due to the high velocity and force values. The negative moment capacity is reached between $h^*=0.1$ and $h^*=0.2$.




Figure 3.35. Hazard probabilities used to generate the probability of failure curve for C-15-O.




Figure 3.36. Probability of failure values for C-15-O.

After incorporating the hazard probabilities, the probability of failure values for the Big Thompson River location can be obtained. For this bridge, the beta values for the critical external and internal girder were both 2.59. In order to meet the beta value criterion for the 100 year flood no adjustments are needed due to the flood not making contact with the low chord of the bridge. However, to meet the criterion for the 500 year flood, the bridge would need to be raised 5'.

3.4 Bridge C-15-U results

C-15-U suffered minor damage as a result of the September 2013 flood. There were cracks with efflorescence on the wingwall at abutment 1, cracks in the asphalt with small settlements at both abutments, exposed rebar at the downstream side of the wingwall at abutment

1 and spalling throughout the length of one of the four girders. The LiDAR data showed good agreement with the plan sheet elevations so no revisions were necessary.




Figure 3.37. Cross sections generated in ArcMap for C-15-U.




Figure 3.38. HEC-RAS geometric plan view for C-15-U.

Figure 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 show a plan view of the actual bridge and the HEC-RAS model. For this bridge, the extra upstream cross section was deemed necessary due to the change in floodplain and constricted channel overbank areas.




Figure 3.39. Plan rating curve for C-15-U (CDOT see Appendix A).




Figure 3.40. HEC-RAS rating curve for C-15-U.

Due to the overtopping discharge not being listed on the plan rating curve, the only gauge of accuracy was on the contact discharge. The plans had a contact discharge value of 11000 cfs compared to 10400 cfs from the HEC-RAS curve. The velocity values generated on the HEC-RAS model are in close agreement with the ultimate velocity on the plans. The models velocity ranges from 7.22 to 5.13 ft/s compared to the ultimate velocity of 7.60 ft/s.




Figure 3.41. SAP2000 model for C-15-U.




Figure 3.42. Plan view of the bridge deck of C-15-U (CDOT see Appendix A).

The difference in the skew angles at abutment 1 and 2 are 0.01° and 0.15° respectfully. This is a prestressed bulb tee 5 girder single span bridge. There are some meshes on the shell elements whose nodes do not line up. This is due to the varying overhang distances throughout the bridge length. Instead of modeling the curved nature of the slab, it was modeled as a trapezoidal shape taking into account the overhang values at each abutment. The few nodes whose meshes do not line up are not an issue as long as it does not occur at the rigid link locations, which it does not.




Figure 3.43. Applied negative moment felt by G1 for C-15-U.

Figure 3.4.7 displays the negative moment felt by G5 under the negative lift force. The relatively low velocity values, large variation in abutment heights and buoyancy forces leads to the roller-coaster values for the girder. For example, if abutment 2 is under the condition of $h^*=1.0$, then abutment 1 feels $h^*=0.595$.




Figure 3.44. Negative nominal moment capacity for an external girder for C-15-U.




Figure 3.45. Fitted lognormal CDF function to the fragility values for C-15-U.




Figure 3.46. Hazard probabilities used to generate the probability of failure curve for C-15-U.




Figure 3.47. Probability of failure values for C-15-U.

For this bridge, the fragility and probability of failure curve values are very small. This is due to the high member capacity coupled with a low applied moment. The minimum nominal negative moment capacity value of 4600 kip-ft as shown in figure 3.4.8 is exceeded by the applied moment felt at h*=1.0. This leads to the very low failure probabilities which can be seen on figure 3.4.9 and 3.4.11. Not surprisingly, the beta value criterion is already met at the current bridge elevation. The beta values are 3.95 and 4.33 for the external and internal girders respectfully.

3.5 Bridge C-15-Y results

C-15-Y is located at the confluence with the North Fork Big Thompson River. This bridge suffered the most damage in this study as a result of the 2013 flood. All of the fill and riprap was washed out at both wing walls, the channel bottom aggraded over 5', a portion of the approach roadway was destroyed due to structural fill being washed out and there were transverse and vertical cracks on the underside of the bridge deck. Due to the severe channel damage, the LiDAR data was adjusted to the elevations on the construction plans.




Figure 3.48. Cross sections generated in ArcMap for C-15-Y.




Figure 3.49. HES-RAS geometric plan view for C-15-Y.

Figure 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 display the ArcMap and HEC-RAS cross sections used for C-15-Y at the mouth of the North Fork Big Thompson River. As a result of the confluence of the two rivers, an extra upstream cross section was needed for the Big Thompson River. Bridge C-15-Y is located at the center of Drake, CO. It should be noted that although the bridge section seems to overlap the Big Thompson River, the model does not treat it as such. Due to the flat and wide floodplain for this area, the bridge was extended to account for the road elevation.

The contact and overtopping discharge values for the model match well with the bridge hydraulic information sheet. For contact and overtopping discharge, the plan sheet has values of 2500 and 7500 cfs which compare well with the values of 2007 and 8736 cfs from the HEC-RAS model. For velocity, the plan has an ultimate value of 6.63 ft/s as opposed to 8.95-14.10 ft/sec on the model. However, considering the extent of damage to the bridge under the flood forces, the bridge sheet could easily have underestimated the velocity values.




Figure 3.50. Plan rating curve for C-15-Y (CDOT see Appendix A).




Figure 3.51. HEC-RAS rating curve for C-15-Y.




Figure 3.52. SAP2000 model for C-15-Y.




Figure 3.53. Plan view of the bridge deck of C-15-Y (CDOT see Appendix A).

C-15-Y is a rectangular four girder prestressed box girder bridge with a fixed condition at the abutments and a pin condition at the pier. Given the symmetry and lack of a skew, meshing and aligning the nodes was a straightforward task.




Figure 3.54. Applied negative moment felt by G1/4 for C-15-Y.

The slight dip after h*=0 is due to the net lift force being positive at the lower h* values. The overall trend is expected and follows the lift coefficient shape.




Figure 3.55. Negative nominal moment capacity for an external girder for C-15-Y.




Figure 3.56. Fitted lognormal CDF function to the fragility values for C-15-Y.




Figure 3.57. Hazard probabilities used to generate the probability of failure curve for C-15-Y.




Figure 3.58. Probability of failure values for C-15-Y.

The beta values for the external and internal girders are 2.37 and 2.38 respectfully. In order to meet the target beta value for the 100 and 500 year floods, the bridge would need to be raised 2' and 6'. Another flood resiliency effort for this bridge would be to redesign the riprap to increase the protection from erosion. Erosion due to fast moving flood waters as well as debris impacts caused the majority of the damage from the September 2013 flood.

3.6 Bridge C-15-C results

C-15-C is the only steel I beam bridge in this study and was originally constructed in 1936. Major rehab was performed in 1997 which reconstructed the whole bridge. No rating curve or channel elevation was provided for this site. Also, no damage was reported due to the September 2013 flood. Based on the field data, there was a 16-18' clear distance from the low chord of the girder to the channel bottom. When comparing this to the LiDAR data no adjustments were needed and the data was taken as is with some minor adjustments made to the overbank areas.




Figure 3.59. Cross sections generated in ArcMap for C-15- C.




Figure 3.60. HEC-RAS geometric plan view for C-15- C.




Figure 3.61. HEC-RAS rating curve for C-15- C.

The best gauge of accuracy for the generated rating curve for C-15-C was to compare the contact and overtopping discharge values to the next downstream bridge C-15-AN. The contact and overtopping discharge values are 16754 and 24557 cfs which differed by 1300 cfs for each value. A difference is expected, but the closeness of the magnitudes confirms that the values are not unreasonable. The velocity values for this bridge have a range of 14.80-15.62 ft/s.




Figure 3.62. SAP2000 model for C-15- C.




Figure 3.63. Plan view of the bridge deck of C-15- C (CDOT see Appendix A).

There is a uniform skew angle of 45° which the SAP2000 model replicates exactly. C-

15-C is a 6 girder 2 span bridge with a difference in elevation of 1.55' between abutments.




Figure 3.64. Applied negative moment felt by G6 for C-15- C.




Figure 3.65. Negative nominal moment capacity for an external girder for C-15- C.




Figure 3.66. Fitted lognormal CDF function to the fragility values for C-15- C.




Figure 3.67. Hazard probabilities used to generate the probability of failure curve for C-15- C.




Figure 3.68. Probability of failure values for C-15- C.

The beta values for the exterior and interior girder are both 2.60. In order to reach the target beta value for the 100 and 500 year flood, the bridge would need to be raised 0' and 7.5'. The 100 year storm doesn't come in contact with the superstructure hence the lack of adjustments needed. For the 500 year flood, the bridge needs to be raised such that no contact is made with the superstructure due to the low capacity of the girders and the high demand as a result of the lift force.

3.7 Bridge C-15-AN results

C-15-AN is a prestressed box girder 3 span bridge located 2.42 miles downstream of C-15-C. No damage was suffered due to the September flood at this site. Comparing the field measurements to the plan elevations resulted in there being about a foot of degradation in the center of the channel. The LiDAR data was adjusted to match the plan elevations because of post flood repairs by CDOT. The channel overbank areas consist of a steep hill on the left bank and a large open area on the right bank with a gradual slope.




Figure 3.69. Cross sections generated in ArcMap for C-15- AN.




Figure 3.70. HEC-RAS geometric plan view for C-15- AN.




Figure 3.71. Plan rating curve for C-15- AN (CDOT see Appendix A).




Figure 3.72. HEC-RAS rating curve for C-15- AN.

The contact and overtopping discharge values from the plans' curve is 15500 and 23000 cfs which compare well with the models' values of 15446 and 23258 cfs. The main difference lies with the velocity values. For this bridge, the HEC-RAS models' values are much lower than the plans. The ultimate velocity is 14.26 ft/s as opposed to the range of 7.26-6.83 ft/s gotten from the model. The velocity and discharge values generated in HEC-RAS were used to be consistent.




Figure 3.73. SAP2000 model for C-15- AN.




Figure 3.74. Plan view of the bridge deck of C-15- AN (CDOT see Appendix A). The model skew is 60.02° and the real bridge has a skew angle of 60°. Also, the

differential elevation occurs at the piers which are 0.44' greater than the abutments.




Figure 3.75. Applied negative moment felt by G1 for C-15- AN.




Figure 3.76. Negative nominal moment capacity for an external girder for C-15- AN.




Figure 3.77. Fitted lognormal CDF function to the fragility values for C-15- AN.




Figure 3.78. Hazard probabilities used to generate the probability of failure curve for C-15- AN.




Figure 3.79. Probability of failure values for C-15- AN.

The low capacity and the variability in the inundation ratio results in a jump of the fragility curve at $h^*=0$ to $h^*=0.1$. The beta values are 2.61 and 2.60 for the external and internal girders. In order to reach the target beta value for the 100 and 500 year flood, the bridge would need to be raised 0' and 7'. The 100 year storm doesn't come in contact with the superstructure hence the lack of adjustments needed.

3.8 Bridge C-16-DI results

C-16-DI is located a mile upstream from the mouth of the canyon and is the only bridge in the study to be modeled as supercritical flow. This is due to the nature of the overbank areas which are vertical rock cliffs and corrugated metal retaining walls. Velocity values are the greatest at this location which leads to very high forces. Due to the large clearance distance of 18-22', the probability of being inundated is small. Field measurements determined that there was 3-5' of degradation to the channel bottom so the LiDAR data was adjusted to match the plan elevations. Damage done was limited to asphalt cracking and slight settlement at the roadwaybridge interface. Also, there was a mild erosion hole at the back right wingwall.




Figure 3.80. Cross sections generated in ArcMap for C-16-DI.




Figure 3.81. HEC-RAS rating curve for C-16-DI.

The degree of meandering plus the fast moving flow required two additional cross sections for the HEC-RAS model.




Figure 3.82. Plan rating curve for C-16-DI (CDOT see Appendix A).




Figure 3.83. HEC-RAS rating curve for C-16-DI.

The plan rating curve does not include a contact or overtopping discharge value, but there is a velocity value provided. Due to the supercritical nature of the channel, the velocity values are the highest at this location when compared to the previous bridges in this study. The plan sheet gives a velocity value of 25 ft/s which corresponds to much lower discharge values. Velocity values range from 30.92-36.31 ft/s at discharge values of 46539 to 63639 cfs for the HEC-RAS model.




Figure 3.84. SAP2000 model for C-16-DI.




Figure 3.85. Plan view of the bridge deck of C-16-DI (CDOT see Appendix A).

The structural configuration of this bridge was unique and handled slightly differently than previous bridges. Instead of a single element for the box girders, it was modeled as shell elements for the top and bottom slab plus rectangular frame elements for the columns. This is felt to align better with the staged construction for this project. The bottom slab and girder web columns were poured first and then the top slab was poured. This differs from other box girder bridges because the deck is part of the box girder as opposed to the box girder top flange being compositely connected via shear studs to the bridge deck slab. The concrete web girders were modeled as straight frames and the curvature was not taken into account. For this bridge, the concrete strength was very low, 1600 psi, which led to a low capacity. Coupling the low capacity with the high demand led to the less robust approach, straight elements, for this bridge.




Figure 3.86. Applied negative moment felt by G6 span 2 for C-16-DI.




Figure 3.87. Negative nominal moment capacity for an external girder for C-16-DI.




Figure 3.88. Fitted lognormal CDF function to the fragility values for C-16-DI.




Figure 3.89. Hazard probabilities used to generate the probability of failure curve for C-16-DI.




Figure 3.90. Probability of failure values for C-16-DI.

For variation in the demand, 20% of the predicted discharge value was used as discussed in the previous chapter and the standard deviation ranges from 9300 to 12700 cfs. Such a large range in the discharge, or the demand, leads to several high inundation ratios at every point. When a distribution is fit to the resulting Mu values, it leads to very high fragility probabilities at even low inundation ratios as seen in Figure 3.8.9. The current beta values are 3.06 for both the external and internal girders. However, due to the large clearance distance, no adjustments are needed to reach the target beta value for the 100 and 500 year storm due to no contact being made with the superstructure.

4 CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The community of Drake, CO was the focal point of this research. Eight bridges were selected and analyzed under flood loading as per the design equations proposed by Kerenyi et al. (2009). Fragilities were developed for the most critical internal and external composite girders. The results obtained from fragility analysis were then used to determine the elevation adjustments needed to reach a target beta value of 3.5. These adjustments would reduce postflood repair cost, increase bridge safety during a low probability storm event, and increase the flood resiliency of the Big Thompson Canyon.

Currently, bridge superstructures are designed based on the 100 year flood, which in the case of the bridges in this study, would not have resulted in any inundation of the bridge deck at the time of construction based on the knowledge at that time. In fact, there is a required amount of freeboard, or clearance distance between the water surface and the low chord of the girder, for bridges to allow for wave surges and debris to pass under the bridge. This methodology results in bridge superstructures not properly being analyzed for flood forces due to inundation, more specifically the lift force which has proven to be significant in this study. The negative lift force is especially significant for fast moving rivers such as the Big Thompson River.




Figure 4.1. 100 year flood beta values for all bridges.




Figure 4.2. 500 year flood beta values for all bridges.

Figures 4.1 and 4.2 display the elevation adjustments needed in order for each bridge to satisfy the target beta value for the 100 and 500 year floods. If a bridge had zero probability of failure, then the beta value was set to 5. Also, the bridges were assumed to be raised in 0.5' increments. The height adjustments needed for the 100 year flood range from 1' to 2' and only 3 bridges require alterations. C-15-Y is the most critical of the three which makes sense considering it suffered the most damage due to the September 2013 flood. The height adjustments needed for the 500 year flood range from 5' to 12.5' for six of the eight bridges in this study. The reason why such high adjustments are warranted for the 500 year flood is due to the high probability of failure at low inundation ratios for this type of flow. So even though the

500 year flood results in h*=0.25 for certain bridges, the high demand coupled with low capacity would require adjustments such that the 500 year flood doesn't result in inundation.

As a result of bridge scour concerns, lowering the channel elevation would not be a feasible mitigation strategy to reduce the failure probability of the superstructure. Bridge scour is currently designed based on the 500 year flood due to it being a catastrophic failure mechanism and decreasing the riprap and depth of soil around bridge foundations would be ill advised. Raising the height of the bridge deck would be the most practical solution.

Bridge substructure components take into account the numerous forces associated with flood flows. This study solely analyzed the superstructure as to quantify the risk associated with inundation. With the trend of a higher frequency of low probability flood events, the risk will only rise. Also, the uncertainty in discharge estimates increases the probability of failure. Future research should be based on the analysis of several different bridge configurations under varying velocity flows as to produce a wide array of fragilities applicable all kinds of flow conditions. Another consideration should be made to assess the fragilities of embankments and approach roadway failure due to erosion.

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
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
Appendices


Appendix A. Construction Drawings


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
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
























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




















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






















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























GENERAL NOTES	MMUS	SUMMARY OF QUANTITIES							
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EXPANSION JONF MATERIAL SYMLE MEET ANSHITIC SPECIFICATION M-213.	206 STRUCTURE EXCAVATION	UNDUE XCAVATION	CACH	800		+	-		
A COLORED STRUCTURAL CONCRETE CONTING FINISH WILL BE REQUIRED, AS SHOWN ON		ACTIVITION AND A CONTRACTOR A	5	447		351	794	INDEX OF DRAWINGS	NINGS
THE PLANS, ON EXPOSED CONCRETE SURFACES TO DNE FOOT BELOW THE GROUND LINE.	206 STRUCTURAL E	STRUCTURAL BACKFILL (CLASS 1)	5	221		193	414	B 01 General Inform	nction -
THE COLOR SHALL BE BECK, EQUIVALENT TO FEDERAL STANDARD 5958 COLOR NO.	206 STRUCTURE E	STRUCTURE BACKFILL (CLASS 2)	ζ	30	-	42	72	02	f Quentities
33446, AND IS TO BE SELECTED FROM TEST PARELS PROVIDED BY THE CONTRACTOR.	206 MECHANICAL	MECHANICAL REINFORCEMENT OF SOIL	۲.	221	-	193	414		A editory
GRADE 60 REINFORCING STEEL IS REQUIRED.	206 SHORING (AREA 5)	EX 5)	51	-			1	50	lic Information
ALL REINFORCING STEEL SHALL BE EPOXY CONTED UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.	206 SHORING (AREA 6)	EA 6)	51						Construction Loyout
(b) DENOTES NON CONTED REINFORCING STEEL	403 HCT EITUMING	HCT BITUMINOUS PAVENENT (S) (75) (PG 64-28)	-	104		ap	02.1	889	ut Detaile
THE FOLLOWING MALE GIVES THE MINIMUM LAP SPLICE LENGTH FOR EPOXY COATED RENFORMS BASE PLUCED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUBSECTION 00205. THESE SPLUCE LENGTHS SHALL FOR INFORMED ON SCOR PADE SAME REALING IN THESE PLUCE		DRILED CARSON (30 NCH)	4	5.9	a	69	70		Detoils
CENTER.		DRILLED CAISSON (42 NCH)		3	09	-	50		ecus Details
BAR SZE #4 #3 #6 #1 #8 #10 #11									e Detoits Girter Detoile
SPUCE LENSTH FOR CLASS D CONCRETE 11-50 11-60 21-20 21-27 21-50 20-20 20-20	515 WATERPROOFIL	WATERPROOFING (MEMBRANE)	15	647		169	816	8 17 Precost Pone 8 18 Precost Pone	Precast Panel Deck Forms (optional) Precast Panel Deck Forms (optional)
WHEN THE CONTRACTOR ELECTS TO SUBSTITUTE EPOCY COATED REINFORCEMENT FOR	513 BRDGE EXPA	BRDGE EXPANSION DEVICE (0-4 INCH)				80	80		rpe 10 Details
THE FOLLOWING TABLE FORS THE MANNUM LAP SPLICE SHALL BE AS DESCRIBED ABOVE.	601 CONCRETE CL	CONCRETE CLASS D (BRIDGE)		181 46	29 4	43 83	181		pe 10 Details sion Device (0-4 in
REINFORCING BARS FLACED IN ACCORDANCE WIT SUBSICITION FORM BARS PLACE LENGTHS SHALL BE INCREASED BY 25% FOR BARS SPACED AT LESS THAN 5" DN	601 STRUCTURAL	STRUCTURAL CONCRETE COATING	11		1	H	611		sion Device b Details
CENTER.	602 RENFORCING STEEL	STEEL					4440	3	in Fill
11 01 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1		RENFORCING STEEL (EPOXY COATED)	++-	54659 4607	++	4581 12550	Ħ	B 27 Deloing Mechanically	stabilized Bockfill anical/Electrical You
SPUCE LENGTH FOR CLASS D CONCRETE 1'-0' 1'-4" 1'-7" 1'-10" 2'-5" 3'-1" 3'-11" 4'-10"	606 BRIDGE RAIL TYPE 10M	TYPE 10M					IT	100	Bevations
THE ABOVE SPLUCE LEWINS SHALL BE INCREASED BY 20 PERCENT FOR 3 BAR BUNCLES AND 33 PERCENT FOR 4 BAR BUNCLES	613 2 NCH ELEC	NCH ELECTRICAL CONDUIT		773			773	858	Elevations Elevations
THE CONTRACTOR S-MIL BE RESPONSELE FOR THE STABLEY OF THE STRUCTURE	614 DECING SYSTEM	CK.	EA 1				1		
DURING CONSTRUCTION.	613 PRESTRESSED	PRESTRESSED CONCRETE BOX (DEPTH LESS THAN 32 INCHES)	SF 2	2275			2275		
F.F. = FAR FACE N.F. = NEAR FACE									
PERMANENT DECK FORMS ARE OPTIONAL (R-D)									
TOR STRUCTURE MANBIR NSTALLARION, SEE STANDARD S-614-12. Standins. Elandinos and Darensons contaned in these plane are culculated standing. Record teld. Simple: the construction stant termen all deposition dimensions in the feed before constants of allocating any material.	DES	DESIGN DATA MSFITO, SECOND EDTION LIFED WITH 1989 INTERIUS					r T		
	06510	DESIGN METHOD: LOAD AND RESISTANCE FACTOR DESIGN							
The IMPOMATIONS SHOWN ON THESE PLANES CONSERVING THE PRA JAU LOCATION OF INTERFERGINAL DUTLINES IS AND SURVANTERS TO BE ACCURRIE OF ALL INCLUSION. THE CONTRACTOR IS RESPONDED. FILL ANALONE AND DESEMUND ALL INCLUSION. THE PARE AND LOCATION OF GADERAGENUND UTLILITES AS MAY BE VERY-RAPY TO AND THE PARE	DEAD	UNE LOAD: HI-43. (DESIGN TRUCK OF TANDEN, AND DESIGN LANE LOAD) DEAD LOAD: ARSIMES 29 HEB. PER 30. TT. FOR REMORE DECK OREAR ASSIMPT 51 INS. PER 53. TT. PER REMOMBLY STELL DECK FORMS	LANE LOND) C OVERLAY TEEL DECK F	SHAS			5	CROSS REFERENCE DRAWING NUMBER IN BLANK, REFERENCE IS TO SAME SHEET	MBER WE SHEET
THERETO, THE CONTRACTOR SHALL CONTACT THE UTILITY MOTERANCY CONTRACTOR OF COLORADO AT 1-800-122-1987 AT LEAST 2 DAYS (NOT INCLUDING THE DAY OF	RENF	RENFORCED CONCRETE:					D	SECTION OR DETAIL IDENTIFICATION	N
NUTE CALIFORD PHICK TO ANY EXCAVATION OR OTHER EARTHWOORG.	9	CLASS D CONGRETE: 1' c = 4.500 psi					-		
	CR .	NEWFORCING STEEL I'N = 50,000 psi						NOITGIGASA TONIGO	
	CAISS	CASSON CONCRETE:						DUIDE DESCRIPTION	7
	9	CLASS DZ DOMORTIE I' c = 4,000 pst					Conc	Concrete State and Prestressed Box Girder, Concrete State and Prestressed Box Girder,	der.
	CBN .	RENFORCHO STEEL: $t_y = 80,000 \text{ ps}$					Over	Over Big Thompson River, on U.S. Hwy 34, 401-43" Dury to Dury Jak and an and a sure	2
	3	CLASS S CONCRETE $f_c = (SEE DETAILS)$ $f'_s = 270,000 \text{ ps}$					Bridge	Rail Type 10M.	From Stetlion 53+38/29
ile Information Sheet	visions	Coloredo Recetation of T		Ac Constructed	Tructed	č	a increase		To Station 54+63.79
User too Date: 10/09/03 hisks KMH (G-D) 7-3-01 Revised note Lise! Modification Date: 05/14/01 hisks (EC O)	ote RL0	CONTRACT STATEMENT OF LEADED OF ADDR	totion	No Revisions & /2/04	2/04	SUIS	MMARY OI	GENERAL INFORMATION	Project No./Code BR 0341-053
e Name: 012EROSHT,DWG		Phone: 303-757-9352 FAX 303-757-9197		Revised:		Designer:	A. Hordji Structure	sciure C-15-Y	13488
Tieter DADI TOU		Design and Construction				Detailer:	- Edwards		113
















C-15-C Construction Drawings





















C-15-AN Construction Drawings














C-16-DI Construction Drawings

















Appendix B. Lognormal Parameters for negative moment fragilities

Bridge	Girder location	Parameters	
	_	λ	ک
C-15-AM	Exterior	-1.029	0.794
	Interior	-0.903	0.781
C-15-AL	Exterior	-0.985	0.518
	Interior	-0.877	0.495
C-15-0	Exterior	-2.812	1.254
	Interior	-2.785	1.252
C-15-U	Exterior	4.765	2.586
	Interior	6.509	2.655
C-15-Y	Exterior	-1.393	0.427
	Interior	-1.365	0.415
C-15-C	Exterior	-3.016	2.068
	Interior	-3.003	2.083
C-15-AN	Exterior	-3.905	5.273
	Interior	-4.401	5.871
C-16-DI	Exterior	-6.141	3.161
	Interior	-5.967	3.148

Table 1. Lognormal parameters for negative moment fragilities